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This Afterword provides a summary of the key themes, issues, and controversies 
covered in each of the preceding chapters. 
 
Luc Boltanski and (Post-) Classical Sociology 
Bridget Fowler 
Readers who are not, or barely, conversant with Luc Boltanski’s key contributions 
to the contemporary social sciences will appreciate the clarity with which Bridget 
Fowler provides a valuable, wide-ranging, and critical introduction to his work in 
the opening chapter of this volume. As indicated in the title of her piece, ‘Figures 
of Descent from Classical Sociological Theory: Luc Boltanski’,1 Fowler examines 
Boltanski’s writings in relation to classical sociological thought. In so doing, she 
suggests that his critical engagement with mechanisms of ‘domination’2 is firmly 
situated ‘in the Marxist and Weberian traditions’,3 whilst his interest in ‘moral and 
symbolic representations’4 is indicative of the profound influence of ‘the Durkheimian 
tradition’5 on his intellectual development. Full of admiration, Fowler insists that 
Boltanski ‘has made an enduring contribution to sociology’.6 More specifically, 
she claims that ‘perhaps the main virtue of Boltanski’s sociology has been to 
enrich our understanding of subjective meanings at moments of indeterminacy’,7 notably 
by exploring ordinary actors’ capacity to cope with the ontological uncertainty 
that appears to be built into the construction of social reality. 
Seeking to make sense of Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory, Fowler proposes 
to distinguish three phases that are particularly relevant to the development of 
ever-more fine-grained conceptual tools in his writings: 
 
I. The initial period refers to Boltanski’s outputs published in the mid-1970s 
and early 1980s. During this stage, he occasionally co-authored articles
  
 
with his ‘intellectual father’, Pierre Bourdieu. According to Fowler, the 
writings that Boltanski produced during this phase bear the hallmarks of 
‘a critical advocate of Bourdieusian theory’8 – that is, of someone sharing 
the basic presuppositions that undergird Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist realism’.9 
II. The middle period is based on the influential studies that Boltanski published 
in the 1990s. In these works, he focused on the sociological significance of 
the emergence of multiple social universes (cités), conceived of as different 
regimes of action and justification. If Fowler is right, this post-Bourdieusian 
phase in Boltanski’s intellectual biography is founded on a socio- 
contextualist version of ‘relativist perspectivism’,10 according to which human 
beings are always embedded in spatio-temporally contingent settings and 
can justify their practices only by undertaking ‘tests’ (épreuves) in relation to 
the normative parameters underlying idiosyncratic regimes of action. 
III. The most recent period designates the phase between 1999 and the 
present – that is, the stage of his intellectual career in which, in Fowler’s 
view, ‘Boltanski has written his three greatest works’11 and in which he 
has sought to develop an outline of ‘an original critical theory’,12 not only 
by eschewing any kind of epistemic or normative relativism, but also, 
more importantly, by ‘combining sociological enquiry with political or ethical 
reflections’.13 In other words, this intellectual period is marked by Boltanski’s 
utmost scholarly maturity, permitting him not only to avoid some of the 
key limitations and shortcomings of his earlier works but also to make 




With regard to the initial period, two studies – both of which Boltanski co-
authored with Bourdieu – stand out: ‘Le fétichisme de la langue’14 (1975) 
and ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’15 (1976). 
In the first of these two works, Bourdieu and Boltanski ‘extended Marx’s 
notion of commodity fetishism to linguistic fetishism’,16 demonstrating that – 
at least since the fourteenth century, in France in particular and in the 
Francophone world in general – the phonetic mastery of the Parisian accent 
has been associated with the ability to benefit from ‘profits of distinction’17 
and obtain privileged symbolic legitimacy. To be sure, the surplus-valuation of 
‘legitimate’ accents goes hand in hand with the devaluation of ‘illegitimate’ 
forms of language use. Thus, ‘the dialects of the devalued strata’18 – such as the 
working classes, peasants, and those people speaking with regionally specific 
accents – are degraded to ‘vulgar’ forms of linguistic expression, used by those 
who are deprived of the social privilege of being able to master the semantic, 
  
 
syntactical, grammatical, phonetic, and pragmatic rules of the ‘legitimate 
language’.19 The differentiation between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ – regardless of 
whether it is socially, economically, culturally, or geographically defined – is 
essential to the reproduction of a ‘social system [that] inflicts from generation 
to generation on the underprivileged’20 the burden of discrimination and 
marginalization. 
In the second of the aforementioned two works, Bourdieu and Boltanski 
provide ‘a brilliant content analysis of key texts of social policy (“new vulgate”) 
and a sociological scrutiny of its sources’.21 In this study, as Fowler explains, the 
emergence of an ‘enlightened conservatism’22 is scrutinized, notably in terms of its 
capacity to replace the obsolete agendas underlying the dominant ideologies 
of both the war and the post-war governments in twentieth-century France. 
On this account, the elites’ ‘radical plans for “unblocking” French society’23 
was motivated not only by the aim to retain Keynesian and progressive policies 
but also, paradoxically, by the market-oriented ambition to undermine ‘the 
“dinosaurs” of French bureaucracy and trade unionism’.24 This ‘modernizing 
agenda’,25 then, anticipated contemporary notions of the ‘Middle Way’ or the 
‘Third Way’, inspired by the conviction that it is possible to find a compromise 
between state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism. 
 
II. 
During the middle period, Boltanski gradually moved away from the Bourdieusian 
framework, which he began to reject for its tendency ‘to focus too much on 
symbolic violence at the cost of a detailed phenomenology of actors’ subjective experience’.26 
One of the main limitations of Bourdieu’s approach was that ‘it was premised 
on a gulf between the everyday world of agents and the objectified scientific understanding of 
the sociologist’27 – that is, on an epistemic divide between people’s situated 
experiences and context-laden interpretations, on the one hand, and experts’ 
situating reflections and context-transcending explanations, on the other. 
The shift of emphasis from ‘the domination of “agents”’28 to the self- 
emancipation of ‘critically resourceful “actors”’29 is reflected in the paradigmatic 
move from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of 
critique’.30 A pivotal assumption underpinning the former programme can  
be described as follows: since field-embedded agents are largely incapable  
of ‘seeing through’ the veil of doxa and common sense, it is the mission of 
sociologists to uncover the underlying mechanisms of domination by which 
social relations are shaped or, to some extent, even determined. A crucial 
conviction at the heart of the latter approach can be synthesized as follows: 
since ordinary actors are equipped with reflexive resources enabling them   
to  problematize  the  legitimacy  of  normative  arrangements  and   attribute
  
 
meaning to the power-laden constitution of the social world, it is the task of 
sociologists to demonstrate that people need to be conceived of as ‘possessing 
and implementing their own critiques’31 when engaged in the construction of 
their everyday lives. 
Several of Boltanski’s key works are associated with this post-Bourdieusian 
period, but Fowler considers two of them especially important: L’amour et la 
justice comme compétences32 (1990) and De la justification : Les économies de la grandeur33 
(1991, with Laurent Thévenot). In this middle phase, Boltanski focused on 
exploring and ‘addressing the multiple worlds contemporary actors inhabit’,34 each of 
which possesses an idiosyncratic mode of functioning and specific normative 
parameters. As Fowler points out, this emphasis on the polycentric constitution 
of differentiated societies constitutes ‘less a break with than an elaboration of 
Bourdieu’s long-held concern with the divergent fields of modernity’.35 When 
examining ‘these clashing worlds (cités)’,36 Boltanski forcefully illustrates that 
‘normative questions’37 can be regarded as ‘the benchmarks of a truly social 
existence’.38 All forms of sociality are impregnated with spatio-temporally 
contingent codes of normativity. In Fowler’s view, however, since the publication 
of La souffrance à distance39 in 1993, ‘an important shift has occurred, a move 
away from cognitive relativism’,40 expressed in a rigorous rejection of ‘the anti- 
realist scepticism of certain post-1968 philosophers, notably Baudrillard’.41 
This epistemological turn paved the way for Boltanski’s most recent phase, in 
which ‘kaleidoscopic perspectivism’42 and socio-contextualist relativism have 
little, if any, place. 
 
III. 
What is remarkable about the French scholar’s most recent – but not necessarily 
final – period is that, according to Fowler, this is the phase in which Boltanski 
‘has written his three greatest works’.43 The three major studies that Fowler 
has in mind are the following: Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme44 (1999, with Ève 
Chiapello), La condition fœtale : Une sociologie de l’engendrement et de l’avortement45 
(2004), and Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes46 (2012). 
Fowler begins by reflecting on the third of these important books. As she 
states, it is in Énigmes et complots (2012) that Boltanski ‘adds to his oeuvre a 
comparative assessment of different national trajectories, focusing closely on 
Britain and France’.47 Comparing and contrasting detective fiction (by Conan 
Doyle and Georges Simenon) and spy novels (by John Buchan, Eric Ambler, 
and John Le Carré), Boltanski aims to shed light on both the cultural and the 
structural determinants that have shaped the development not only of detective 
and spy genres, but also, more generally, of the social constitution of France and 
Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century.48  What is particularly
  
 
noteworthy, in this respect, is Boltanski’s claim that ‘the rise of positivist sociology in 
the 1850s inaugurates a mode of investigation of […] social forces underlying 
and structuring perceived regularities of social action’.49 This scientifically 
justified belief in the possibility of discovering hidden laws and causal mechanisms in both 
the natural world and the social world – which was epitomized in the uncovering 
mission of methodical enquiry and pursued in ‘such disparate disciplinary 
fields as sociology and psychiatry’50 – was reflected in the radical reconceptualization 
of the human subject: once portrayed as ‘sovereign arbiters of their own fates’,51 
notably in liberal and socialist versions of Enlightenment thought, social actors 
now appeared constrained by both internal and external forces, whose existence 
largely escaped not only their consciousness but also their control. The rise 
of the nation-state and ever-more sophisticated instruments of ‘bio-power’52 
were integral components of this paradigmatic shift from ‘autonomy’ to ‘heteronomy’. 
More significantly, however, Fowler maintains that, ‘for Boltanski, the spy 
novel revolves around the epistemological problem of determining the real 
springs of action within modern capitalism’.53 In Boltanski’s own words,  
‘the spy novel exploits systematically what we have called the “hermeneutic 
contradiction”’;54 that is, it illustrates the ontological uncertainty that is built 
into the seemingly most consolidated forms of sociality. 
Fowler goes on to draw attention to the main contributions made in Boltanski’s 
La condition fœtale (2004). As she explains, not only is this study based on the 
Durkheimian proposition to conceive of social order as a moral order; but, in addition, 
it offers a ‘radical neo-Durkheimian analysis’55 that ‘enhances our empirical 
understanding of this moral order’.56 According to Fowler, Boltanski accomplishes 
this by making a case for ‘a progressive position from the point of view of feminist 
theory’57 – namely, in relation to the normative  defence  of  ‘women’s  freedom 
to have an abortion’.58 Indeed, one of the significant limitations of Durkheim’s 
analysis is that, although it endorses ‘the meritocratic  right of  actors’,59  it does 
so – essentially – in relation to men and, thus, without including women. 
As Fowler stresses in her appreciative remarks, Boltanski succeeds in making 
‘a powerful case for the moral nature of abortion itself ’,60 rather than simply 
examining the presuppositional underpinnings of the arguments made in 
opposition to it. Fowler praises Boltanski for providing an empirically informed 
and ‘invaluable phenomenology of abortion’,61 in which he illustrates how 
women who decide to have an abortion justify their choice. Indeed, it appears 
that, for many of them, it represents the ‘least bad choice’62 and – in the light 
of ‘work, kinship, and personality constraints’63 – ‘an unfortunate necessity’.64 
Similar to key themes running through recently developed conceptions of 
‘reflexive modernity’,65 according to which actors living in highly differentiated 
societies are not only allowed but also expected to make both short-term and 
long-term decisions for themselves,  Boltanski  places considerable emphasis
  
 
on the sociological significance of ‘choice’. According to Fowler, ‘Boltanski’s basic 
argument is that once a woman becomes pregnant she has a choice of whether 
or not to keep the “tumoral foetus”.’66 From this perspective, pregnancy 
confronts the woman carrying the foetus no less with the option of aborting  
it than with the option of keeping it. If, for instance, it fits into her ‘parental 
project’,67 she will metaphorically ‘adopt’68 it and, hence, project herself into 
the future with and through it, rather than without and against it. 
Although she agrees with substantial parts of the argument made in this 
study, Fowler posits that La condition fœtale suffers from significant shortcomings 
for the following reasons: 
 
(a) for failing to take into account ‘the specific patriarchal bargain that women 
make in current capitalist societies, particularly in relation to their 
occupational fields’;69 
(b) for painting a reductive picture of the situation, insofar as ‘the place where 
the sample was selected – the abortion clinic – means that it throws light 
on women who choose abortions’,70 thereby systematically excluding the 
views and practices of those categorically opposed to them; 
(c) for understating the sociological consequences arising from ‘the 
construction of “abortion” as a criminalized act in the nineteenth century’;71 
(d) for downplaying the sociological significance of structural differences – notably 
those based on class, ethnicity, and age – in shaping women’s relation to, 
attitude towards, and perception of abortion. 
 
Drawing on Kristin Luker’s Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood72 (1984), 
Fowler insists that women who enjoy the benefit of being equipped with high 
cultural and economic capital tend to conceive of motherhood as a ‘private 
discretionary choice’,73 rather than as ‘a natural role for all women’,74 whereas 
‘[w]omen who have few of these resources and limited opportunities in the 
job market want to see motherhood recognized as the most important thing  
a woman can do’.75 In short, sociological determinants – such as class, ethnicity, 
and age – are enormously powerful in influencing attitudes towards, as well as 
embodied practices in relation to, the contentious subject of abortion. 
Finally, Fowler comments on what is arguably ‘the crowning achievement of 
Boltanski’s career’:76 Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme,77 co-authored with Ève Chiapello 
(1999). In Fowler’s opinion, this study not only provides a ‘compelling critique  
of neo-liberal individualism’,78 but, furthermore, transcends the relativism 
underpinning some of Boltanski’s previous works.79 Yet, far from naïvely portraying 
the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism as an exclusively progressive – let alone universally 
empowering – historical achievement, Boltanski and Chiapello stress its ‘obscenely 
inegalitarian’80 character.  Indeed, its ‘expectations of mobility and constant tests for
  
 
selection (épreuves) create a precarious existence for ordinary people’81 to the extent 
that they cannot cope with the new systemic imperatives thrown at them and are, 
in many cases, relegated to the fringes of society. In Fowler’s eyes, the brilliance 
of Boltanski and Chiapello’s account ‘lies in its grasp of the complexity of the social 
world’.82 Rejecting the socio-ontological optimism of communication-focused – notably 
Habermasian – approaches and the socio-ontological pessimism of power-focused – 
especially Nietzschean – approaches, Boltanski and Chiapello endorse a position of 
socio-ontological realism capable of doing justice to the fact that all societies – including 
advanced capitalist ones – are permeated by the paradoxical interplay between 
altruistic and egoistic, solidary and strategic, as well as cooperative and competitive 
forces. 
What is crucial from a historical perspective, however, is to distinguish 
between three ‘spirits of capitalism’: 
 
• The ‘first spirit of capitalism’ is intimately interrelated with the ‘productive 
ethos’83 of Weber’s famous Protestant Ethic.84 Yet, instead of endorsing an 
idealist reading of this ‘spirit’, Fowler – drawing upon Christopher Hill’s 
Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England85 (1991 [1974]) – insists that 
‘it was only the conjunction between the already developing sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century urban capitalists and the new spirit’86 that was capable 
of doing away with ‘the ancient mould’87 of feudal-absolutist societies. Doing 
away with the rigid social, political, and economic structures of premodern 
formations, the constitutive component of the ‘first spirit of capitalism’ was 
productivism. 
• The ‘second spirit of capitalism’ emerged in ‘response to the crisis of 1929– 
30’.88 In essence, it was composed of a combination of Keynesianism and 
Fordism – that is, of ‘Keynesian economics and the Fordist factory division 
of labour’89 –, which can be conceived of as ‘a trade-off between the civic 
cité of Rousseau and the industrial cité of Saint-Simon’.90 The societal 
constellation generated by this historic settlement – which may be described 
in terms of a search for a ‘class compromise’ aimed at maintaining and 
legitimizing, rather than undermining or jeopardizing, capitalism – had two 
major consequences: (a) it contributed to enhancing the acquisitive power 
of the working classes as well as people’s chances to benefit from upward 
social mobility; and (b) it contributed to the rise, and increasing influence, 
of a ‘more autonomous salaried professional work, especially in the liberal 
professions, arts and sciences, and public sector’.91 
• The ‘third spirit of capitalism’, also described as the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, 
is founded on ‘the restoration of full-blown market discipline together with 
a shift to financialization’.92 This development appears to indicate ‘the re-
emergence   of   the   power   of   capital’93   at  the   expense  of  previously
  
 
established processes and structures of social integration based on cross- 
class solidarity. Similar to Bourdieu, Boltanski and Chiapello interpret ‘the 
new ideologies of the 1970s as a turn to neo-liberalism’.94 As Fowler highlights, 
however, it appears that ‘the architects of the neo-liberal spirit developed 
an innovative form of individualism, paradoxically gaining new  force 
from its adversaries’.95 More specifically, ‘the unexpected recuperation of a 
number of the critical themes of the student and artists’ revolt of May 
1968 and of the nineteenth-century modernist critique of the philistinism 
of the bourgeoisie’96 implies that the ‘third and new spirit of capitalism’ has 
succeeded in appropriating the subversive forces that sought to undermine 
its very legitimacy for its own purposes. In other words, the elastic and 
flexible nature of this ‘new spirit’ builds on capitalism’s capacity to promote 
and integrate, rather than to tolerate or marginalize, discursive processes  
of debate and critique, thereby transforming itself into a politico-economic 
system that is structurally and ideologically highly adaptable.97 In brief, the 
idea of ‘dominating by change’98 represents the Zeitgeist that lies at the heart of 
the ‘new spirit of capitalism’. 
 
As Fowler explains in the penultimate section of her chapter, Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s analytical approach is similar to Bourdieu’s method, in the sense 
that both not only draw upon but also seek to cross-fertilize ‘classical’ – that is, 
Marxian, Weberian, Durkheimian, and Simmelian – traditions of sociological 
thought. The most general consensus, in this respect, is the insight that ‘markets 
are embedded in social relations’99 and that, to use Bourdieusian terminology, 
they cannot be dissociated from the social – and, hence, historically 
contingent – conditions of production under whose influence they emerge. Thus, 
even if we come to the conclusion that, in principle, ‘the desire for ever- 
increasing money has no limits’,100 it is the task of sociologists to examine 
this seemingly ‘natural drive’ against the background of idiosyncratic – and 
constantly shifting – socio-historical backgrounds. 
In her Conclusion, Fowler turns her attention to De la critique101 (2009), one 
of Boltanski’s latest books. In various – recently published – review articles,102 
this study has been criticized on several counts, perhaps most importantly 
(a) for making numerous rather straightforward points in an unnecessarily 
complicated language, (b) for failing to make an original contribution to 
critical theory, and (c) for not succeeding in providing a systematic account of 
what is to be gained – both theoretically and practically – from reconciling 
Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ with Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of 
critique’.103 
According to Fowler, one of the most central aspects of De la critique, 
however,  is  Boltanski’s  attempt  ‘to  combine  critical  realism  with social
  
 
constructivism’104 by drawing a conceptual distinction between ‘world’ (monde) 
and ‘reality’ (réalité). The former is composed of ‘everything that is the 
case’,105 whereas the latter encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’.106 
Put differently, the world is ‘everything that happens to people’, whilst reality 
is ‘everything that is constructed by people’.107 As Fowler eloquently states, the 
sociological significance of this distinction is due to the fact that the world ‘of 
which we have experience’108 is ‘often out of kilter with ideological expectations 
and constructions’109 emerging within and through social reality. From a 
Boltanskian perspective, therefore, it is the task of social institutions – that is, 
of perhaps the most powerful ‘bodiless beings’110 regulating the performative 
constitution of  the modern world – to enable human actors to cope with    
the ontological insecurity that is built into their lives, by constructing a sense of 
existential certainty and praxeological predictability in their symbolically 
mediated encounter with reality. Boltanski’s belief in the necessity and 
viability of an ‘emancipatory politics’111 is motivated by the conviction that 
ordinary people’s critical capacity permits them not only to problematize  
the countless ‘hermeneutic contradictions’ that shape the tension-laden 
developments of  their communities and societies, but also to contribute to  
‘a better distribution of capacities for action’112 in the attempt to construct 




Luc Boltanski and Pragmatism 
Louis Quéré and Cédric Terzi 
In their methodical and in-depth contribution to this volume, Louis Quéré 
and Cédric Terzi take on a paradoxical task: they examine, assess, and criticize 
Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic’ sociology from a ‘pragmatist’ perspective. The thought- 
provoking spirit underlying this endeavour is reflected in the provocative 
title of their chapter: ‘Did You Say “Pragmatic”? Luc Boltanski’s Sociology 
from a Pragmatist Perspective’.113 As they state in the opening section of their 
analysis, ‘Luc Boltanski’s sociology has been labelled “pragmatic”, and the 
author now uses this label to characterize his research endeavour’.114 Yet, the 
two authors seek to challenge the validity of this description; indeed, they go 
as far as to assert that they ‘do not see what is truly “pragmatic” in Boltanski’s 
sociology’,115 which they perceive as ‘a continuation of the classical dualisms 
of European thought’.116 In particular, they maintain that the explanatory 
framework proposed by Boltanski ‘seems to make the same mistakes as the 
wholesale generalizations of social theory’.117 Their chapter is divided into 




In the first section, entitled ‘What Is “Pragmatic” about Boltanski’s 
Sociology?’,118 the authors explore the distinctive presuppositional nature    
of the explanatory framework developed by Bourdieu’s arguably most 
influential disciple. According to their account, Boltanski, when choosing the 
term ‘pragmatic’ to characterize his sociology, draws mainly upon linguistic 
pragmatics. The distinction between ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ is essential to 
understanding the extent to which the social construction of meaning is not 
only symbolically mediated (‘semantics’) but also contingent upon context- 
specific practices (‘pragmatics’).119 In a somewhat critical manner, Quéré and 
Terzi insist, however,  that such a meaning-focused approach – which aims  
to study social orders ‘from the perspective of action and actors’120 – is not 
unique to Boltanski’s pragmatism. What is more original about his framework, 
they claim, is his attempt to construct a ‘wide grammar of action oriented towards 
morals’,121 which is based on the following four operations: 
 
(a) the attempt to conceive of critical capacity as a moral capacity, thereby 
accounting for the fact that ordinary criticisms are, to a large extent, 
founded on ethical reasoning and a sense of justice;122 
(b) the attempt to examine social actions in terms of both normative requirements 
and structural constraints, both of which play a pivotal role in shaping 
people’s everyday practices;123 
(c) the attempt ‘to “model” both actors’ competences and the devices in which their 
actions take place’,124 notably with regard to the evaluative capacities and 
regulative supports that are necessary for the construction of culturally 
codified practices;125 
(d) the attempt to provide a conceptual framework capable of ‘connecting the 
analysis of action to an analysis of situations’.126 
 
As Quéré and Terzi point out, the key assumption underlying most so-called 
‘pragmatic’ frameworks in sociology is that action can be conceived of ‘as a 
purposive process – that is, as an ordered and self-organizing series of acts carried out in 
order to achieve a particular result’.127 On this view, social actions should be studied 
not only in terms of their context-specific ‘temporality, sequentiality, and seriality’128 
but also in terms of people’s capacity to convert their ‘reflexivity’129 into one 
of the core elements of their performative engagement with reality. What is 
perhaps even more significant about most ‘pragmatic’ conceptions of human 
actions, however,  is that they strongly ‘reject the idea that qualities, ends,   
or values can be determined without practical experience’.130 On this account, 
people’s purposive, normative, and expressive ways of relating to reality are
  
 
embedded in the everyday practices in which they find themselves immersed, 
and of which they have direct experiences, as members of a given society. 
In his ‘sociology of critique’, however, Boltanski seeks to ‘reconstruct a 
“grammar” of action’131 by insisting on the socio-ontological significance of 
both normative requirements and structural constraints, owing to the central 
role that they play in shaping the course of human practices. Drawing on 
French structural semantics, the following three – interrelated – operations 
appear to be chiefly important in Boltanski’s sociology: 
 
(a) the attempt to identify specific interactional patterns by virtue of a grammatical 
analysis of social practices; 
(b) the attempt to confirm the existence of these patterns on the basis of the 
empirical study of the ways in which ordinary actors experience reality; 
(c) the attempt to examine historical variations of these patterns and of the 
ways in which they impact upon the constitution and the development of 
individual and collective actions. 
 
Quéré  and  Terzi  interpret  the  elaboration  of  this  sociological  framework  as 
a product of Boltanski’s serious engagement with processes of qualification and 
categorization in general as well as with public denunciations of different forms of injustice in 
particular. This focus on normative issues led him to distance himself from 
Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and, subsequently, develop his own approach, 
widely known under the name ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’.132 As they 
explain, Boltanski – in his later work, notably in his On Critique: A Sociology of 
Emancipation133 (2011 [2009]) – has made a substantial effort to cross-fertilize the 
two frameworks.134 Such an endeavour is aimed at formulating a ‘metacritique’135 
by virtue of which social orders can be studied as ‘totalities’, whilst acknowledging 
that ordinary people have the capacity to engage in disputes over the tension-laden 
constitution of multiple regimes of action. More specifically, Boltanski’s interest in 
different forms of criticism is inextricably linked to his insistence on the ‘role of 
contradictions at the core of social life’,136 expressed in the ‘vulnerability of institutions’137 




In the second section, entitled ‘A Depreciation of the Domain of Practice’,139 
the authors scrutinize Boltanski’s interpretation of ‘the limitations of capacities 
of practice’.140 To be exact, they affirm that Boltanski seeks to justify his view of 
these limitations by reference to three key concerns: (a) ‘linguistic pragmatics’, (b) 
‘reflexivity’, and (c) ‘qualification’.141 
  
 
(a) Linguistic Pragmatics 
In relation to the concept of ‘linguistic pragmatics’, the distinction between ‘semantics’ 
and ‘pragmatics’ is central. The former conceives of meaning ‘as a linguistic 
relation between signs’142 and focuses on the relations between ‘signifiés’143 within 
a given language. The latter examines meaning in terms of its ‘contextual 
production’144 and the way it is constructed through the use of symbolic forms 
in spatio-temporally specific settings.145 As Quéré and Terzi remark, Boltanski 
‘takes up this distinction in a somewhat idiosyncratic fashion’.146 For him, they 
contend, semantics concerns essentially ‘the “construction of reality” in the domain of 
discourse’147 and, hence, the ‘relation between a symbol and an object, or between 
a symbol and a state of affairs in the world’.148 Given his critical engagement 
with processes of classification, he is particularly interested in ‘the establishment 
of qualifications’149 – that is, in ‘the operations which indivisibly fix the properties of 
beings and determine their worth’.150 According to Quéré and Terzi, pragmatics 
is interpreted as ‘the reverse of semantics’151 in Boltanskian thought. As such, it is 
intimately interrelated with ‘the uncertainty and contingency of situated action’.152 In 
short, ‘[w]hereas semantics is integrative and totalizing, pragmatics is about the display of 
the many interpretive operations required by action and, consequently, about a 
field in which meanings are infinitely divided’.153 
For Quéré and Terzi,  the principal problem with Boltanski’s assertion  
that his approach deserves to be described as ‘pragmatic’ is that ‘he borrows 
many of his concerns and presuppositions from semantics, especially from 
Greimas’s structural semantics and from Chomsky’s generative semantics’.154 
Consequently, he runs the risk of failing to do justice to the importance of 
‘pragmatics’ for a genuinely ‘pragmatic’ sociology of action. Moreover, it 
appears that his ‘account of objects remains partial’:155 it overemphasizes the 
role of ‘actors’ competences’156 and of ‘their cognitive and deontic endowments’;157 at 
the same time, it underemphasizes the centrality of actors’ practices and of their 
experiences. In particular, Quéré and Terzi are critical of Boltanski’s portrayal of 
‘the social world as the scene of a trial, in the course of which actors in a situation 
of uncertainty proceed to investigations, record their interpretations of what happens 
in reports, establish qualifications and submit to tests’.158 The main reason why the 
two authors reject Boltanski’s framework is that, as they see it, it suggests that 
actors’ critical competences are substantially restricted in two respects: 
 
(i) the preponderance of grammatical constraints in realms of social 
interaction ‘is unfavourable to the development of critique’;159 and 
(ii) in the Boltanskian universe of normative tests, one gets the impression that 
actors can ‘hardly grasp the devices and test the formats through which the 
worth and value of persons and things are defined’.160 
  
 
In brief, for Quéré and Terzi, there is little doubt that, in essence, ‘this 
approach is more structuralist than pragmatist’161 and that it fails to take seriously the 
accomplishments of both classical and contemporary forms of pragmatism, 
which not only ‘attribute critical competences to people’162 but, furthermore, 
avoid falling into the pitfalls of ‘grammaticalist’ forms of social determinism. 
Put differently, according to Quéré and Terzi, there is too much structuralism and 
too little pragmatism in Boltanski’s sociology. 
(b) Reflexivity 
In relation to the concept of ‘reflexivity’, Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski of 
endorsing an intellectualist position. As they state, Boltanski differentiates between 
two registers of analysis: ‘the practical’ and ‘the metapragmatic’.163 In the first 
register, ‘reflexivity is low and tolerance prevails’.164 At this level, there is not much 
room for critique, as it is characterized by general acceptance, tacit agreement, 
and de facto taken-for-grantedness, implying that contradictions remain largely 
unnoticed. In the second register, ‘reflexivity is high’,165 meaning that, in principle, 
everything is open to questioning and scrutiny. At this level, critique is vital, 
as ‘the attention of participants shifts from the task to be performed to the 
question of how it is appropriate to characterize what is happening’.166 
Boltanski, then, ‘links the increase of reflexivity in action to dispute or controversy’.167 
On this view, reflexive processes are based on ‘a transition from an implicit 
qualification of events, situations, objects, and persons to an explicit one through 
an open confrontation’.168 As far as Quéré and Terzi are concerned, this account is 
problematic in that it gives the misleading impression that an intensification of 
reflexivity is possible only in terms of a ‘disconnection’169 between the framing of 
a judgement of a situation and the situation itself. Yet, as the two commentators 
insist, from a genuinely pragmatist perspective, ‘there can be no switch of such 
kind: we cannot stop acting, but there are many ways of acting’.170 In opposition 
to Boltanski’s account, they posit that ‘passing from the “practical register” to the 
“metapragmatic register” looks more like a change in attitude in a continuous course of 
action, in which a normative practice takes over from an ordinary one’.171 Indeed, 
it seems that, in everyday life, these attitude-specific transitions are common, 
rather than exceptional, forming an integral part of ‘situated practical activities’.172 
If this is true, then ‘Boltanski’s distinction between “pragmatic registers” and 
“metapragmatic registers” is unsatisfactory’.173 For what he presents – or, to be 
precise, misrepresents – ‘as an increase in the level of reflexivity is, rather, a change in 
attitude’174 – that is, a transformation in an actor’s way of relating to reality whilst 
immersed in an incessant stream of actions. Quéré and Terzi put this as follows: 
One evidence for the reflexive character of mundane action is the fact that every 
practical  activity  directs  and  corrects  itself  from  within  its  accomplishment –
  
 
through adjusting itself to transformations of its object or to the changes 
occurring both in agent and in circumstances, through evaluating a priori and  
a posteriori the results and consequences of movements and gestures, through 
measuring what has been done in the light of what should have been done, or 
what is being done in the light of what is aimed for, and so on and so forth.175 
 
Far from being reducible to a mechanical switching-back-and-forth between 
‘the practical register’ and ‘the metapragmatic register’, social life constitutes 
a continuous flow of interconnected actions, which are shaped and modified 
from within, rather than from without, their spatio-temporally situated sphere 
of performative unfolding. 
 
(c) Qualification 
In relation to the concept of ‘qualification’, Quéré and Terzi remark not only 
that it lies at the heart of Boltanski’s sociology of everyday tests (épreuves), but 
also that, within his framework, it is to be understood ‘in reference to juridical 
procedures’.176 In essence, the process of qualification represents ‘an authorizing 
act’,177 which fulfils three key functions: 
 
(i) it establishes typological definitions of objects and of its predicates; 
(ii) it determines their value in relation to other objects; 
(iii) it provides implicit or explicit codes of normativity, stipulating what ought 
to be done and what ought not to be done.178 
 
According to Quéré and Terzi’s perspective, 
 
Boltanski’s modelling is problematic because he takes into consideration only 
the semantic function of legal qualifications – that is, without mentioning their 
pragmatic dimension.179 
 
More specifically, they maintain that ‘qualifications imply less ontological import 
than Boltanski appears to suggest’.180 In their eyes, he ‘confines the “qualification 
of beings” in the merely metapragmatic register, as he downgrades the reflexive component of 
practices’.181 As illustrated by John Dewey, however, qualification processes form 
an integral component of all practical judgements, including those resting on 
‘an intuitive or emotional grasp both of the unique quality of a situation and of 
the qualities of things in that situation’.182 Quéré and Terzi go as far as to affirm 
that ‘Boltanski’s action-based approach appears as a regression with reference to 
Bourdieu’s analysis of practice’.183 In their view, the latter provides an astute 
account of the logic of bodily knowledge – including ‘practical reflection’ and
  
 
‘practical reasoning’ – in terms of a person’s ‘habitus’, whereas the former offers 
little more than an intellectualist explanation of corporeal practices. 
 
In the end, even if Boltanski had good reasons to distance himself from Bourdieu, 
he left aside Bourdieu’s ‘logic of practice’ approach; consequently, he was led to 
adopt the intellectualist depreciation of the domain of practice.184 
 
As Quéré and Terzi see it, however, actors are always already required to cope 
with the practical imperatives to which they are exposed when finding themselves 
immersed in particular social situations. Consequently, they are – although, 
admittedly, to varying degrees – used to facing ‘uncertainty, contingency, and 
unpredictability of circumstances and consequences, of acts and events, and the 
risks they imply’.185 Given this inseparable relationship between the experiential and the 
epistemic dimensions of social practices, pragmatism has always sought to challenge the 
scholastic ‘depreciation of practice’,186 which fails to account for the fact that, as 
Charles Taylor puts it, ‘[r]ather than representations being the primary locus of understanding, 
they are only islands in the sea of our unformulated practical grasp on the world’.187 
In their analysis, Quéré and Terzi draw on a central conviction articulated  
by the later Wittgenstein: insofar as language games are played within spatio- 
temporally specific life forms, the  emergence  of  grammatical  rules  cannot 
be dissociated from the unfolding of social practices. With this contextualist 
persuasion in mind, Quéré and Terzi insist that, from a pragmatist perspective, 
‘one cannot agree with an approach asserting that the normative frameworks 
required for ordering social life cannot be produced and maintained through 
practices’.188 What is, for them, utterly unsatisfying about Boltanski’s allegedly 
‘pragmatic’ account is that, upon reflection, it turns out to be ‘a very 
“classical” – or, if one prefers, “mainstream”  – theory of  action’,189  culpable 
of ‘belittling the domain of practice’.190 On this interpretation, is seems that,  
not dissimilar to methodological-individualist models, it ‘remains focused on the 
actors’,191 instead of engaging with the realm of performances in a far broader 
sense. Owing to this significant shortcoming, ‘it is not interested in how processes 
of action are organized and directed from within their accomplishment’;192 rather, 
it is limited to the unsatisfactorily abstract – that is, ‘metapragmatic’ – analysis 
of performative processes, without doing justice to the fact that these are always 
already inhabited by the practical power of reflexivity. 
 
III. 
In the third section, entitled  ‘A  Hobbesian  Anthropology  as  a  Background 
for “Pragmatic Sociology”?’,193 Quéré and Terzi – in line with arguments put 
forward by Joan Stavo-Debauge194 as well as by Laurence Kaufmann195 – defend
  
 
the claim that Boltanski’s theory of critique is founded on an atomistic conception 
of the human condition. To be exact, Boltanski’s sociology is based on a Hobbesian 
anthropology, since it aims – in the author’s own words – ‘to pose the question of 
the consistency of the social world from an original position where a radical uncertainty 
prevails’.196 Inevitably, as Quéré and Terzi  remark,  ‘[h]is  conception  of  such 
an original position gives primacy to individuals needing to be acculturated and 
socialized’.197 According to this Hobbesian account, we need to recognize not 
only that individuals are driven by ‘differing impulses, desires, and interests’198 
and that, as a consequence, they develop particular worldviews representing their 
position in relation to others, but, in addition, that – owing to the ontological 
‘primacy of individuals’199 – ‘the social world is derived and constructed’.200 
Thus, instead of making a case for methodological holism, inspired by the belief 
in the existential preponderance of ‘the social’, Boltanski appears to embrace a 
position of methodological individualism, expressed in the insistence on the ontological 
prevalence of the – relatively independent and seemingly self-sufficient – ‘human 
actor’. Grappling with the problems arising from this Hobbesian presupposition, 
Quéré and Terzi reflect on the following sociological issues. 
 
(a) The Semantic Nature of Institutions 
One of the most fundamental Hobbesian – and, arguably, Boltanskian – 
questions can be formulated as follows: If the existence of individuals enjoys 
ontological primacy over the existence of society and if – owing to their multitude of 
impulses, desires, and interests, as well as to their plurality of interpretations, opinions, and 
worldviews – there is no consensus inherent in, or quasi-naturally emerging from, the 
construction of social life, how is it possible to avoid an outbreak of violence and, indeed, of 
‘the war of all against all’? As Quéré and Terzi point out, ‘Boltanski’s 
response is a variation of Hobbes’s: only submission to institutional authority can 
reduce radical uncertainty, because institutions are in charge of ordering what 
reality is, decreeing what has worth, and prescribing what must be done’.201 
For Boltanski, ‘[i]nstitutional authority is a “bodiless” one’.202 Yet, although 
‘institutions provide for a semantic and deontic vouchsafing’,203 they are 
always in danger of being undermined. To the extent that ‘an institutionally 
constructed, stabilized, and totalized reality remains irretrievably fragile’,204 
the most consolidated social constellations are subject to the possibility of 
their deconstruction and transformation. 
Thus, similar to John Searle’s conception of social constructionism, 
Boltanski insists that ‘[r]eality is radically uncertain’.205 Whilst ‘institutional 
devices take on the semantic function of reducing the gaps between “world” 
and “reality”’,206 the attempt to take control of the ‘world’ in its entirety can 
never be fully accomplished, since ‘“reality” remains irremediably fragile and 
exposed to the risk of division’.207  Given his ‘nominalist bias’208 derived from
  
 
linguistic semantics, Boltanski is eager to stress that one of the key functions 
of institutions is to guarantee the symbolically mediated ‘maintenance of 
reality’.209 As Quéré and Terzi contend, however, ‘Boltanski’s Hobbesian 
anthropology rules out the existence of primordial agreement between 
members of a society’.210 In their eyes, this atomistic anthropology is deeply 
problematic for the following reason: 
 
The agreement Boltanski rules out is a semantic, not a pragmatic, one. He objects – 
and rightly so – to the existence of an agreement of beliefs, of a convergence  
of opinions and representations, or of a harmony of interpretations. Yet, he 
ignores a possible agreement in activities that would differ from the agreement 
of opinions or points of view.211 
 
In other words, Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski not only of effectively 
endorsing a Hobbesian anthropology but also of advocating a semanticist, rather 
than pragmatist, conception of agreement. According to this allegation, his 
approach fails to account for actors’ capacity to establish pre-cultural and pre- 
semantic – that is, pre-institutional – forms of coexistential arrangements, allowing 
for the relative predictability of their peaceful practices. What is even more 
significant, however, is the following irony: owing to the emphasis it places on 
the empowering – notably, critical and moral – capacities of ordinary actors, 
Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ tends to be conceived of as a form of 
socio-ontological optimism; by contrast, due to its insistence on the potentially 
disempowering – notably structural – effects of social domination, Bourdieu’s 
‘critical sociology’ tends to be interpreted as a form of socio-ontological pessimism.212 
As elucidated above, Quéré and Terzi challenge this assessment by claiming 
that the Hobbesian spirit underlying Boltanski’s understanding of ‘the social’ – 
especially in his later work213 – leaves little, if any, room for an idealist conception 
of the human condition in general and of human lifeworlds in particular. 
 
(b) Do Desires and Points of View Precede Society? 
In opposition to Boltanski’s – arguably Hobbesian – conception of pre- 
institutional life, which is characterized by radical uncertainty and constant 
fear sparked by the potential outbreak of violence, Quéré and Terzi defend 
the notion that, ‘[f]rom a pragmatist point of view, desires and interests, opinions 
and points of view are always already socially saturated’214 for the following reasons: 
 
(i) they cannot be abstracted from the spatio-temporally specific contexts in 
which they emerge, and they cannot be reduced to ahistorical forces 
driving quasi-disembodied entities; 
  
 
(ii) given that they are shaped by the concrete conditions of particular 
environments, they cannot be dissociated from the norms, conventions, and 
customs established in a given socio-historical setting; 
(iii) they are influenced, if not determined, by situations, which can be 
perceived as positive or negative, appropriate or inappropriate, appealing 
or repellent, illustrating the interpretive contingency permeating people’s 
interactions with reality.215 
 
Quoting Vincent Descombes, Quéré and Terzi argue that ‘the social is 
present in the mind of everybody’,216 reflecting a relationalist conception of 
human cognition, to which Boltanski’s ‘intellectual father’, Bourdieu, would 
have happily subscribed. As Quéré and Terzi affirm, however, his disciple’s 
approach is flawed due to the Hobbesian presuppositions on which it is 
based. 
 
A Hobbesian anthropology cannot conceive of the antecedence of ‘objective 
mind’ over the ‘subjective’ one. At most, it can consider a weak form of mediation 
by others in the vouchsafing of reality.217 
 
From a genuinely pragmatist angle, on the other hand, all aspects of the human 
condition – including desires and points of view – are profoundly social. 
 
(c) Radical Uncertainty 
As the two commentators explain, Boltanski borrows not only the concept of 
‘radical uncertainty’ but also the distinction between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ from 
Frank H. Knight.218 Whereas ‘uncertainty’ cannot be calculated, ‘risk’ can be 
measured insofar as it constitutes a probabilistic category.219 More  importantly, 
for Boltanski’s concerns, the uncertainty that is built into social life ‘is expressed in 
disputes and conflicts of interpretation as a constant worry about “what is” and 
“what matters”’.220 By no means do Quéré and Terzi deny the socio-ontological 
centrality of the uncertainty that appears to be inherent in all human life forms. 
They do argue, however, that Boltanski’s conception of ‘radical uncertainty’ is 
misleading: 
 
Uncertainty is never utter, because we are accustomed and adjusted to behavioural 
regularities of things, of people, and of ‘social settings’, even though we know 
we cannot accurately anticipate their conduct in such and such a situation. If 
uncertainty were radical, then indeterminacy would prevail and action would be impossible. We 
could not act or think if we were deprived of certainties and doubted everything. And one must 
consider many things to be certain in order to doubt.221 
  
 
From this perspective, people’s fundamental existential certainties possess an 
objective, rather than a merely subjective, character. For, as Quéré and Terzi 
emphasize, they ‘do not belong to the realm of thought or representation,  
but they are ways of acting’;222 that is, they are deeply ingrained in people’s 
everyday performances. On this account, ‘[o]bjective certainty is a kind of 
Ur-Trust, a know-how, the lack of which would prevent us from behaving in 
a meaningful way’.223 Owing to its largely implicit, intuitive, and unreflexive 
constitution, objective certainty can be described as ‘a practical attitude that 
appears as complete trust in the accomplishment of actions’224 and, hence, in 
the possibility of realizing purposive, normative, and expressive performances 
with the aim of contributing to the meaningful construction of social life. 
 
(d) The Lack of Common Sense 
Quéré and Terzi have similar reservations about Boltanski’s understanding  
of common sense. Drawing on the work of the later Wittgenstein, the two 
commentators suggest that we cannot overemphasize the fact that ‘agreement 
between humans is an agreement embedded in a form of life’.225 If we take this socio- 
existentialist insight seriously,  then we need to recognize that agreement,  
far from being reducible to a mere ‘convergence of beliefs or opinions’226 
held by independent or even free-floating individuals, is ‘situated at a much 
deeper level’227 than at the symbolic level of discursive encounters between 
semantically equipped entities. From this perspective, ‘[c]ommon sense is an 
agreement in action’228 – that is, a form of tacit consensus operating at the socio-existential 
level of everyday performances. To the extent that ‘[a]greement in action consists 
of reacting in the same way, doing the same things’,229 it presupposes the 
possibility of creating culture, shared by interconnected and interdependent 
subjects capable of relating to the world in normatively codified modes of 
mental and physical functioning. In this sense, both the possibility of reaching 
agreements and the possibility of generating culture are fundamental to the 
unfolding of social practices based on mutual recognition and embedded in 
collectively sustained, albeit potentially shifting, horizons of meaning: 
 
Agreement in a form of life underpins even the expression of the most subjective opinions 
and points of view, for a speech act can be regarded as the expression of an opinion 
only if it takes place in a form of common life in which one can (or is expected to) 
express something recognized as one’s opinion.230 
 
In short, agreements – especially those attained by virtue of common sense – are 
symptomatic of the ineluctable preponderance of ‘the social’ permeating human 
life forms.   Yet, contrary to Boltanski’s claim that common sense can be regarded as
  
 
‘an obstacle to the sociology of critical operations’,231 Quéré and Terzi maintain that 
the former constitutes a precondition for the emergence of the latter. On this 
account, common sense is a requirement for, rather than an impediment to, critical operations, 
irrespective of whether they are undertaken by sociologists or by ordinary actors. Put differently, 
subjects capable of action, reflection, and justification can criticize only by 
drawing on socio-historically contingent background assumptions. 
 
(e) Is Reality a Construction? 
Quéré and Terzi accuse Boltanski of embracing ‘too easily fashionable 
discourses about the “social construction of reality”’.232 In their mind, he is 
guilty of endorsing 
 
the well-known ‘myth of the given’, considering the world as a senseless fact, on which 
meanings are imposed through the semantic work of symbolization, mainly by 
selecting, defining, conceptualizing, categorizing, or setting the reference of words.233 
 
On this view, we are confronted with the binary separation between ‘world’ 
(monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité): the former constitutes a meaningless conglomerate 
of physically structured existence; the latter represents a meaningful domain of 
symbolically organized systems of action, perception, and interpretation, which 
are projected upon the world in order to work upon, relate to, and make sense  
of it. 
According to Quéré and Terzi, however, ‘Boltanski’s nominalist and semanticist 
approach excludes practical experiences and activities from our understanding of relationships, 
interactions, and properties of things (except in the form of “reality testing”)’.234 Put 
differently, they accuse him of putting forward a misleadingly abstract notion 
of social practices performed by quasi-disembodied actors. ‘To escape such a 
restrictive approach’, they go on to argue, 
 
one should consider ‘reality’ not as a matter of statements or discourses, but as 
primarily related to our practical participation in the world – that is, to the explorations 
and investigations in which we engage in order to deal with it.235 
 
From this perspective, what is fundamental to the construction of reality is the 
constant unfolding of human practices. In Quéré and Terzi’s eyes, there is no 
doubt that 
 
it is a mistake both to consider that we grasp the world, first and foremost, by 
relying on our description and categorization of things and to assert that we 
totally rely on institutional definitions of the ‘whatness of what is’.236 
  
 
For the constitutive element permeating the construction of reality are not 
names (nominalism), symbols (semanticism), or institutions (institutionalism), but 
human practices (pragmatism). 
 
(f) Social Order, Inherent Contradictions, and Institutions 
Quéré and Terzi are aware of the centrality of Boltanski’s twofold assertion 
that ‘institutions [are] both necessary for and fragile within social life’.237 They 
are necessary because they allow for the establishment of ‘a minimum 
semantic agreement’,238 without which the consolidation of social order 
would be impossible. At the same time, they are fragile because they are 
‘mere fictions’239 and, as such, they can be as easily constructed as they can 
be deconstructed and reconstructed, thereby confirming the radical contingency 
of  social life. Chiefly important for Boltanski’s analysis, in this regard, is  
his claim that ‘any social order contains contradictions – that is, “inherent 
contradictions”’.240 To be exact, from a Boltanskian standpoint, we are 
confronted with two main ‘hermeneutic contradictions’: the first one stems from 
a tension internal to institutions, and the second one emanates from a tension 
between semantics and pragmatics. 
The  first  ‘hermeneutic  contradiction’ is  due  to the tension between two 
praxeological options: institutions can either ‘resign their semantic function’241 
of defining the parameters and boundaries of a  particular  ensemble  of 
social arrangements, thereby contributing to the symbolic and material 
destabilization of reality, or ‘rely fully on spokespersons’,242 thereby fulfilling 
their regulative role of delineating a specific set of principles allowing for 
normatively codified interactions, but also – given their prescriptive character – 
raise doubts about their trustworthiness. 
The second ‘hermeneutic contradiction’ is due to the tension between semantics 
and pragmatics – that is, between the semantic function of bodiless institutions 
and the practices of actors.243 The former is crucial to the task of establishing 
‘the whatness of what is’ and, hence, to the definition of reality; the latter is 
vital to actors’ symbolically mediated performances and, thus, to their interaction 
with reality. In fact, ‘institutions irremediably face the problem of being 
unable to cope with “the contingency and uncertainty inherent in situations”’.244 For 
Boltanski, this is – if one can put it in these terms – critique’s chance; that is, it is an 
opportunity for the emergence of emancipatory processes. For ‘[t]his tension 
between semantics and pragmatics opens a space for critique as “a relativization of 
institutional qualifications”’.245 Although Quéré and Terzi are willing to recognize 
that ‘Boltanski rightly insists on the semantic function of institutions’,246 they argue that 
‘his nominalist conception of this function is not satisfactory’.247 The main reason for 
this critical assessment is that, according to  the  two commentators, ‘critique is an
  
 
inherent aspect of institutions when they are – implicitly or explicitly – created’.248 
More specifically, they express their reservations, concerning this issue, as 
follows: 
 
[Institutions] are able to be challenged by any alternative that can prove more 
accurate, more efficient, or more legitimate. Institutions are especially open to 
critique when their effective functioning deviates from their constitutive normative 
ideals.249 
 
In other words, instead of demonizing institutions as sources of arbitrary 
symbolic and material power, we should recognize their  –  at  least  potential 
– openness to both internal and external forms of criticism and, hence, their 
ability to adjust in accordance with discursively channelled normative 
demands if and where their transformation is deemed necessary by those 




In the fourth section, entitled ‘From “Sociology of Critique” Back to 
“Critical Sociology”’,251 Quéré and Terzi reflect on the controversial 
relationship between Boltanski’s and  Bourdieu’s  respective  contributions 
to the contemporary humanities and social sciences. As Quéré and Terzi 
stress, Boltanski – that is, the ‘later’ Boltanski – and Bourdieu share one   
key assumption: ‘domination systems are socially accepted because they 
mask the power and constraints they entail and because dominated actors 
misunderstand domination’s actual operating modes’.252 At the same time, 
they point out that Boltanski rejects various aspects of Bourdieu’s approach, 
notably the following: 
 
his overarching perspective; the way he excessively extends the notions of 
domination and violence; his appeal to ‘the unconscious’ to explain social actors’ 
blindness to domination; his systematic underestimation of actors’ critical abilities; 
his endorsement of the long-standing scheme of the incorporation of dominant 
norms; his focus on dispositions and structures disregarding actual situations; his 
ignorance of social activities through which social structures are achieved (Boltanski 
specifically mentions state activities, including categorization, classification, 
measurements, etc.); his conception of sociologists as omniscient beings […]; his 
correlative strong distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’; 
and, finally, his incapacity to ‘fully account for action’ and, especially, for disputes and 
blurred situations […].253 
  
 
Summarizing these misgivings in a systematic fashion, we can distinguish the 
following levels of criticism levelled against Bourdieu’s approach: 
 
(1) sociological holism 
(overarching perspective) 
 
(2) sociological fatalism 
(domination and violence) 
 
(3) sociological determinism 
(‘the unconscious’) 
 
(4) sociological paternalism 
(underestimation of actors’ critical abilities) 
 
(5) sociological reproductionism 
(longstanding scheme of the incorporation of dominant norms) 
 
(6) sociological (dis-) positionalism 
(focus on dispositions and structures) 
 
(7) sociological scientism 
(sociologists as omniscient beings) 
 
(8) sociological functionalism 
(‘ordinary knowledge’ vs. ‘scientific knowledge’) 
 
(9) sociological structuralism 
(incapacity to account for action) 
 
(10) sociological reductionism 
(incapacity to account for disputes and blurred situations) 
 
Quéré and Terzi do not deny that the above-mentioned issues are problematic 
aspects of Bourdieu’s approach. They insist, however, that Boltanski’s 
conception of ‘metacritique’ is essentially useless.254 In his attempt to make  
a case for the formulation of a ‘metacritique’, Boltanski draws not only upon 
Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ but also upon the tradition of ‘critical theory’ 
associated with the works of the Frankfurt School. According to both 
intellectual currents, the ‘unveiling’ or ‘uncovering’ of underlying mechanisms of power 
and domination  by  critical social scientists  is necessary, because ordinary actors lack the
  
 
conceptual and methodological tools to identify, let alone understand, the structural forces  by 
which fundamental aspects of their lives are shaped or, to some extent, even determined. Yet, 
Quéré and Terzi warn of the danger involved in proclaiming ‘glittering 
generalities’255 based on sweeping statements about the nature of ‘general 
forces’256 governing the development of the social world. Referring to Dewey,257 
they go as far as to assert that – far from being restricted to experts in the social 
sciences – ‘different actors can lead social inquiries’258 and thereby contribute 
to an insightful understanding of reality.259 
Suspicious of elitist and scholastic ways of engaging – or, rather, not 
engaging – with key elements of human existence, Quéré and Terzi emphasize 
that, from their perspective, it is as ‘unrealistic to relate social mobilizations 
to mere intellectual convictions about reality gained by the study of real 
situations’260 as it is erroneous to underestimate the socio-ontological value 
of emotions, imagination, creativity, subjectivity, and experience in and for 
people’s everyday lives. On this account, then, it is the task of both critical 
sociologists and critical social actors – that is, of both experts and laypersons – to 
contribute to ‘the day-to-day analysis and treatment of problems’261 as well 
as to discursive processes ‘determining purposes to be pursued and values to 
be preserved in a given society’.262 Thus, rather than subscribing to ‘overall 
generalizations’263 and announcing holistic  truisms  about  the  functioning 
of society, we should concede that – as Dewey once eloquently stated – ‘the 
dependence of ends upon means is such that the only ultimate result is the 
result that is attained today, tomorrow, the next day, and day after day, in the 
succession of years and generations’.264 In brief, spatio-temporal specificity is 
irreducible to socio-structural generality, just as the in-depth and empirical 
engagement with local particularities undermines the validity of the quest for 
epistemic universality. 
More significantly, however, Quéré and Terzi contend that a genuinely 
pragmatist ‘conception of inquiry makes pointless the foundation of critique on 
the mere “hermeneutic contradiction”’.265 In fact, in their eyes, such a foundation 
‘proves to be nothing but the Achilles’ heel of the authoritarian method, to which 
Boltanski attaches great importance and which is actually privileged by most 
institutions’.266 For the two commentators, then, there is no substantial reason 
why both individual and collective actors – including those functioning within 
‘bodiless entities’ such as institutions – should not have the capacity to reject 
‘the authoritarian method’267 and endorse an emancipatory ‘method of 
inquiry’.268 They insist that such a pragmatist understanding of reflection and 
investigation contributes to ‘revealing the relativity and the contingency of reality 
“constructed” by institutions and opening a space for critique’269 – that is, a space 
for critique both within and beyond, rather than outside and against, institutions. 
Arguably, such an approach obliges us to  discard  any  attempt  to  demonize institutions by
  
 
reducing them to mere vehicles of social domination. As George Herbert Mead – one of 
the founding fathers of American pragmatism – provocatively declared, 
 
[t]here is no necessary or inevitable reason why social institutions should be 
oppressive or rigidly conservative, or why they should not rather be, as many 
are, flexible and progressive, fostering individuality rather than discouraging it.270 
 
Summary 
The principal objective of Quéré and Terzi’s chapter has been to demonstrate 
that, ironically, Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic’ approach is incompatible with key 
aspects of pragmatist thought, mainly due to his failure to overcome the 
pitfalls arising from his ‘intellectualist and asocial anthropology’271 as well as 
from his ‘authoritarian methodology’.272 Whatever one makes of Quéré and 
Terzi’s substantial accusations, there is little doubt that their analysis illustrates 
that, for numerous commentators, Boltanski’s proposal for a ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ raises more questions than it offers assurances. As his 
advocates will indicate in response to this critical observation, however, the 
whole point of an emancipatory sociology is to raise open questions, rather 
than to provide ultimate answers. Instead of aiming to build stifling systems 
of epistemic recipes and definitive solutions, we should recognize that critical 
capacity constitutes, above all, a normative competence permitting us to   
call different aspects of reality into question, thereby creating a discursively 
assembled space of open reflection. 
 
Tanja Bogusz 
The title of Tanja Bogusz’s chapter – ‘Why (Not) Pragmatism?’273 – sums up the 
purpose of her discussion, which consists in responding to the following question: 
To what extent is it justified to characterize Boltanski’s research programme as a 
‘pragmatist’ endeavour? Put differently: ‘Is Luc Boltanski a pragmatist thinker?’274 At 
first glance, it appears that the label ‘pragmatic’ plays a pivotal role in permitting 
Boltanski to distinguish his approach, the ‘sociology of critique’, from that 
developed by Bourdieu, generally known as ‘critical sociology’ or, in Anglophone 
circles, as ‘reflexive sociology’.275 Interestingly, Boltanski and his followers at the 
Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale (GSPM) have always tended to avoid 
any allusions, let alone explicit references, to the works of classical American 
pragmatists – notably, to the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, 
John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Whilst the significance of this omission 
has been acknowledged by some members of the GSPM,276 it does not appear 
to represent a major problem for Boltanski. Yet, given that he is now widely
  
 
regarded ‘as one of the founders of French neo-pragmatism’,277 the fact that 
Boltanski’s ‘references to this philosophy of knowledge and action are scattered 
and appear anything but systematic’278 is somewhat surprising. This should be 
reason enough to consider Bogusz’s analysis a long-needed contribution to our 
understanding of Boltanski’s relation to pragmatism in general and to neo- 
pragmatism in particular. 
Bogusz observes that, similar to Bourdieu, Boltanski has sought to overcome 
the counterproductive divisions between rival intellectual traditions by 
combining their respective insights in his own work. Constitutive elements of this 
undertaking are ‘structuralist hermeneutics, symmetrical analysis, Deleuzean 
thought, practical phenomenology, anthropological empiricism, and, finally, 
critical theory’.279 Even though, according to Bogusz, various ‘postmodern’280 
traces can be found in Boltanski’s oeuvre, he is not interested in endorsing an 
‘abysmal regression into pure relativism’.281 Rather, in his attempt to provide  
a systematic account not only of the profound structural transformations of 
capitalism in recent decades282 but also of the role of ‘critical capacity’ in the 
development of human societies,283 he ‘has opened up new avenues of enquiry 
and challenged the historical legacy of critical theory’284 as well as of ‘critical 
sociology’. On this view, ‘Boltanski’s merit […] lies exactly in the fact that his 
sociology has enlarged critical theory by making actors part of it’.285 In other words, he 
has succeeded in demonstrating that critical capacity – far from being reducible 
to a professional privilege of intellectuals, experts, and scientists – constitutes 
an empowering competence with which, in principle, every ordinary subject 
capable of action, reflection, and justification is equipped. 
Throughout her chapter, Bogusz stresses that ‘[t]he critique of the fixing of 
concepts, rich in nouns but poor in data’,286 is central not only to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ and to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, both of which are 
committed to the empirical study of social reality, but also to Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and Actor–Network Theory (ANT), both of which have made major 
contributions to the socio-historical understanding of ‘knowledge production 
practices’.287 What all of these approaches  share with classical pragmatism, 
notably with the work  of John Dewey,288 is the assumption that ‘knowledge [is] a 
matter of practice, a matter of “doing”’.289 Exploring the significance of this 
pragmatist presupposition for assessing the contributions of Boltanski’s 
sociology, Bogusz focuses on three key dimensions: (I) the conceptual dealing with 
uncertainty, (II) the constitutive character of critique in society, and (III) the relationship 
between description and normativity.290 
 
I. 
In relation to the first dimension, the conceptual dealing with uncertainty, Bogusz 
makes a number of important observations. As she points out, ‘[t]he concern
  
 
with uncertainty is a main feature of both classical pragmatism and the 
sociology of Luc Boltanski’.291 In opposition to ‘mainstream philosophy’292 and 
‘abstract academicism’,293 the pragmatist insistence upon the fact that there is 
‘a close relation between knowledge and reality’294 is vital to recognizing that 
the artificial ‘separation between theory and practice’295 is counterproductive, 
preventing us from facing up to the intimate link between cognition and 
action. Therefore, ‘the isolation and marginalization of practice’296 – arguably, 
‘the fatal error of rationalism’297 in its traditional forms – has no place in 
pragmatist thought. 
One of the principal pragmatist challenges, then, consists in developing 
ways of ‘coping with uncertainty’.298 Boltanski and Thévenot’s concern with 
the role of ‘trials’ or ‘tests’ (épreuves) – not only in scientific enquiries but also in 
everyday life – is essential to the capacity of developing an existential, rather 
than simply a professional, ‘ethos of contingency’.299 As Bogusz remarks, this open 
attitude towards the experience of uncertainty is no less important to STS and 
ANT than it is to the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. To be sure, this is not 
to deny the structuring influence of underlying social ‘grammars’,300 notably 
those shaped by ‘the power of institutions’.301 This is to accept, however, that 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘detailed analysis of the varieties of practices and 
test formats’302 demonstrates that, even in the seemingly most consolidated 
realms of interaction, human subjects cannot escape ‘the radical uncertainty 
of social arrangements’.303 Indeed, to the extent that ‘critique functions as a 
driving motor for social transformation’,304 people’s reflexive capacity – that 
is, their ability to call the legitimacy of different aspects of their existence into 
question – constitutes an individually and collectively empowering resource 
that can be mobilized in order to contribute to subverting mechanisms of 
domination and, at the same time, creating processes of emancipation. 
 
II. 
In relation to the second dimension, the constitutive character of critique in society, 
Bogusz draws an analytical comparison between classical American and 
contemporary French pragmatism: ‘[w]hat for Dewey is the experimental 
character of democracy as a practice is the constitutive character of critique in 
capitalism for Boltanski’.305 Put differently, democratic and critical practices 
are inextricably linked. In Boltanski’s writings, the concept of ‘critique’ is 
used as a multidimensional category, examined within a ‘genealogical’,306 
‘symmetrical’,307 ‘political’,308 and ‘moral’309 framework  of  analysis  with 
the aim of illustrating the socio-ontological power of agreements that are 
discursively established between different actors. The decision to abandon 
Bourdieu’s ‘structuralist habitus’310 and instead consider ‘critical capacity’
  
 
as ‘an anthropological constant’311 is central to Boltanski’s – arguably 
pragmatist – ambition to shed light on ‘the human potential for intelligent 
action’,312 especially in terms of the anthropological centrality of problem- 
solving practices. 
In Boltanski’s ‘engaged sociology’,313 problem-solving practices – far from 
representing merely purposive, instrumental, or teleological performances 
oriented towards the utility-driven realization of a particular goal – constitute 
normative modes of interacting with reality, whose presuppositional 
underpinnings are, in principle, exposed to critical testing and open to revision. In this 
respect, Boltanski’s attempt to combine ‘structuralist and pragmatist analysis’314 
by illustrating that grammatical constructions and interactional performances 
presuppose, rather than exclude, one  another  is  a  way  of  demonstrating 
that ‘society is not a form of order, but an ordering’315 – that is, a set of spatio- 
temporally contingent constellations and, thus, a relatively arbitrary assemblage 
of symbolic and material arrangements that are in a constant state of flux. 
From a Boltanskian perspective, then, ‘critique is a methodological tool to 
understand actors’ capacity to seek for equivalences in a non-coherent world’.316 
It is one of the key tasks of his ‘engaged sociology’317 to question any ordinary 
or scholastic projection of total consistency upon a reality that is, by definition, 
fundamentally marked by both the existence and the experience of uncertainty. 
 
III. 
In relation to the third dimension, the relationship between description and normativity, 
Bogusz insists, in line with Boltanski, that ‘[e]ndless disputes’318 are as much 
part of scientific developments as they are ‘part of our everyday life’.319 In 
this light, pragmatic sociology is confronted with a twofold task: the task of 
describing normative practices, as well as the task of assessing them in terms 
of the extent to which they contribute either to sustaining mechanisms of 
domination or to generating processes of emancipation. 
In essence, ‘principles of equivalence’320 constitute – sometimes explicitly 
defined, but, for the most part, implicitly established – ‘normative criteria to 
orient actor’s negotiation practices’.321 What is remarkably important in this journey 
through the jungle of ‘principles of equivalence’, however, is the pragmatist 
commitment to ‘putting actors’ descriptions and sociological descriptions on the same 
analytic level’,322 rather than contending that scientific modes of studying the 
world in the search for objective epistemic validity are necessarily superior 
to ordinary ways of engaging with oneself and one’s environment through 
everyday constructions of reality. 
Wary of ‘the implicit normativism critical sociologists conceal by pretending 
positivist neutrality’,323 pragmatic sociologists of critique à la Boltanski urge us
  
 
to face up to the contestability pervading all forms of sociality. Just as social 
values have a factual dimension in the sense that they have a tangible impact upon 
people’s practices, social facts have a value-laden dimension in the sense that they are 
culturally codified. Put differently, the legitimacy of normativity is impregnated 
with the power of performative objectivity, whilst the validity of objectivity is 
permeated by the force of social normativity.324 To the extent that ‘the social 
sciences grapple with moral beings interacting with other moral beings’,325 
social actors can problematize their own normative standards when exposed 
to values and principles that differ from those they tend to take for granted. In 
a more general sense, the recognition of the ineluctable normativity shaping 
all forms of sociality has two major implications: 
 
(a) We need to draw an ontological distinction between ‘the natural world’ 
and ‘the social world’: the latter, unlike the former, is composed not 
only of physical but also of self-conscious, reflexive, critical, and moral 
entities. 
(b) We need to draw a methodological distinction between ‘the natural sciences’ 
and ‘the social sciences’: the latter, unlike the former, need to provide 
operational and conceptual tools able to account for the fact that the 
human universe constitutes a realm of interpreting beings, who are 
equipped with the species-distinctive capacity to attribute meaning to their 
existence by virtue of symbolically mediated practices and imaginaries. 
 
Critical Pragmatism? 
As forcefully stated in Bogusz’s Conclusion, pragmatic sociologists are 
confronted with the challenge of grasping people’s ‘capacities to criticize one 
another or given sets of social arrangements in particular situations’.326 Given 
his emphasis on the sociological significance of the empowering – notably, 
critical and moral – resources mobilized by ordinary actors, Bogusz rightly 
suggests that one of Boltanski’s key contributions to the contemporary social 
sciences can be summarized as follows: 
 
The sociology of critique has become one of the most advanced attempts to 
reinforce – with a certain optimism – ordinary people’s capacities to design their 
environment and to move methodologically closer to their own ways of modelling, 
judging, classifying, protesting, enquiring, or even resigning given frameworks of 
action and thought.327 
 
If we take seriously the fact that subjects capable of action, reflection, and 
justification are able to empower themselves by engaging in processes
  
 
of  normative  construction  and perspective-taking   discussion,   then we 
need to pay no less attention to the ‘experimental character and 
unpredictability’328 pervading the ostensibly most consolidated forms of 
social reality. 
 
Pragmatism has taught us that the experimental attitude must be judged not only 
by what is being said, but also by what is being done.329 
 
One may add to this that Boltanski has taught us that an ‘engaged sociology’330 – 
irrespective of whether it is conceived of in terms of a ‘critical sociology’ or a 
‘sociology of critique’ – must be judged not only by its theoretical capacity to 
explain or interpret reality, but also, more importantly, by its practical capacity 
to change it. 
 
Cyril Lemieux 
The title of Cyril Lemieux’s chapter gives a concise summary of its thematic 
focus: ‘The Moral Idealism of Ordinary People as a Sociological Challenge: 
Reflections on the French Reception of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s 
On Justification’331 (2006 [1991]). As Lemieux accurately states, the main purpose 
of this influential book is to demonstrate that ‘we need to take seriously the 
fact that ordinary actors are equipped with critical, moral, and judgemental capacities’.332 
In contrast to one-sided approaches in the social sciences, notably rational 
choice theories and structuralist explanatory frameworks, here it is assumed 
that ‘normative claims are irreducible to simple calculations of self-interest and 
cannot be directly deduced from relationships of force’.333 With the aim of 
examining the intellectual significance of  On Justification, Lemieux’s chapter is 
divided into seven sections. 
 
I. 
In the first section, Lemieux argues that On Justification offers ‘a new approach to 
the relation of sociology with common sense’.334 Whilst acknowledging that Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s research programme can be regarded as a major contribution 
to our understanding of the relationship between action and justification,  
Lemieux insists that we are confronted with the following question: 
 
If the sociologist makes it a rule not to reduce actors’ normative claims to power 
relations, to relations based on individual or social interests, to the local values of a social 
group, or to the product of private arrangements, does this not undermine the very 
purpose of sociology?335 
  
 
If we abandon the project of ‘uncovering’ underlying structures that are supposed 
to govern both the constitution and the evolution of the social world, does it 
still make sense to draw a distinction between ‘social-scientific knowledge’ and 
‘ordinary knowledge’? To be clear, the point is not to deny that there are several 
significant qualitative differences between scientific analysis and common sense. 
Rather, the point is to recognize that these two levels of epistemic engagement 
with reality are not as far apart as they may appear at first sight.336 
Undoubtedly, sociologists  of  critique  à  la  Boltanski  and  Thévenot  
will find it difficult to express much sympathy for Bourdieu’s proposed 
‘epistemological break’337 with the ‘doxic illusions of common sense’.338 As 
astutely noted by Lemieux, ‘for a whole generation of young researchers, On  
Justification  has  become  a  sort  of  manifesto  in  favour  of  a  completely 
renewed vision (in the French context) of the craft of sociology’339 – that is, of 
a paradigmatic approach determined to ‘locate “reflexivity” in “common 
sense”’,340 instead of opposing the latter to the former. Similar to micro-
sociological  and ethno-methodological research programmes in the social 
sciences,341 and comparable to Bruno Latour and Michel Callon’s 
anthropology of science and technology,342 Boltanski and Thévenot are 
interested in ‘examining discursive processes of critique and justification 
carried out by social actors’.343 Indeed, in terms of their methodological 
mission, the two French neo-pragmatists  are willing to go one step further: 
‘we need to study how they themselves are capable of undertaking acts of 
unveiling and of adopting perspectives’.344 On this view, people’s quotidian 
search for intelligibility is not an obstacle to but, rather, a precondition for the 
possibility of reflection and justification. 
 
II. 
In the second section, Lemieux is concerned with the nature of Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s ‘grammatical’345 approach to ordinary actors’ ‘common sense of 
justice’.346 According to Lemieux, the study of its sociological significance 
contains two principal levels: 
 
(a) the empirical level, implying that ‘one needs to collect data on situations in 
which people make normative claims’;347 
(b) the conceptual level, suggesting that ‘one needs to formalize the implicit rules 
that people adopt or fail to respect when they find themselves immersed 
in social situations and when they have to remind each other of the 
obligation to respect them’.348 
 
In other words, similar to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s  ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’  constitutes – literally –  a socio-logical
  
 
approach that is committed to combining empirical and conceptual, practical 
and theoretical, substantive and interpretive analysis. Hence, inspired by the 
thorough empirical engagement with processes of reflection, argumentation, 
and discussion in ordinary social life, the introduction of an innovative 
conceptual framework into the sociological canon can be regarded as one of  
the  main  intellectual  achievements  of  On  Justification:  ‘grandeur  (worth), 
personne (person), monde (world), bien commun (common good), cité (polity), or 
épreuve (test)’349 – to mention only a few. In essence, these terminological tools 
are aimed at shedding light on ‘people’s capacity to mobilize their reflexive, 
discursive, and moral resources in everyday life’.350 
 
III. 
In the third section, Lemieux examines the extent to which Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s approach may be conceived of as a ‘relativist theory of justice’.351 As is 
well known, in their ‘formal-grammatical’352 examination of normative orders, 
the two French neo-pragmatists – if we can characterize them as such – ‘identify 
six ideal cités (polities)’:353 ‘market’, ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘of fame’, ‘civic’, and 
‘industrial’.354 According to this ‘axiomatic model’,355 in modern societies actors 
are confronted with multiple ‘orders of worth’,356 in relation to which they are 
required to mobilize ‘multiple normative resources’.357 
As elucidated by Lemieux, it is because of the preponderance of this 
axiomatic framework in their co-authored writings that Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s pragmatic account of regimes of interaction and justification 
avoids falling in the trap of ‘complete epistemic or moral relativism’.358 Far 
from declaring that, in the normative construction of social life, ‘anything 
goes’ and that claims to cognitive or moral validity are entirely arbitrary, 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s axiomatic model draws attention to both the plurality 
and the grammaticality of interactional regimes. On this account, 
 
everyone involved in the normative construction of interactional situations has to 
obey largely implicit grammatical rules according to which some arguments count 
as legitimate and others as illegitimate.359 
 
Of course, one may contend that, owing to its emphasis on the contextual 
contingency of claims to theoretical or practical validity, Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s conception of human interactionality leaves considerable room 
for the situational relativity of all individual and collective constructions of 
normativity. Nonetheless, as Lemieux is eager to stress, the most context-specific 
expressions of sociality cannot transcend the constraints imposed upon actors 
by the structural force of grammatical determinacy. 
  
IV. 
In the fourth section, Lemieux grapples with the question of the extent to 
which Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic approach may be interpreted as ‘a 
new version of historical materialism’.360 One of the key insights gained from their 
framework is that 
 
[d]isputes, even apparently minor ones, are decisive moments that determine 
the material and symbolic nature underlying both the reproduction and the 
transformation of social life.361 
 
Hence, far from being reducible to symbolically mediated encounters or 
merely self-referential language games, controversies between cognitively 
and normatively motivated actors have an impact on both the ideological 
representation and the empirical structuration of reality. Put differently, 
 
disputes result not only in the symbolic reallocation of different kinds of worth attributed 
to each participant, but also in the material reorganization of social relations.362 
 
In this light, Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology may be 
characterized as ‘historical-materialist’ to the degree that it is aimed at 
studying the dialectical – that is, the symbolic and the material, the conceptual 
and the empirical, the theoretical and the practical, the invisible and the 
visible – dimensions shaping processes of interaction and justification. 
 
V. 
In the fifth section, Lemieux illustrates that the concept of épreuve (test) forms 
an integral component of ‘a denaturalizing analysis of socialization’.363 Perhaps, 
one of the central elements of sociological enlightenment obtained from the 
pragmatic exploration of everyday discursive encounters is that ‘most actors 
possess a degree of realism when engaging in disputes’.364 Practically speaking, 
this implies that ‘people regularly assess the value of  the things and ideals  
at stake in the situations in which they find themselves immersed’.365 Their 
willingness to undertake ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’366 
on a daily basis presupposes the capacity to put things in perspective and 
thereby recognize that different social contexts generate different normative 
arrangements with different expectations. At the same time, however, we need 
to recognize the historical significance of ‘the substantial socio-economic differences 
and structural asymmetries generated by the division of labour in modern 
societies’.367 Indeed, in stratified societies, the unequal allocation of people’s
  
 
capacities for action manifests itself in an ‘asymmetrical distribution of access 
to cités’.368 Insofar as the ability to participate in the normative construction 
of social life is contingent upon an actor’s access to material and symbolic 
resources, processes of reflection and justification cannot be dissociated from 
asymmetrically constituted realms of socialization. 
 
VI. 
In the sixth section, Lemieux asks to what extent Boltanski and Thévenot put 
forward ‘an irenic view of social relations’.369 Commenting on the validity of this 
charge, he spells out that, from his perspective, 
 
[t]he accusation that Boltanski and Thévenot are trapped in an irenic, and hence 
idealistic, conception of social relations is based on a profound misinterpretation of 
their work.370 
 
Indeed, according to Lemieux, it would be utterly mistaken to assume that these 
two influential French scholars ‘suggest that ordinary actors are equipped with 
only one competence: their moral competence’.371 For they are interested in 
the pivotal role that several fundamental human capacities – notably, people’s 
critical and reflexive faculties – play in the construction of social life. This, 
however, does not mean that they embrace some kind of socio-ontological 
idealism or lifeworld-romanticism.372 On the contrary, they are well aware of 
the fact that, ‘in real life, conflicts are full of insincerity, violence, cynicism, 
intimidation, insinuation, personal attraction, local bargaining, etc.’.373 Hence, 
just as ‘people have to make compromises’,374 they have to learn to live with the 
fact that both open and hidden conflicts are constitutive ingredients of social 
life. Put differently, in the construction of intersubjective relations, instrumental 
and strategic forms of action are no less significant than communicative and 
discursive practices oriented towards mutual understanding. 
 
VII. 
In the seventh section, Lemieux seeks to show that Boltanski and Thévenot 
have developed ‘a new approach to personal identity’.375 Touching upon crucial 
themes explored in Bernard Lahire’s theory of the ‘plural actor’,376 it is vital 
to take into account that 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot insist upon the idea that one and the same person has 




Similar to Bourdieu’s field-theoretic framework and Lahire’s action-theoretic 
account, Boltanski and Thévenot’s cité-theoretic approach posits that highly 
differentiated societies are polycentrically organized. Given the multiplicity of 
regimes of action in decentred societal formations, human actors are expected 
to take on a variety of roles and to be able to cope with the diversified normative 
imperatives with which they find themselves confronted in different relationally 
constituted contexts. In such a pluralized world, ‘a multiple personality is in a 
certain sense normal’;378 that is, those actors who are exposed to diverse social 
settings with specific – grammatically codified – modes of functioning tend to 
develop increasingly fragmented subjectivities that lack a context-transcending 
epicentre for the formation of individual or collective identities. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of  ‘On Justification’ 
In his Conclusion, Lemieux provides a sympathetic but critical assessment of 
the impact of  On Justification. In his opinion, numerous criticisms commonly 
levelled against this study are both unfounded and misleading. In particular, 
Boltanski and Thévenot have never sought to argue that the distinction 
between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’ is based on an 
entirely artificial conceptual antinomy and that, therefore, these two epistemic 
spheres can be collapsed into one another. Furthermore, they have not 
intended to make a case for a philosophical idealism according to which, in 
the last instance, communicatively constituted processes of justification and 
action-coordination are preponderant over strategically driven dynamics of 
domination and competition. Finally, it would be no less naïve to assert that 
normatively established regimes of action and justification can escape the 
constraining influence of social stratification. 
Nonetheless, Lemieux is willing to concede that at least two key forms   
of criticism launched against Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology 
are legitimate. The first accusation, brought forward primarily by social 
historians,379 is that their pragmatic approach is considerably weakened by the 
fact that it fails ‘to account for the historical nature of cités’.380    The second charge, 
articulated especially by macro-sociologists, 
 
takes issue with the authors’ tendency to focus on the micro-level of social 
interactions at the risk of underestimating the sociological significance of systemic 
regularities that have to be, and can only be, observed at a larger level.381 
 
As Lemieux remarks, however, Boltanski’s later works do contain pertinent 
reflections on both the spatio-temporally contingent and the institutionally consolidated 
constitution of different regimes of action.382 Arguably, this also applies – to a
  
 
significant extent – to Thévenot’s later writings.383 Whatever one makes of the 
respective strengths and weaknesses of  On Justification, there is no doubt that 
this study deserves to be regarded as one of the most original, and also most 
significant, contributions to French sociology in the late twentieth century. 
 
 
Luc Boltanski and Critique 
Simon Susen 
In his chapter,  Simon Susen poses the following question: ‘Is There Such     
a Thing as a “Pragmatic Sociology of Critique”?’384. As indicated in the 
second part of the title of his contribution, his essay aims to respond to this 
question by articulating several ‘[r]eflections on Luc Boltanski’s On 
Critique’385 (2011 [2009]). As is widely acknowledged in the literature, 
Boltanski’s oeuvre has had, and continues to have, a substantial impact upon 
paradigmatic developments in the contemporary social sciences. The label 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ provides a succinct description of the key 
characteristics of Boltanski’s approach. 
 
(a) The term ‘sociology’ indicates that Boltanski is concerned with the empirical 
enquiry into ‘the nature of the social’386 in general and into ‘both the social 
nature and the social functions of critique’387 in particular. 
(b) The term ‘pragmatic’ expresses Boltanski’s conviction that ‘an essential task of 
sociology consists in studying human practices’,388 thereby demonstrating that, 
in order to do justice to the socio-ontological significance of fundamental 
‘anthropological competences’,389 ordinary ‘people need to be taken seriously’.390 
(c) The term ‘critique’ is central in that – as illustrated in great detail and 
with considerable skill in Boltanski’s writings – it is due to ‘people’s critical 
capacities’391 that they are able to relate – both reflexively and discursively – 
to the three constitutive worlds of human experience: that is, to ‘“the” 
external world (objective realm), “our” external world (normative realm), 
and “their” internal world (subjective realm)’.392 
 
In short, from a Boltanskian perspective, ‘society is the ensemble of practical and 
criticizable relations established between human actors’.393 It appears that in On Critique 
Boltanski succeeds in conveying the paradigmatic weight of this pivotal 
assumption with more analytical conviction, philosophical inspiration, and 
conceptual precision than in any of his other studies. This should be reason 
enough to take this book seriously and scrutinize its key thematic foci and 
intellectual contributions. As demonstrated in Susen’s chapter, five dimensions 
are especially important in this respect. 
  
I. 
Boltanski reflects upon the task of critical theories. All critical theories ‘share a 
fundamental concern regarding the concept of social domination’.394 Guided 
by this diagnostic orientation, they seek to identify ‘the causes, symptoms, 
and consequences of power relations within concrete historical contexts’,395 
notably in societies whose development is significantly governed by systems 
of domination. What is problematic from a ‘socio-critical’ standpoint is not 
power, in the sense of ‘the capacity to do something’,396 but domination, in 
the sense of  ‘the capacity to impose oneself  upon another entity’397 with   
the aim of  exercising a relatively arbitrary degree of  control over it. From   
a Boltanskian perspective, ‘[t]he fact of exercising power or of being 
subjected to power does not escape the consciousness of actors’.398 On this 
account, ordinary people are not only aware of  power relations but also  
able to problematize the tangible implications of their existence. From a 
Bourdieusian standpoint, by contrast, ‘actors establish a largely unconscious 
relation with power in general and with domination in particular’.399 On    
this view, critical sociologists are confronted with the task of uncovering the 
underlying structures that shape field-specific interactions and go beyond 
people’s everyday grasp of reality. 
Unlike Bourdieu, Boltanski insists that we need to understand ‘the intrinsic 
relation between morality, critique, and reflexivity’.400 To be exact, the notion that 
moral, critical, and reflexive resources are built into the human condition has 
four major philosophical implications.401 
 
(a) We need to draw an ontological distinction between the natural world and the 
social world: ‘whereas the former constitutes a physical and objective space 
composed of an ensemble of things and non-reflexive creatures, the latter 
represents a cultural and normative space constructed by reflexive entities 
equipped with moral and critical capacities’.402 
(b) We need to draw a methodological distinction between the natural sciences and 
the social sciences: the former are concerned with the study of ‘the natural 
world, which is composed of non-conscious entities’;403 the latter explore 
‘the cultural world, which is constructed by creatures that are conscious 
not only of their environment but also of their existence’.404 
(c) We need to question the empirico-conceptual distinction between facts and 
values: the former are pervaded by the latter, since ‘everything that “is” 
within the world of collective construction needs to be consolidated through 
processes of normalization’;405 the latter are permeated by the former, since 
‘everything that “should be” within the world of normative actualization 
needs to be confirmed by processes of objective realization’.406 
  
 
(d) We need to question the epistemological distinction between ordinary knowledge and 
scientific knowledge: both the former and the latter can be informed by critical 
reflection and perceptive insights; both the former and the latter are context- 
laden, perspective-laden, value-laden, interest-laden, and power-laden. 
 
II. 
Boltanski grapples with the key functions of social institutions. The principal 
task of social institutions is to produce solidified – or, at least, seemingly 
solidified – realms of social interaction and thereby enable actors to cope 
with the uncertainty that is built  into  human  life  forms.  In  relation  to  the 
sociological study of  institutions, three analytical distinctions appear   to be 
crucial: (a) the epistemological distinction between ‘exteriority’ and 
‘interiority’, (b) the methodological distinction between ‘explanation’ and 
‘justification’, and (c) the socio-ontological distinction between ‘distancing’ 
and ‘immersion’. Arguably, Bourdieusian sociology tends to focus on the 
analytical levels of exteriority, explanation, and distancing. Boltanskian sociology, 
on the other hand, tends to place the emphasis on the analytical levels of 
interiority, justification, and immersion.407 Rather than seeking to scrutinize the 
functional logic of institutions ‘from without’ – that is, from the perspective 
of the objective and objectifying scientist – the whole point of Boltanski’s 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to examine institutional realities ‘from 
within’ – that is, from the perspective of bodily equipped and spatio- 
temporally situated actors. 
From a Boltanskian angle, then, ‘the institutional’ and ‘the social’ can be 
conceived of as two interdependent – if not, equivalent – aspects of reality: 
 
[I]t is because societies are institutionally consolidated and because institutions 
are socially naturalized that the reality of the world is structured and the world 
of reality remains unnoticed. What distinguishes ‘social facts’ from ‘natural facts’ 
is that they are not only ‘given’ but also ‘instituted’. Social reality is inconceivable 
without the ensemble of instituted facts.408 
 
In this context, Boltanski’s conceptual distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and 
‘reality’ (réalité) is central. The former is ‘everything that is the case’,409 whereas 
the latter encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’.410 In other words, 
whereas the world is ‘everything that happens to people’,411 reality is ‘everything 
that is constructed by people’.412 Institutions play a pivotal role in the material 
and symbolic construction of reality, for they convert our encounter with the 
world into an experience based on the illusion of relative certainty. To the 
extent that ‘[a]n institution is a bodiless being to which is delegated the task
  
 
of stating the whatness of what is’,413 it is imperative to recognize that it is ‘first 
of all in its semantic functions that the institution must be considered’.414 Owing 
to their symbolic power, institutions can determine the vocabulary mobilized by 
members of society when attributing meaning to reality. Owing to their material 
power, institutions possess the normative capacity to set the parameters for 
performative operations embedded in specific grammars of interaction. This 
double-function appears to make institutions indispensable to the construction 
of social life. 
 
III. 
Boltanski explores the role of critique. In the most general sense, critique 
constitutes a driving force of historical change, for it permits both individual 
and collective actors to shape the development of society in accordance with 
their discursively articulated search for principles that are defensible in terms 
of their practical worth and normative validity. For Boltanski, two registers  
of action are vital to comprehending the possibility of social development: a 
‘practical register’,415 on the one hand, and a ‘metapragmatic register’,416 on the other. 
The former is characterized by rather weak and rudimentary levels of reflexivity, 
involving ‘a certain tolerance for differences’417 and thereby maintaining a 
set of codified arrangements that guarantee the reproduction of society. The 
latter is marked by relatively elevated and differentiated levels of reflexivity, entailing 
an implicit or explicit reference to the necessity of critique and allowing for 
the articulation of two metapragmatic forces: confirmation and justification.418 On 
this view, ‘the normative rivalry between the immanent force of confirmation 
and the transcendent force of justification’419 is central to every person’s ability 
to participate in processes of interaction and socialization. Rather  than 
taking their social conditions of existence for granted, human actors have  
the ability to draw on their critical capacity in order to reflect on and, if 
necessary, transform the symbolic and material arrangements prevalent in 
their communities or societies. Confronted with ‘hermeneutic contradictions’420 
emerging in relationally constituted life forms, human actors are able to call 
the apparent givenness of reality into question by reminding themselves of 
the constructedness of all products of social action. 
 
The power of critique can be confirmed only by criticizing the power of 
confirmation, just as the power of confirmation can be criticized only by 
confirming the power of critique.421 
 
To be sure, different types of test (épreuve) can be undertaken in order to reinforce 
or undermine the legitimacy of a specific ensemble of social constellations: 
  
 
Truth tests (épreuves de vérité) are ‘symbolic’ in the sense that, on the basis of 
interpretations, they aim to understand ‘a universe of signs’422 shared by a 
community. Reality tests (épreuves de réalité) are ‘material’ in the sense that, by 
means of actions, they seek to uncover ‘the powers concealed’423 within society. 
Existential tests (épreuves existentielles) are ‘experienced’ in the sense that they face up 
to ‘the incompleteness of reality and even its contingency, by drawing examples 
from the flux of life’424 and by exposing manifestations of the fundamental 
ambiguity pervading all social constructions which, in their totality, form the 
ensemble of reality.425 
 
Irrespective of whether – within a spatio-temporally unique context – truth 
tests, reality tests, or existential tests decide over the worth and validity of  
an idiosyncratic set of principles and actions, there is no emancipatory 




Boltanski discusses the nature of domination. In so doing, he proposes to draw a 
distinction between two fundamental types of domination: ‘simple domination’426 
and ‘complex domination’,427 or – if one prefers – ‘primitive domination’428 and 
‘managerial domination’.429 
The former represents a monolithic form of domination, in the sense that 
the control over a particular population is monopolized by a state or an 
overarching institution. Here, people are deprived of fundamental liberties 
(such as freedom of speech, expression, and communication) – as well as of 
basic rights (such as civil, political, social, economic, and human rights). Under 
regimes of ‘simple domination’, the exercise of power is relatively arbitrary 
and unambiguously asymmetrical. Obvious historical examples of this type 
of domination include absolutism, fascism, and any kind of dictatorial 
government whose exercise of power is motivated by normative principles 
based on political authoritarianism. 
The latter, by contrast,  constitutes  a  polycentric – or, in  a  more  radical 
sense, even centreless – form of domination, in the sense that power structures 
are circular, amorphous, volatile, and in a constant state of flux, lacking an 
institutional or ideological epicentre. Here, people’s essential liberties and rights 
are not only largely respected, or even defended, but also instrumentalized in 
order to foster the legitimacy of the hegemonic political and economic system 
in place. Under regimes of ‘complex domination’, the exercise of power is 
seemingly democratic and even, to some extent and in some areas, relatively 
horizontal. The easily discernible historical scenario that Boltanski has in
  
 
mind can be found in the emergence of ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist 
societies’,430 in which it is ‘the establishment of a new kind of relationship 
between institutions and critique and, in a sense, the incorporation of critique 
into the routines of social life which characterize these systems’.431 In societies in 
which – within the limits of the parameters prescribed by liberal-democratic 
systems – the cultivation of critical processes is not only accepted but also 
encouraged, domination can obtain unprecedented degrees of  legitimacy. 
The idea of ‘dominating by change’432 and by openness to criticism is a constitutive 
ingredient of the new spirit of capitalism:433 
 
The more a social system succeeds in giving a voice to critique without running 
the risk of being undermined, the more critique becomes an affirmative force 
contributing to, rather than a negative counterforce moving away from, the 
reproduction of social domination.434 
 
The elasticity, adaptability, and long-term viability of domination under the 
new spirit of capitalism depends on its capacity to respond to both the systemic 
and the normative, the institutional and the experiential, the structural and 
the ephemeral, as well as the material and the ideological pressures building 
up in highly differentiated societies. 
 
V. 
Boltanski proposes to consider the conditions underlying the possibility of 
emancipation. Surely, in the history of social and political thought, one finds 
multiple conceptual tools to identify the species-constitutive competences that 
have permitted human actors not only to raise themselves out of nature but 
also to attribute meaning to the idea of individual and collective liberation 
from relatively arbitrary – and, hence, unnecessary – sources of alienation, 
repression, exploitation, subjugation, and domination. Kantians  insist  on 
the civilizational accomplishments derived from the use of pure reason, 
practical reason, and aesthetic judgement. Marxists point at the empowering 
potential of purposive, cooperative, and creative activity built into work- 
based processes of self-realization and fulfilment. Habermasians draw attention 
to the socio-ontological significance attached to the affirmative, normative, 
and expressive functions of language, stemming from communicative reason 
and intersubjective processes oriented towards mutual understanding. And 
Boltanskians seek to bring to light the anthropological centrality of critical 
capacity, by means of which discursively versatile actors engage in disputes 




For Boltanski, a fundamental feature of emancipatory processes is that they 
are motivated – consciously or unconsciously – by the attempt to promote  
the ‘critical project of a reduction in the privileges’435 of dominant social groups 
and thereby contribute to ‘a better distribution of capacities for action’.436 In this 
sense, emancipation designates any kind of purposive process oriented 
towards, or contributing to, individual or collective  empowerment in terms  
of one’s belonging to a common humanity, rather than in terms of one’s 
tribalist identification with a particular social group. Whilst it is ‘the closure 
of reality on itself that discourages critique’,437 it is the opening of society in 
relation to itself, and to other societies,  that stimulates  critique.  Criticism,  in 
this radical sense, needs to encourage experimentation with life forms in 
which the risk of disempowerment – based on implicit or explicit mechanisms of 
segregation, exclusion, and discrimination – is minimized and the possibility of 
empowerment – emanating from individual and collective processes of integration, 
inclusion, and self-realization – is maximized. In this light, the point is not to 
aim for the construction of a perfect society. Rather, the point is to contribute to 
the creation of human life forms in which people’s self-empowering potential, 
projects, and imagination play a greater role than privilege, status, and access 
to material and symbolic resources in shaping the development of their lives. 
 
Critical Remarks 
Susen’s chapter draws to a close by examining the weaknesses and limitations 
of Boltanski’s On Critique. Following the thematic structure of his previous 
analysis, he points at five significant problematic aspects of this book. 
 
I. Critical Theory: Given that ‘Boltanski fails to provide solid normative foundations 
for his conception of sociology in general and for his conception of 
critique in particular’,438 it is far from clear on what grounds it is possible 
to distinguish between emancipatory and repressive, desirable and 
undesirable, empowering and disempowering sets of beliefs and practices. 
II. Institutions: Owing to its terminological vagueness, its weak discursive 
justification, and its lack of evidence-based sociological analysis, his 
account of institutions suffers from definitional ambiguity, from absence 
of clarity as to what ‘the indispensable and irreplaceable functions of 
institutions’439 are, as well as from the failure to identify criteria by means 
of which the boundaries of institutional settings can be defined. 
III. Critique: Due to Boltanski’s unsystematic approach to the multilayered 
relationship between ordinary and scientific forms of critique, it is far 
from evident on what grounds it is possible to defend the contention that 
‘[b]oth scientific critique and ordinary critique are legitimate and potentially insightful’.440 
  
 
Indeed, in order to avoid fabricating an ineluctable epistemic hierarchy 
between ‘scientific’ and ‘ordinary’ modes of engaging with and attributing 
meaning to reality, it is imperative to demonstrate that a comprehensive 
‘sociology of critique’ is inconceivable without an analytical ‘philosophy 
of epistemic capacities’.441 
IV. Domination: Boltanski’s lack of attention to the polycentric constitution of power 
relations in highly differentiated societies implies that his ‘conception of 
domination suffers from residual economic reductionism’442 and, thus, 
falls short of accounting for the complex interplay between multiple 
‘sources of both structural and ideological domination, such as ethnocentrism, 
racism, sexism, ageism, and ableism’,443 let alone for the convertibility of 
different forms of capital, such as social, cultural, symbolic, and linguistic 
capital, in addition to economic capital in the strict sense. 
V. Emancipation: Boltanski’s understanding of human emancipation is so 
elastic and nebulous that it ‘fails to capture the qualitative specificity of 
universally empowering social practices’;444 that is, it does not succeed in 
offering a normative framework that is, at the same time, sufficiently wide- 
ranging to be applicable to any kind of society, regardless of its spatio- 
temporal idiosyncrasy, and sufficiently narrow to distinguish empowering 
from disempowering sets of beliefs and practices, in the face of radical 
historical contingency. 
 
Finally, it is striking that, despite its author’s explicit ambition to reconcile his 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ with Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, On Critique 
contains little in the way of ‘a systematic overview of the key points of convergence, 
divergence, and possible integration between the two approaches’.445 It is the task of 
Susen’s second chapter in this volume – entitled ‘Towards a Dialogue between 
Pierre Bourdieu’s “Critical Sociology” and Luc Boltanski’s “Pragmatic Sociology 
of Critique”’446 – to provide such an outline and thereby demonstrate that useful 
insights can be gained not only from comparing and contrasting, but also from 
combining and integrating, these two paradigmatic frameworks. 
 
Rob Stones 
As indicated in the title of his chapter, Rob Stones proposes to unearth the ‘Strengths 
and Limitations of Luc Boltanski’s On Critique’447 in his contribution to this volume. 
He stresses from the outset that, in his opinion, ‘On Critique is an important book 
that deserves to be influential’.448 In addition, he points out that its author explicitly 
states that On Critique449 (2011 [2009]) ‘is to be seen as sketchy and provisional’,450 as 
it is based on ‘a series of remarks, presented in synthetic form, which accompanied 
his thinking in the three years before publication’.451 The core contents of this
  
 
study were delivered in the form of three lectures – that is, in this case, the 
prestigious Adorno Lectures – at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in 
November 2008. Despite its author’s modest contextualizing comments, aimed  
at reminding the reader that his treatise is, at best, ‘a sort of précis of critique’,452 
Stones rightly insists that it represents one of Boltanski’s most significant – and, as 
one may add, most philosophical – contributions to contemporary debates on the 
nature of critique, notably in relation to its place in the social sciences in particular 
and in society in general. Hence, ‘[w]hatever its imperfections, it is much better 
that On Critique has been written than not written’,453 mainly, perhaps, because it 
obliges us to rethink the role of critique in ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist 
societies’,454 especially in terms of its capacity to call established modes of complex 
domination into question and thereby challenge the hegemonic power of ‘neo- 
managerialism’455 in the current era. 
 
I. 
In the first section of his chapter, Rob Stones reflects on ‘“Neo-managerialism” 
and the Proliferation of Tests,  Audits,  and  Benchmarks’.456  In  accordance 
with Boltanski, he states that the concept  of  ‘neo-managerialism’  refers  to 
‘an instrumental mode of governance whose arch value is efficiency’.457 In essence, 
this implies that, in advanced capitalist societies, systemic forms of rationality 
are converted into hegemonic modes of functioning, imposing their impersonal 
and outcome-oriented logic upon almost every sphere of society. Undoubtedly, 
Boltanski’s concern with the domineering power of systemic forces echoes 
Jürgen Habermas’s misgivings regarding the ‘colonization of the lifeworld’:458 in 
the modern era, systemic forces – notably the state and the economy – have the 
capacity to undermine communicative rationality, which is built into everyday 
life, by virtue of instrumental rationality, which constitutes the underlying driving 
force of the increasing bureaucratization and commodification of society. 
It seems that, in such an instrumentally driven world, ‘[t]he space for 
meaningful conversation and debate about the role of normative values in 
guiding policy has become severely constricted’,459 for almost every aspect of 
social life appears to be dominated by success-oriented considerations, rather 
than shaped by the critical engagement with the search for and defence of 
ethical standards and principles. From a Boltanskian perspective, this tension- 
laden reality – which is created by the lack of concern with substantive 
rationality and, correspondingly, by the preponderance of instrumental 
rationality – manifests itself in a ‘hermeneutic contradiction’460 between ‘the 
voice of experts’461 and ‘the voice of the people’462 – that is, between the self- 
legitimizing influence of specialists, elites, and managers, on the one hand, 
and laypersons and ordinary actors, on the other. 
  
 
The systemically mediated compulsion to exercise hegemonic control 
over society ‘from the top down’ is reflected in ‘an intensification of rules, 
categories, decrees, and technical directives’.463 This applies, above all, to neo- 
managerially organized institutions, which promote modes of ‘monitoring 
according to tests, audits, and benchmarking of countless kinds’.464 What 
may be – somewhat euphemistically – referred to as ‘the accountability of 
practices’465 represents a strategic imperative permeating an increasing number 
of relatively solidified spheres of interaction. The illusion of creating a social 
order that is not only largely ‘coherent and progressive’466 but also seemingly 
immune to crises and contradictions exposing its inherent fragility is central to 
‘[t]he semantic functions of legitimation performed by institutions’.467 
As Stones astutely suggests, however, we must not underestimate 
Boltanski’s insistence upon the fact that ‘the incessant character of change in 
test formats undermines the possibility of radical critique, as no sooner have the 
dominated grasped the putative values  of  legitimation  embedded  within 
the relevant tests than the tests are altered once again’.468 In other words, 
owing to the dynamic, malleable, and adaptable nature of the test formats 
emerging within power-laden spheres of interaction, critique – to use 
Boltanski’s words – ‘finds itself disarmed’469 when confronted with the 
rearming capacity of the systemic structures whose legitimacy it is supposed 
to call into question. Normative parameters constantly shift, redefining the 
rules of the game – and so do the test formats designed to reaffirm their 
legitimacy. Critique, then, becomes a paradoxical affair, since it is never 
quite clear to what degree it succeeds in reaching beyond the immanence 
permeating its own quest for transcendence. 
In practice, this dismantling of critique – or,  at  least,  of  its  radical 
forms – may ‘entail the incremental redundancy of debates and disputes 
concerning the criteria of normative justification appropriate to the activities 
that go on in a particular sphere’.470 To be exact, systemic processes oriented 
towards reinforcing ‘the authority that institutions claim for themselves’471 
involve – in the best-case scenario – the marginalization of radical critique and 
the relative weakening of reformist critique or – in the worst-case scenario – the 
de facto elimination of radical critique and the decorative instrumentalization of 
reformist critique. Suspicious of the misleading test-format-driven ‘window 
dressing’472 of neo-managerial institutionalism, Boltanski conceives of 
critical capacity as the ultimate resource permitting actors ‘to rebalance their 
relationship with institutions [and] to make their voice heard within them’.473 
In this sense, it is the task of a comprehensive ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ 
to expose the ‘provisional and revisable character of modes of qualification, test 
formats and definitions of reality’474 and thereby remind us of the fragility 




In the second section of his chapter, Stones grapples with the idea of ‘A 
Synthesis of Two Forms of Critique: “Structural” and “Pragmatic”’.475 According 
to Stones’s characterization, Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ tends to focus on the 
former, whereas Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ tends to be concerned with 
the latter. On this account, Bourdieu stresses the importance of the structural 
components of social life, whereas Boltanski insists upon the significance of its 
pragmatic dimensions. 
To be precise, ‘critical sociologists’ à la Bourdieu maintain that their 
explanatory mission consists in shedding light ‘on structures of domination 
and, hence, on deep and enduring asymmetries within the social world’,476 as 
these are ‘necessarily inaccessible’477 to ordinary people, whose quotidian 
engagement with reality is based on common-sense preconceptions. In order 
to accomplish this, however, social researchers have to embrace ‘the point of 
view of the totality from which to develop modes of classification’.478 This 
‘overarching’479 perspective emanates from an ambitious ‘cartography, 
metrology, and social morphology’,480  according to which the key task of  the 
critical sociologist   is to uncover the underlying structures that shape – or, in 
some cases, even determine – the development of human reality. 
By contrast, ‘pragmatic sociologists of critique’ à la Boltanski propose that ‘[h]uman 
persons [be] envisaged as active agents involved in unfolding practices’481 and able 
not only to attribute meaning to their lives but also to recognize and problematize 
the power relations permeating their everyday existence. In Boltanskian studies, 
then, particular emphasis is placed on the sociological significance of exploring 
the ‘series of fragmented and singular, individual, experiences’.482 Rather than 
implying that ‘structures of domination escape the consciousness of lay actors’,483 
here it is assumed that both scientists and ordinary people are, at least in principle, 
equipped with ‘the tools required to grasp their character and effects’.484 To be 
sure, this is not to posit that structural inequalities between social actors do not 
exist. Rather, this is to insist that every subject capable of  action, reflection,  
and justification has the ability not only to become aware of asymmetrically 
arranged social relations but also to problematize and, if necessary, criticize their 
detrimental and potentially disempowering consequences. 
 
It is only when one begins to ask what Boltanski calls ‘deliberately naïve’ questions – 
such as, why is it always the same people who pass all or most of the tests? – that the 
structured patterning of asymmetries are revealed.485 
 
It is this ‘deliberate naïvety’ that permits social scientists to draw on the potential 
perceptiveness of people’s understandings of the world when examining ‘patterns
  
 
of opportunity and exclusion that transcend individuals’.486 Ordinary actors may 
not be able to offer methodologically rigorous explanations of the structural 
determinants shaping their existence. To the extent that they are equipped with 
critical, reflexive, and moral capacities, however, they are in a position to provide 
insightful accounts of the tangible challenges arising from their exposure to and 
immersion in vertically structured regimes of social interaction. As Stones explains, 
such a methodologically open perspective attributes ‘a sense of active agency’487 to 
all sources of meaningful – that is, semantically mediated and ‘testable’ – practices. 
Whilst, according to Stones, Boltanski appears to be willing to concede that 
‘the standpoint of the totality adopted by “critical sociology”’488 permits the 
detached researcher to ‘generate a greater critical power than the pragmatist 
approach’,489 he considers that the real challenge consists in cross-fertilizing 
the former and the latter with the aim of taking advantage of their respective 
conceptual and methodological strengths, in the attempt to contribute to an 
insightful understanding of the social world. Undoubtedly, for Boltanski, this 
entails the following conviction: just as we need to take seriously ‘pragmatists’ 
appreciation of the active skills and capabilities of persons within situations’490 
and, hence, avoid falling into the trap of overstating ‘their passivity and their 
subjugation by structural factors’,491 we need to be careful not to ignore the 
substantive influence of  both micro- and macro-sociological determinants 
capable of shaping human interactions in powerful ways. 
The methodological ambition ‘to compare social orders with other possible 
social orders’492 obliges the critical researcher ‘to relativize the current reality as 
merely one possible way of doing things’.493 Indeed, this contextualist insight lies at 
the heart of Boltanski’s commitment to exploring the functioning of different ‘regimes 
of  normativity’.494 One of his most influential studies, On Justification495 (2006 [1991]), 
co-authored with Laurent Thévenot, is founded on one of the most ambitious 
intellectual undertakings of modern social and political thought – namely, the 
attempt to demonstrate that ‘the principles and justifications at work’496 in classical 
texts of political philosophy are also at work in ordinary regimes of interaction 
and justification, to which the authors refer as ‘orders of worth’:497 ‘the inspired 
world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the world of fame’, ‘the civic world’, ‘the market 
world’, and ‘the industrial world’.498 Whilst ‘each of these worlds can coexist with 
the others within any particular site’,499 each of them has its own operational  
logic, comprising idiosyncratic codes of normativity that undergird the processes 
of interaction and justification taking place within pragmatically established and 
semantically sustained boundaries.500 The ‘metacritical labour’501 performed by 
ordinary people when confronted with the task of establishing and negotiating 
‘moral criteria appropriate to enlist in support of arguments and justifications 
within a given world’502 is central to the normative construction of the regimes of 
action in which they find themselves situated. 
  
 
Somewhat emphatically, Stones applauds Boltanski for following the 
Foucauldian tradition of social analysis when insisting upon ‘the disseminated 
nature of power […] and the pluralistic character of the modes of assessment and 
attachments operative in social life’.503 Just as Foucauldian scholars highlight the 
plurality of regimes of power and the multiplicity of épistèmes generated in 
order to sustain or undermine them, Boltanskian researchers stress the diversity 
of regimes of action and the variety of épreuves undertaken in order to preserve 
or subvert them. In such polycentric accounts of society, there is no place for 
the temptation to reduce the daily unfolding of micro- and macro-spheres of 
human interactionality to a monolithically constituted process steered by an 
overarching logic permeating the entirety of relationally constructed realities. 
 
In emphasizing the plurality of the sites and situations of power and also the plurality 
of principles and concerns at work in society, Boltanski aims to criticize and counter 
another of the deficiencies of overarching theories of domination – one it shares 
with absolutisms of various colours – which is its tendency to reduce all struggles, 
conflicts, and dimensions of social life to one or other preferential dimension, 
whether this be religious, ethnic, sexual, or social class […].504 
 
In brief, Boltanski is committed to both methodological and ontological pluralism. 
His pluralism is methodological in the sense that he is committed to developing 
practical tools and theoretical frameworks permitting us to study, and account 
for, the polycentric physical and symbolic organization of the social world. 
His pluralism is ontological in the sense that he is committed to exploring the 
degree to which the behavioural and justificatory codes structuring people’s 
engagement with and interpretation of the world are themselves polycentrically 
constituted, lacking a centre of praxeological or ideological gravity. Since 
‘complex societies are necessarily multi-sited and multi-dimensional in their “orders of 
worth” and “principles of justification”’,505 their members are effectively obliged 
to develop ‘the ability to live with compromise’506 and accept that different criteria 
and principles are applied in different social contexts. As Stones – drawing on 
Boltanski’s pragmatist account – accurately states, ‘critique always involves 
an in situ hermeneutic moment in relation to the inner worlds of implicated 
actors’.507 Put differently, critique is necessarily ‘immanent’ insofar as it is 
formulated by spatio-temporally situated entities equipped with reflexive 
resources, which they need to mobilize in order to be able to cope with the 
normative imperatives thrown at them in socio-historically specific contexts. 
 
[…] ‘immanent standards’ are produced through an examination of the norms and values of 
the community of participants from which these judgements have emerged, but only once 
these norms and values have been considered in a more systematic and reflective 
  
 
manner than is typically possible for ordinary people responding to contingencies 
within the flow of events.508 
 
One of the key problems arising from the holistic explanatory framework of 
Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ consists in the fact that it has little, if anything, 
to say about the role of people’s critical capacity in grassroots processes of 
normativization. It is, therefore, one of the principal aims of Boltanski’s 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ to bring to light the sociological – and, 
arguably, civilizational – functions of ordinary people’s ability to mobilize their 
reflexive resources when confronted with the daily challenge of negotiating 
and renegotiating normative standards, permitting them to create relatively 
solidified domains of action and, thus, to cope with both the fragility and the 
contingency built into the constitution of reality.509 
 
III. 
The aforementioned issue leads us to the third, and penultimate, section of 
Stones’s chapter: ‘Three Kinds of Test: Truth, Reality, and Existential’. By 
‘looking closely at how actors actively engage in disputes over regulatory 
regimes’,510 whose purposive and potentially transformative force gives 
them the opportunity to ‘express resistance to  forms  of  regulation’511 and 
normalization, Boltanski proposes to distinguish three types of test: ‘truth 
tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’.512 As Stones highlights in his 
scholarly explanation of this conceptual differentiation, ‘[a]ll of these can 
figure in each of  the plural worlds outlined by  Boltanski and Thévenot  in 
On Justification’;513 that is, each of them plays a pivotal role in the 
normative construction of ‘orders of worth’. This section shall elucidate 
the extent to which these three types of test need to be distinguished from 
one another. 
 
(a) ‘Truth Tests’ 
‘Truth tests’ function, first and foremost, as symbolic checks, especially as 
‘instances of confirmation’514 or as ‘instances of transformation’515 in contexts 
in which habitualized practices and canonized declarations ‘make visible the fact 
that there is a norm’.516 Their principal role is to confirm or undermine, stabilize 
or disrupt, legitimize or challenge established orders of interaction and 
justification. By and large, ‘truth tests’ – by means of ‘rituals and formulaic 
pronouncements’517 – are ‘designed to reduce uncertainty and to confirm the current order 
of things’.518 No society can exist without a minimal degree of interactional 
predictability and certainty, which its members need to project upon reality in
  
 
order to convert their encounter with the world into a symbolically mediated 
and culturally codified immersion in reality. 
The ‘need for institutions’,519 then, derives from the necessity ‘to create a 
secure and authoritative environment’520 and thereby permit actors to cope  
with the experiential gap between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité). The fact 
that the former and the latter tend to be out of kilter corroborates people’s need 
to construct empirical or conceptual domains of normativity by transforming 
their immersion in the world into an engagement with socially constructed 
realities. ‘Norms are celebrated and ceremonialized in order to emphasize both 
the desirability of the current state of affairs and its identity with [the] symbolic 
forms’521 upon which actors rely when attributing meaning to their quotidian 
practices. It is ‘[f]ormulas and codifications […], rather than arguments’,522 
which allow patterns of ‘familiarity, repetition, and identification’523 to emerge 
in social life. Crucially, however, all ritualized confirmations of existing states 
of affairs ‘are tests in the sense that it is possible for them to fail’.524 Hence, 
‘[t]ruth is revealed as fallible, uncertain, and fragile’;525 it is no less imperfect, 
indeterminate, and frail than social life itself. 
 
(b) ‘Reality Tests’ 
‘Reality tests’ function, above all, as material checks, notably in terms of the 
empirical manifestation of contextually specific established norms and values. 
Affirmative ‘truth tests’ ‘invoke, hold up, and symbolically reinforce what is valued 
in a social world’.526 Negative ‘truth tests’ question, challenge, and symbolically 
emasculate what is taken for granted in a given ‘order of worth’. By contrast, 
‘reality tests’ – regardless of whether they are affirmative or negative – pose 
the question of whether specific sets of established ‘values are translated into 
the routine, everyday practices, and processes that take place within that 
world’.527 In this sense, their sociological role is to ‘test the symbolic truths 
against the reality of particular mundane processes’.528 Consequently, they confront 
actors with two épreuve-specific options: ‘they can end up either confirming the 
existing order or criticizing it for not living up to its own ideals’.529 The socio- 
ontological significance of ‘reality tests’ stems from their capacity to test  
the validity of symbolically mediated and normatively established relations 
against the practical imperatives imposed upon actors when exposed to the 
tangible constraints of empirical realities. 
 
(c) ‘Existential Tests’ 
‘Existential tests’ function, above all, as experiential checks, mainly in the 
sense that they concern the ways in which actors experience the normative
  
 
parameters that implicitly or explicitly underlie the construction of social 
realities. ‘Truth tests’ relate to the symbolic or epistemic level, and ‘reality tests’ to 
the material or substantive level, at which codes of action and justification can 
be confirmed, rejected, or transformed. ‘Existential tests’, on the other hand, 
refer to the experiential or immersive level at which social practices situated in 
particular settings are experienced, and potentially acted upon, by people in 
their everyday lives. As such, they can involve ‘human responses to injustice 
or domination’,530 often articulated by those who live on the fringes of society. 
The normative implications of Boltanski’s conceptualization of these ‘tests’ 
are not trivial: whereas ‘truth tests’ and ‘reality tests’ tend to be reformist, ‘existential 
tests’ are more likely to have the potential of being radical. 
 
Their critique retains a ‘lived’ character that escapes the boundaries of institutional 
reality and opens up a path to […] ‘the world’, a sphere beyond the ‘iron cage of reality’ 
embodied in institutions, which gives freer rein to the ‘public personal experiences 
and feelings’ and to imaginative, creative and aesthetic impulses that can subvert 
and revitalize existing forms of moral and legal reasoning.531 
 
Thus, it is through ‘existential tests’ emanating from direct experience that 
the arbitrary world of reality can be challenged by the – non-mediated and 
non-distorted – reality of the world. This is crucially important with regard 
to the sociological understanding of actors suffering from mechanisms of 
discrimination, marginalization, and domination on a daily basis. For their 
direct experience of individual or social forms of disempowerment implies 
that nobody is in a better position to speak about access to power, freedom, 
and autonomy than those who are deprived of this entitlement. To the extent 
that actors are driven by ‘[t]he desire [...] to speak with authority for the whole 
institution and, in so doing, to solidify reality’,532 the emancipatory potential 
embedded in their ability not only to face up to ‘radical uncertainty’533 but 
also to encourage subversion motivated by argument and dialogue around 
alternative perspectives is degraded to a decorative appendage of a sterile 
reality drowning in the preponderance of its self-inflicted immanence. 
 
Weaknesses and Limitations 
One may sympathize with Boltanski’s conceptual framework and with the 
normative presuppositions underpinning his attempt to confront the challenge 
of reflecting on the meaning of both domination and emancipation in the 
contemporary era. As Stones forcefully demonstrates, however, it would be 
erroneous to ignore the significant limitations of Boltanski’s analysis. It is 
the task of the final section of his chapter – entitled ‘Addressing On Critique’s
  
 
Limitations: In Situ Critique and the Strategic Terrain’534 – to draw attention 
to some of the most important shortcomings of Boltanski’s account. Let us, for 
the sake of brevity, mention only the key issues raised and discussed by Stones 
in his chapter. 
 
1. Generality and Abstraction 
Stones suggests that Boltanski’s approach is weakened insofar as he ‘self- 
consciously pitches his argument at a relatively high level of generality, in order 
to optimize the intellectual impact of his message’.535 The problem with the 
universalizing tendencies underpinning Boltanski’s analysis, Stones claims, is 
that it pays insufficient attention to ‘the contextual, the specific, and the particular’536 – that 
is, to the irreducible composition of social settings as they are constructed and 
experienced by human actors. Undoubtedly, this limitation is ironic, given 
that the whole point of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to take 
ordinary actors seriously and to shed light on the ways in which justificatory 
processes operate in everyday life. Indeed, as Stones admits, large parts of 
Boltanski’s writings are ‘marked by unusual sensitivity to the contextual and 
the situational’.537 On Critique, however, appears to suffer from an unnecessarily 
‘high level of abstraction’538 and a lack of ‘substantive illustrations’.539 In short, 
the exceedingly general and abstract level of the analysis developed in On 
Critique may not be perceived as particularly helpful by those who, like Stones, 
are used to Boltanski’s strong commitment to the sociological engagement 
with the idiosyncrasies of empirical realities, whose irreducibility cannot be 
captured by relying on essentially philosophical and universalizing statements. 
 
2. Power and Domination 
Stones considers it important to point out that, owing to the previous limitation, 
Boltanski’s treatise is 
 
overlaid both with a lack of detailed attention to the meaning of the ‘totality’ in 
any given case study and with a one-sided account of structures that […] is overly 
focused on normative issues.540 
 
According to Stones, what is needed is a critical examination of the ‘structural 
positioning’541 of both dominated and dominant actors, in order to do justice 
to the complexity of advanced societies and avoid falling into the trap of 
producing one-dimensional misinterpretations of symbolically and materially 
highly differentiated realities. Stones is unsatisfied with Boltanski’s lack of 
attention to ‘the structural positioning of the dominant actors’.542 Crucial, in this regard,
  
 
is the sociological challenge of examining ‘the extent to which dominant 
actors feel they have autonomy from external pressures and forces’543 – that 
is, the degree to which individual or collective subjects occupying positions of 
power and privilege conceive of their own situation as a condition based on 
sovereignty, freedom to make choices, and the capacity to exercise a certain 
amount of control over others. For Stones, then, 
 
[c]ritique needs to understand not only the ideal moral orientations of dominant 
actors, but also the constraints they feel confront any attempt to put these into 
‘action’.544 
 
On this view, critical reflection is no less important to ‘dominant’ actors than 
it is to ‘dominated’ ones. Yet, as Stones remarks, 
 
[Boltanski’s] lack of attention dedicated to the conceptualization of power and 
its distribution within the structural context of a dispute prevents [him] from 
thinking through the practical implications of critique in situ.545 
 
Surely, as Stones is willing to concede, ‘[t]o charge Boltanski with neglecting 
the role of power within the field of domination may well seem counter- 
intuitive’,546 since there are numerous passages in On Critique in which the 
concept of  power is examined in detail. Whilst Boltanski’s emphasis on   
the ‘semantic’,547 rather than merely ‘economic’,548 dimensions of power in 
general and of domination in particular may be perceived as useful by those 
committed to rejecting the explanatory reductionism inherent in monolithic 
accounts of human coexistence, his failure to conceptualize vertical social 
relations from the standpoint of those who have the ‘upper hand’ appears to 
represent a major shortcoming of On Critique. 
 
3. Perception and Reality 
As Stones notes, 
 
[f]or Boltanski, ‘the semantic’ – borrowing terms from Wittgenstein – refers  to 
the field in which the relationship between symbolic forms and states of affairs is 
established.549 
 
In every regime of action, we are confronted with a ‘hierarchy of normative values 
implicitly or explicitly vaunted within those symbolic forms’.550 These values are either 
reproduced or transformed by means of ‘normative tests’,551 which – according to 
Stones – ‘represent the core of Boltanski’s argument’.552 Despite their centrality,
  
 
it seems that in On Critique there is ‘too little elaboration of how these normative 
tests are to be thought of in situ’553 – that is, of how they are embedded in and 
impregnated with power relations. This is ironic, given that every regime of action 
is marked by the aforementioned ‘hierarchy of normative values’,554 which can 
hardly be explained by reference to merely epistemic or moral criteria detached 
from the unequal distribution of social forces and resources. 
Stones accepts that the whole point of cross-fertilizing Bourdieu’s ‘critical 
sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ is to contribute 
to ‘a greater grasp of the broader structural terrain’,555 whilst connecting this big- 
picture approach ‘with a respectful, engaged understanding of the everyday perceptions of 
situated actors, their shared normative worlds and related justifications, and 
their existential motivations to rebel and transgress’.556 
Surely, Boltanski seeks to take ordinary actors’ experiences of processes 
of segregation, exclusion, and discrimination seriously. As Stones contends, 
too frequently, however, he ‘writes as if this powerlessness were a matter of 
perception’.557 As a result, one gets the impression that, in the Boltanskian 
universe of social relations, the aforementioned ‘hierarchy of normative 
values’558 is reducible to an imaginary of semantically constituted projections, 
rather than a reality of structurally established and vertically organized 
intersections. 
 
4. Variability and Heterogeneity 
The previous point ties in with another issue: the problem of the empirical 
variability of test formats. As Stones forcefully states, 
 
the capacity of any one group of social actors caught up in this web to affect a specific test format or 
set of codified regulatory processes will be extremely variable.559 
 
This, of course, applies not only to the praxeological differences between 
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ actors but also, more significantly, to those between 
‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ actors. Indeed, Stones challenges Boltanski’s 
account of test forms by insisting that ‘[c]ollectives of dominant actors will have 
variable capacities’560 and that, moreover, ‘they will often find themselves caught 
up in networks of social relations that allow them little autonomy’.561 Instead of 
presupposing, then, that dominant actors can be conceived of as a homogenous 
group of interrelated subjects with homological interests, we need to study the 
structural and ideological divisions between them. To put it bluntly, it would 
be sociologically reductive to assume that test formats are negotiated between 
‘dominant’ and ‘hegemonic’ groups, on the one hand, and ‘dominated’ and 
‘counter-hegemonic’ groups, on the other. This is not to suggest that this is
  
 
not a valid distinction; rather, this is to insist that dichotomous conceptions  
of the distribution of resources for action – and, hence, of the capacity of 
individual and collective subjects to shape test formats – fail to do justice to the 
polycentric complexity of heterogeneous realities.562 
 
5. ‘Context’ and ‘Situation’ 
It is far from obvious what is to be gained – theoretically or practically – from 
the distinction between ‘context’ and ‘situation’.563 For Boltanski, the latter ‘is more 
exclusively phenomenological’564 than the former. In other words, ‘situation’ 
is a phenomenological sub-realm of the empirical domain called ‘context’. 
Within a ‘situation’, ‘meaning and significance can change from moment to 
moment as the texture of attention is altered’.565 Within a ‘context’, by contrast, 
actors find themselves immersed in a ‘structural terrain’.566 This ‘theorized 
contextual field’567 is much closer to Bourdieu’s conception of ‘field’,568 which 
is largely shaped by underlying structural constellations that form the spatio- 
temporal basis of interest-laden interactions between objectively positioned 
agents. Thus, the Boltanskian distinction between ‘context’ and ‘situation’ 
reflects the attempt to overcome the divide between structuralist objectivism 
and phenomenological subjectivism. Yet, as Stones appears to imply in his critical 
reflections, it is not immediately evident what insights can be obtained from 
drawing this conceptual distinction. Indeed, the ambition to overcome the 
counterproductive antinomy between structuralist and phenomenological 
thought lies at the heart of the Bourdieusian project.569 The question of 
whether or not one comes to the conclusion that Boltanski is more successful 
than Bourdieu in transcending this paradigmatic divide is a different matter. 
 
6. Reflexivity and Irreducibility 
Boltanski’s account of social domination is illuminating in many ways. 
Examining the transformation of power relations in the contemporary world, 
he is deeply critical of the ‘managerial mode of domination’,570 notably of 
the ‘hegemonic managerial and expert-centric discourses of the age’,571 
which prioritize neo-liberal and market-oriented principles (such as efficiency, 
productivity, mobility, flexibility, and risk-taking) over social-democratic or socialist 
values (such as solidarity, cooperation, cohesion, stability, and predictability). 
In the connectivist world of constant movement and change, ‘you have  to  
be always one step ahead of the game, exhibiting flexibility and creativity in 
order to seek new differentials’.572 Building on the first of his aforementioned 
criticisms, however, the problem for Stones is that ‘[t]he force of Boltanski’s 
argument […] is weakened by its generality’573 and that, more specifically, ‘[he]
  
 
can argue as he does only because he treats the dominated as a homogenous 
group and, consequently, as abstracted from particular contexts’.574 
Yet, as far as Stones is concerned, those who are in a position of social, 
political, cultural, or economic power belong to a highly heterogeneous 
assemblage of relatively loosely interconnected actors. On this view, ‘there are 
many dominant groups, differently situated, and the power of any particular group-in- 
focus will be more or less constrained, hedged-in, and limited’.575 Thus, we need 
to acknowledge that ‘[t]he ability of particular dominant groups to ignore the 
rules, for example, will in fact be highly variable’;576 no less inconstant is their 
capacity to impose or transform specific test formats. What is needed, then, is 
a case-sensitive analysis of social groups, based on sociological ‘reflexivity in 
situating the relevant “leaders”, carefully and responsibly, within the networks 
and relations of their fields of action’.577 Ironically, one of Boltanski’s main 
criticisms of Bourdieu appears to apply to the rebellious disciple himself: the 
reflexivity of ordinary actors in vertically organized societies is irreducible to a 
strategic mechanism of position-taking oriented towards the homological 




The purpose of Peter Wagner’s contribution to this volume is captured in the 
thought-provoking title of his chapter: ‘A Renewal of Social Theory That 
Remains Necessary: The Sociology of Critical Capacity Twenty Years After’.578 
As he aims to demonstrate in his essay, Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘sociology 
of critical capacity’ represents a major contribution to the contemporary 
social sciences. Inspired by this conviction, Wagner’s chapter has three main 
objectives: 
 
first, to define the project of the renewal of social theory that is at stake; second, to 
demonstrate why the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ has had the potential to make 
such a renewal possible; and, third, to provide some reasons why, today, this renewal 
remains necessary, despite the work that has already been accomplished.579 
 
As Wagner points out, the appearance of De la justification580 (1991) triggered a 
lively controversy regarding the question of whether or not a radically new form 
of social science had been born in France, particularly in terms of its impact 
on contemporary conceptions of both social theory and social research.581 
Indeed, more recently, debates about the value and significance of pragmatic 
sociology have begun to play a pivotal role in other – notably Anglophone 
and Germanophone – traditions of sociology. From Wagner’s perspective, the
  
 
discussions on this ‘pragmatic turn’ in European – especially Francophone – 
sociology have been accompanied by an ‘uneven history of reception’.582 
More importantly, perhaps, Wagner expresses his reservations about the ways 
in which Boltanski and Thévenot’s studies have been interpreted and applied, 
asserting that many scholars ‘fail to recognize the issues at stake and, thus, the 
fruitful potential of [their] approach’.583 
As has been widely acknowledged, the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ 
emerged in opposition to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. The latter, which is 
also characterized as ‘genetic structuralism’,584 stresses the influence of structural 
constraints on the unfolding of social life. The former, on the other hand, insists on 
the ‘significance of human agency for societal developments and transformations’.585 
Granted, ‘the emphasis on human agency makes it more difficult to analyse 
large-scale social phenomena and their transformations’.586 In fact, this is  
one of the main reasons why many Bourdieusian scholars are suspicious of 
Boltanskian approaches. Rather than establishing a counterproductive division 
between ‘social holism’ and ‘methodological individualism’, however, the point 
is to understand the extent to which ‘conceptual reconstructions’587 that have 
been taking place in social theory over the past decades reflect the willingness 
of most contemporary sociologists to combine and cross-fertilize micro- and 
macro-oriented approaches in their research. 
As Wagner has demonstrated both in this chapter and in various other studies,588 
Boltanski and Thévenot – in their proposal for a ‘sociology of critique’ – insist on 
taking various ‘radical steps’589, which shall be considered in the following sections. 
 
I. Action and Justification 
In opposition to both ‘atomism and holism, as forms of social metaphysics’,590 
Boltanski and Thévenot seek to shed light on ‘the need for human beings to 
justify their actions and the consequences of those actions’.591 On this account, 
the relationship between action and justification is vital not only to the construction of 
social life but also, in a more fundamental sense, to what it means to be human. 
As morally responsible beings, ‘we have to be able to give good reasons for 
our actions when interrogated about them’.592 In other words, the ‘sociology 
of critique’ is based on the assumption that human entities are capable of 
purposive action and reason-guided justification. 
 
II. Normativity and Plurality 
In opposition to ‘the philosophical ambition to determine a single order of 
justification’,593 Boltanski and Thévenot stress the sociological significance of the 
multiplicity of normative regimes of action. Insisting that both within and across
  
 
societies we are confronted with ‘a plurality of criteria of justification’,594 they go one 
step further by affirming that each set of criteria is ‘irreducible’595 and that, in 
terms of their regulative function, they are ‘devoid of hierarchy’.596 It is not the 
case, however, that ‘a dominant order of justification’597 is – straightforwardly and 
unambiguously – homological to ‘a dominant order of action’,598 irrespective of 
whether these orders are constituted ephemerally or institutionally. Rather, as 
Wagner points out, ‘[i]t is the task of the actors themselves to determine which 
order of justification is the appropriate one in the situation in which they find 
themselves immersed’.599 To be sure, whilst ‘[t]he degree to which a given situation 
is open to interpretation is empirically highly variable’,600 it is true that different 
interactional orders impose context-specific normative parameters upon those 
immersed in them. To the extent, however, that ‘Boltanski and Thévenot give […] 
methodological priority to ambivalence and openness to interpretation’,601 they 
emphasize both the radical plurality and the relative uncertainty of normative 
criteria underlying the construction of social life. 
 
III. The Spirits of Capitalism 
As Wagner critically remarks, the problem with this French neo-pragmatist 
approach is that, insofar as it ‘runs the risk of  concentrating on situations   
of interaction’,602 it fails to account for the complexity of ‘the entire social 
configuration’.603 In this sense, although Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘sociology of 
critical capacity’604 – or, if one prefers, of their ‘sociology of disputes’605 – can 
be regarded as an important contribution to the contemporary social sciences, 
it is limited in terms of its investigative and explanatory scope. Yet, as Wagner 
convincingly illustrates, Boltanski has made a significant attempt in his later 
works to address ‘the question of the long-term development of entire social 
configurations’,606 notably in The New Spirit of Capitalism607 (2005 [1999]), 
co-authored with Ève Chiapello. In this influential study, the two French 
analysts distinguish three ‘spirits of capitalism’: 
 
(a) The ‘first spirit of capitalism’ was intimately interrelated with ‘the promise 
of domestic peace’608 as well as with the increasing ‘wealth of nations’,609 
both of which were reflected in the rise of industrial society, driven by 
‘entrepreneurial creativity’,610 and characterized by the ‘the paternalistic 
care of the factory owner for his workers’.611 
(b) The ‘second spirit of capitalism’ was ideologically sustained by developing 
patterns of ‘justification through the industrial efficiency of standardized 
mass-production and through the social achievements that would be secured by 
trade-union participation in the rationalized capitalism of the twentieth 
century’.612 What is important from a sociological point of view, in this
  
 
respect, is that the paradigmatic shift from the first ‘spirit’ to the second 
‘spirit’ can be conceived of as a large-scale response to the social criticisms 
that gained considerable influence throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
(c) Similarly, the intellectual and artistic forms of radical criticisms that led to the 
events of 1968 played a pivotal role in bringing about the ‘third spirit of capitalism’, 
under whose umbrella the  preponderance  of  commodification  processes  
and market-driven practices is justified by reference to people’s ‘potential self- 
realization at work’,613 and, thus, to their seemingly unprecedented capacity to 
contribute – purposively and creatively – to the development of society.614 
 
IV. Critique and Change 
Wagner draws attention to the fact that the ‘connection of action, institution, 
and critique’615 represents a central concern in Boltanski’s On Critique616 (2011 
[2009]). Indeed, as a sympathetic commentator, he goes as far as to suggest 
that it is the fine-grained exploration of this nexus 
 
that turns the ‘sociology of critical capacity’ into the most significant, and also 
the most promising, attempt at renewing social theory and historical-comparative 
sociology which has emerged over the past twenty years.617 
 
In this context, critical capacity can be conceived of as a socio-historical driving force 
capable of shaping the relationship between actions and institutions in potentially 
emancipatory – that is, both individually and collectively empowering – ways. 
Undoubtedly, the credibility of critical theory will always depend on its ‘time- 
diagnostic capacities’.618 Whilst expressing strong reservations about the – largely 
disempowering – effects of capitalist forms of social organization, Boltanski is 
willing to recognize that ‘incessant change’619 constitutes  a  central  ‘feature  of 
our time’.620 In other words, as sociologists concerned with contemporary – and, 
arguably, complex – forms of domination, we need to face up to ‘the elastic, 
adaptable, and integrative power’621 of capitalism – especially of its most recent 
variant, driven by its ‘third spirit’. The question of whether or not this means that 
capitalism can go on forever by constantly inventing new successive ‘spirits’ is an 
entirely different issue. 
 
Laurent Thévenot 
As indicated in the title of his chapter, Laurent Thévenot grapples with 
‘Enlarging  Conceptions  of  Testing  Moments   and   Critical   Theory’.622 
He proposes to do so by reflecting on key themes covered in Boltanski’s and
  
 
his On Justification: Economies of  Worth623 (2006 [1991]), Boltanski’s On Critique: 
A Sociology of Emancipation624 (2011 [2009]), and his own single-authored 
writings on the ‘sociology of engagements’.625 In the opening section of his chapter, 
Thévenot draws his readers’ attention to the fact that, although his own writings 
and those of his colleague and former collaborator Luc Boltanski diverge in 
many respects, ‘the long, friendly, and ongoing conversation between [them], 
renewed this past year’,626 illustrates that they tend to agree on the crucial 
issues at stake in their respective research projects. 
As spelled out in the opening sections of  his chapter, Thévenot aims    to 
shed light on what occurs ‘before and after the “critical reality test”’.627 As 
he explains, Boltanski – notably in On Critique628 – distinguishes three types 
of test: ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’.629 All of them play a 
vital role in the normative construction of social life. Similar to Boltanski, 
Thévenot has sought to make sense of two essential dimensions of everyday 
life: namely, ‘endorsement’ and ‘critique’.630 In any society, we are confronted 
with 
 
the paradoxical tension between affirming the unifying, instituting letter of the 
code and the doubt awakened when differences and other possible connections 
are noted between the particular beings that get grouped together by the code 
form.631 
 
Put differently, the interplay between confirmation and critique, taken-for- 
grantedness and questioning, intuitive immersion and reflexive distance- 
taking is central to the unfolding of social existence. 
 
I. Between ‘Endorsement’ and ‘Critique’ 
As Thévenot explains, since the publication of his paper ‘L’action qui convient’ 
(The appropriate action),632 the concern with the concept of ‘engagement’ has 
become more and more central to his work, notably with respect to his attempt 
to make sense of the two aforementioned ‘moments’ – that is, ‘endorsement’ 
and ‘critique’. Rather than interpreting them as separate aspects, however, 
here the idea is to consider the possibility of ‘integrating the two moments as two 
sides of one and the same “mode of engagement of persons and things” or “engagement in 
appropriate action”’.633 In addition, Thévenot takes on the challenge of exploring 
‘the issue of uncertain “coordination” of actions’.634 Action coordination cannot 
take place without some form of engagement with the external world. Yet, as 
Thévenot stresses, the daily quest for contextual or existential ‘assurance is 
highly dependent on the arrangement of the material environment with which 
one engages while grasping it by means of a certain format’.635 On this view,
  
 
the construction of ‘personal identity’636 is always a matter of ‘mobile, fragile 
consistency’637 contingent upon processes of recognition and, hence, upon the 
constant – both subjectively and intersubjectively exercised – going-back-and- 
forth between certainty and uncertainty.638 
 
II. Between ‘Truth Tests’ and ‘Reality Tests’ 
Thévenot goes on to offer a detailed account of  the main commonalities  
and differences between Boltanski’s and his own conceptual architecture. 
According to the theoretical framework defended in Boltanski’s On Critique, 
we need to draw a distinction between ‘metapragmatic registers’ of explicit 
confirmation or questioning, on  the  one  hand,  and  ‘practical  moments’  
of implicit agreement, on the other.639 The ‘metapragmatic register’ is 
characterized by a tension between ‘truth tests’ and ‘reality tests’: the former tend 
to be founded on ‘systems of confirmation’640 sustaining ‘official assumptions’641 
and leading, practically, to the ‘absolutization’ of a given set of social 
arrangements; the latter, by contrast, can trigger a form of criticism that can 
‘create unease, by challenging the reality of what presents itself as being, either 
in official expressions or in manifestations of common sense’.642 Boltanski has 
famously characterized this tension in terms of a ‘hermeneutic contradiction’,643 
emanating from ‘the relationship between language and the situations of 
enunciation wherein it is realized’644 – that is, from ‘the tension between  
“the letter” and “the spirit” of the law’645 or – if one prefers – between its 
representational and its empirical reality. 
 
III. Between ‘Closed Eyes’ and ‘Open Eyes’ 
In this regard, Thévenot’s conceptual framework, which is concerned primarily 
with the socio-ontological role of ‘regimes of engagement’,646 differs substantially 
from Boltanski’s universe of ‘hermeneutic contradictions’. Indeed, he claims 
to advocate ‘a broader understanding of this tension’,647 which it locates in 
‘all attempts to find guarantees or assurances’,648 thereby proposing to move 
beyond the merely institutional or linguistic level of  action coordination  
and conflict resolution. Similar to Boltanski’s account, however, Thévenot’s 
approach is based on a fundamental dichotomous distinction: namely, the  
one between ‘closed eyes’ and ‘open eyes’.649 He explains the significance of this 
conceptual separation as follows: 
 
In each regime, one can rely blindly (‘with one’s eyes closed’) on marks that one 
views as the most significant reference points for coordination. Yet, symmetrically 
to marking, engaging also involves the phase of doubting (‘having one’s eyes 
  
 
opened’) – that is, remarking and, thus, noticing with renewed attention what one 
sacrifices, or fails to see, by ‘blindly’ trusting in the given mark.650 
 
In other words, it appears that we are confronted with a well-known dialectics 
underlying the everyday construction of social life: when interacting with 
the world, we draw on both implicit and explicit, intuitive and reflexive, 
unconscious and conscious, as well as practical and theoretical forms of 
knowledge. Ultimately, people’s ‘quest for assurance’651 reflects their need for 
a minimum of ontological security in their daily interaction with reality. This 
search for certainty manifests itself in the establishment of different regimes 
of action: irrespective of whether one focuses on the ‘regime of individual 
engagement in a plan’652 – central to ‘the capacity to project oneself into the 
future’653 and thereby express a sense of purpose – or on the ‘regime of familiar 
engagement’654 – crucial to an individual’s experience of ‘feeling at ease’655 in a 
given social setting – the capacity to switch back and forth between intuitive 
and reflexive forms of relating to reality lies at the heart of both reproductive 
and transformative, conformative and deviant, complicit and subversive forms 
of agency. 
 
IV. Between ‘Critique from Above’ and ‘Critique from Below’ 
The question remains ‘what the sociology of engagement contributes to critical 
theory’,656 and vice versa. Not only in Bourdieu’s critical sociology, but also in the 
critical theory associated with the writings of members of the Frankfurt School, 
it appears to be the case that ‘normative forms get imposed on dominated 
agents by means of unconscious internalization’.657 Thévenot contends that 
Boltanski, especially in his later works, has a tendency to (over-) ‘dramatize’658 
his previously undertaken ‘break from the sociology of critique’.659 Moreover, 
the former does not subscribe to the latter’s thesis that 
 
pragmatic sociology, because it is rooted in the ‘taken for granted’ aspect of 
pragmatic moments and is ‘set on starting out from reality as it presents itself 
both to the actors and the observer, tends to produce an effect of closure of reality on 
itself’.660 
 
In fact, for Thévenot, quite the opposite is the case if we take the methodological 
strategy of his ‘sociology of engagement’ seriously: 
 
The plurality of formats for ‘marking’ engaged reality at levels that are below 
institutional and symbolic forms enables us to enlarge and deepen critical 
sociology of domination.661 
  
 
For him, then, the whole point of his approach is to shed light on multiple 
‘dominating forms’662 without necessarily privileging one over any other 
because of its alleged – institutionally or symbolically constituted – 
preponderance. More specifically, Thévenot is convinced that his ‘sociology of 
engagement’663 has enriched Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ in three respects: 
 
(a) The concept of ‘engagement’ permits us to make sense of ‘people’s 
relationship to sources of trust without explaining it in terms of unconscious 
internalization’.664 For, in each regime of engagement, actors are given 
the opportunity not only to develop ‘trust in an objective marker’665 but 
also to undertake a conscious process oriented towards their ‘self-distancing 
from it’.666 
(b) Far from limiting its analytical framework to a critical concern with the 
sociological function of symbolic forms, his approach aims to examine the 
existence of ‘a wider range of formats’.667 Thus, it is ‘attentive to bodies, objects, 
and instruments’.668 
(c) Within the parameters of this new methodical strategy, one  is  ‘no 
longer confined to exposing domination in publicly  instituted  forms 
and formats’.669 Consequently, the distinction between ‘the official and the 
unofficial’670 loses its previously defended socio-ontological primacy. 
 
To put it tautologically, the sociology of engagement engages with the multiple ways in 
which human actors engage in different forms of engagement. To be clear, this is not to 
suggest that it is blind to, or indifferent towards, processes of ‘reification, 
objectification, and alienation’.671 On the contrary, the critical study of 
mechanisms of ‘structural oppression’,672 of ‘domination by symbolic forms’673 
or by material arrangements, and also of ‘micro-power dispositifs’674 is central 
to its attempt to unearth the underlying factors shaping people’s everyday 
interactions. Yet, far from advocating some kind of socio-ontological pessimism, 
let alone fatalism, there is considerable room for socio-ontological optimism, or 
even a healthy degree of idealism, in the sociology of engagement, to the extent 
that it seeks to account for the drive towards looking-forwardness that appears 
to be built into the human condition. In particular, its interest in the pivotal 
role of ‘explorative engagement’675 in the construction of future-oriented forms 
of coexistence is fundamental to its commitment to taking seriously people’s 
‘excitement of discovering the strangeness of something new’.676 
Certainly, one may defend a rather cynical view of this socio-ontological 
dimension when acknowledging that ‘[p]resent-day economies play on 
people’s engagements’677 by exploiting the fact that they can get (superficially 
or profoundly) excited by the stimuli thrown at them by the consumerist 
imperatives of advanced forms of capitalism. Indeed, ‘the presence of
  
 
stimulating cues that trigger one’s eagerness’678 – channelled by digital 
‘[t]echnologies of communication and web navigation’679 – is vital to complex 
regimes of governance capable of ‘dominating by change’.680 For Thévenot, 
however, it is equally important to recognize that ‘explorative engagements’681 are 
part and parcel of what it means to be ‘human’, regardless of the extent to 
which this anthropological need can be instrumentalized by external systemic 
forces and constellations of power. 
 
V. Between ‘Sociological Art Forms’ and ‘Literary Art Forms’ 
In the final section of his chapter,682 Thévenot provides an astute and 
imaginative analysis of the relationship between ‘sociological art forms’ 
and ‘literary art forms’. Indeed, he demonstrates the relevance of the 
examination of human modes of engagement to our understanding of culture 
in general and of aesthetic appreciation in particular. This interest is shared by 
Boltanski, who has produced not only influential sociological studies but also 
respectable artistic – notably, theatrical and poetic – works.683 The insightful 
analogy that Thévenot draws in this context is that writers – similar to social 
actors – deal with tensions of different kinds by taking a ‘critical’, ‘ironic’, or 
‘lyrical’ stance.684 Indeed, one may go a step further by declaring that what  
is needed is not only a ‘sociology of critical capacity’, but also a ‘sociology 
of ironic capacity’ as well as a ‘sociology of lyrical capacity’. As Thévenot 
forcefully reminds us in the Conclusion of his chapter, we must not forget 
that what is often one-sidedly characterized as ‘Boltanskian thought’ is, in 
reality, based on what may be described – more accurately – as a ‘Boltanski– 
Thévenot paradigm’685 or as a ‘Boltanski–Thévenot matrix’.686 This is due    
to the fact that some of Boltanski’s major intellectual achievements are 
inextricably linked to the ‘foundational’ work that he co-produced with 
Thévenot during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Luc Boltanski and Critical Sociology 
Derek Robbins 
The key explorative concern of Derek Robbins’s contribution is pertinently 
synthesized in the title of his chapter: ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Early Luc Boltanski 
(1960–1975): Collective Ethos and Individual Difference’.687 As indicated in this 
title, Robbins aims to scrutinize key aspects underlying the personal and intellectual 
relationship between ‘the master’ (Bourdieu) and ‘his disciple’ (Boltanski), both of 
whom are now widely regarded as belonging to the selective group of the most 
influential French sociologists of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
  
 
A fundamental conviction that Bourdieu shared with his collaborators – including 
not only Boltanski, but also Yvette Delsaut and Jean-Claude Passeron – was the 
firm belief in ‘the continuous interplay between theory and research’688 and, thus, 
in the importance of the attempt to contribute to ‘the overcoming of the division 
between “thinkers”  and  “researchers”’.689  Robbins  follows  Tom  Bottomore690 
in suggesting that an important characteristic of the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne (CSE) was – especially in its early years – the ‘elective affinity between the 
members of the group’.691 As pointed out by Yvette Delsaut, one of Bourdieu’s former 
collaborators, ‘there were real bonds and common goals between people’692 at the 
CSE; and Bourdieu, in his response to her comment, confirmed that, for him, it 
represented ‘a collective’.693 One may infer from Robbins’s detailed description of 
the early days of the CSE that its members shared a particular ‘habitus’ – that is, 
‘an acquired disposition as well as an incorporated disposition’694 that permitted them to 
relate to and identify with one another. 
At the same time, there is little doubt that ‘Bourdieu was the dominant 
point of reference, always the primus inter pares’.695 In other words, he appeared 
to have the upper hand, both interpersonally and intellectually. Hence, there 
was the constant danger of him antagonizing members of the group who 
were not willing to accept the power dynamics in which they found themselves 
immersed. Delsaut made this clear when voicing her misgivings about the deep 
ambivalence permeating her experience of this ensemble of collaborators: on 
the one hand, the group membership gave her a sense of belonging, purpose, 
confidence, and solidarity; on the other hand, its apparent ‘ethos of mutual 
support’,696 in practice, translated into the reproduction of hegemonic power 
mechanisms, reflected in ‘a form of “censure” preventing members from 
breaking rank and fully expressing their individualities’.697 It remains open to 
debate whether this was mainly due to ‘Bourdieu’s style of management’,698 
often perceived as ultimately self-referential and authoritarian, or whether this 
was mostly down to other – internal or external – factors, or indeed whether 
this was a result of a combination of these elements. 
The principal purpose of Robbins’s chapter, however, ‘is to seek to place 
Boltanski and his early work within this framework’.699 Indeed, as Robbins – one 
of the most knowledgeable experts concerned with the in-depth study of the 
history of European social theory – spells out, such an endeavour involves at 
least three ‘necessary methodological caveats’:700 
 
(a) Owing to the inaccessibility of specific textual sources, in addition to the 
limited space available in the context of his chapter, Robbins’s analysis is 
‘selective rather than comprehensive’.701 
(b) His report, rather than being informed by anecdotal or first-hand – for instance, 
interview-based – evidence, is based exclusively on his ‘reading of texts’.702 
  
 
(c) Robbins does not aim to provide an ‘ex post facto interpretation’703 of the 
contradictory mechanisms of cooperation and competition that affected 
the tension-laden relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski during – 
and, to some degree, even after – their years of intense collaboration. 
Furthermore, in his examination, he does not rely on the explicit (both 
unsympathetic and sympathetic) criticisms that Boltanski formulated – 
especially in his later works704 – when reflecting upon the respective 
weaknesses and strengths of Bourdieusian sociology.  Rather,  Robbins  
is concerned – primarily – with ‘seeking to understand the mutual 
influence’705 between the two French sociologists and the ways in which 
this reciprocal impact shaped their respective oeuvres. 
 
Robbins’s entire account is founded on one central assumption, which – he 
claims – is largely accepted by Bourdieusian scholars: namely, the supposition 
that 
 
there was a crucial change in Bourdieu’s thinking at about 1972, as he allowed himself to 
explore fully the implications of the ‘post-structuralist’ position, which had been 
dormant throughout the 1960s.706 
 
More specifically, Robbins contends that Bourdieu’s attempt to  achieve 
some kind of balance between structuralism and ethnomethodology707 ‘can be better 
understood in comparison with Boltanski’s – arguably distinctive – attempt to 
resolve the problems associated with the analysis of everyday experience’.708 
The detailed enquiry that follows is chronologically structured: (I) 1960– 
1965, (II) 1965–70, (III) 1970–1972/73, and (IV) beyond 1972/73. 
 
I. 
With regard to the first period, 1960–1965, Robbins remarks that ‘Luc 
Boltanski’s introduction to Bourdieu was initially social – that is, the 
consequence of a social network’.709 In fact, as the British commentator remarks, 
Boltanski explains in a footnote in his recently published Rendre la réalité 
inacceptable710 (2008) that he met Bourdieu ‘through the medium of [his] elder 
brother, Jean-Élie’.711 The latter got to know the former whilst completing  
his military service in Algiers. During his studies in Sociologie at the Sorbonne, 
Boltanski had the chance to establish an unusually close and friendly link with 
Bourdieu, after this new ‘assistant’ had returned from Algeria. What is more 
significant from an intellectual perspective, however, is his sustained interest in 
epistemological questions regarding the difference between ‘common sense’ and 
‘science’ as well as in methodological issues concerning the sociological study of
  
 
human practices. Of noteworthy importance, in this respect, is the book Un art 
moyen : Essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie712 (1965), which he co-authored 
with Luc Boltanski, Robert Castel, and Jean-Claude Chamboredon. 
As Robbins explains, in relation to the epistemological level, 
 
Bourdieu was anxious to explore the nature of the relationship between ordinary 
experiences (in particular, the accounts of their experiences given by people in 
everyday life) and scientific analysis (notably, the accounts given by sociologists of 
those experiences).713 
 
As Robbins states, referring to the methodological level, Bourdieu sought to 
 
analyse sociologically the practice of photography, because sociological discourse 
tended to operate with an imposed stratification of research objects.714 
 
To the extent that, in every hitherto existing society, objects of study have been 
classified in terms of different – relatively arbitrary – hierarchies of legitimacy, 
we are confronted with socio-historically contingent mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion justified ‘under the guise of objectivity’.715 For Bourdieu, then, the 
sociological examination of photographic practices was ‘an attempt to advance 
the study of hitherto unconsecrated objects’716 and thereby ‘retrieve everyday 
practice’.717 The sociological engagement with ‘the immanent effects of 
indigenous objectivity’,718 expressed in the quotidian mastery of photography, 
seemed to enable Bourdieu to transcend the artificial and counterproductive 
antinomy between the positivist belief in scientific purity and the interpretivist 
celebration of subjective grasps of reality. In Robbins’s words, 
 
Bourdieu was seeking to oppose – simultaneously – intuitive and narrative spontaneity, 
on the one hand, and abstracted and detached objectivism, on the other.719 
 
Given its ‘grassroots’ usage, photographic activities – unlike other socio-creative 
practices, especially those associated with ‘high-brow culture’ – seemed to be 
largely ‘uncontaminated by the legacy of consecrated rules of art’720 and, 
therefore, appeared to possess some sort of empowering ‘anti-establishment’ 
potential. To the degree that photographic technologies could be seen as an 
instrument not only for the production but also for the recognition of ‘naïve 
experience’,721 their sociological study could help understand ‘the primary 
attitudes of ordinary people’722 without ignoring, let alone refuting, the social 
and aesthetic value of their own small-scale cultural practices. 
In this context, Boltanski’s single-authored contribution to Un art moyen, 
entitled ‘La rhétorique de la figure : Image de presse et photographie’,723
  
 
is exceptionally interesting, since, according to Robbins’s account, it 
illustrates – amongst many other things – the extent to which its author’s 
conception of language differed from that of his intellectual patron, Bourdieu. 
Within Bourdieu’s framework, producers of symbolic forms tend to be analysed 
‘in direct correlation with their social conditions or social position-taking’724 that is, 
human practices are examined in terms of their homological determination 
contingent upon sets of  social structures. Within Boltanski’s framework,   
by contrast, producers of symbolic forms are scrutinized ‘in relation to the 
socially constructed codes of their specific professional contexts’,725 in which strategic 
forms of action play a much less significant role than in the Bourdieusian 
universe of  constant struggle for symbolic and material resources. Insofar  
as ‘Boltanski seems to have been inclined to regard language as the medium 
which pragmatically constitutes and consolidates social structures’,726 he has 
been willing to attribute a far greater degree of autonomy to human agency 
than Bourdieu within the rather constraining parameters of his ‘socio-genetic 
structuralism’. 
In brief, according to Robbins, the main difference between the two 
sociologists in Un art moyen can be described as follows: Bourdieu sought to 
demonstrate that 
 
the social position-taking of photographic professionals inhibited the possibility that 
the democratization of image making secured by a new technological apparatus 
might actualize a greater degree of egalitarian social solidarity.727 
 
Boltanski, on the other hand, sought to shed light on processes of ‘normative 
structuration’728 emerging through people’s capacity to construct ‘networks of 
semiotic signification’729 based on ‘individual and collective representations’.730 
 
II. 
With regard to the second period, 1965–70, Robbins makes a number of 
interesting remarks. Let us, for the sake of brevity, focus on a few key issues 
raised in relation to this phase. One of the striking features of the second 
edition of Un art moyen in 1970 was that it no longer included ‘the single- 
authored contributions to Part 2 of Lagneau and Boltanski’,731 in addition to 
having excluded Castel’s previously published Conclusion.732 Reflecting on the 
implications of this omission, Robbins makes an important point: 
 
This exclusion may simply have been to render the argument of the book more 
coherent and consistent, but the effect was to suppress the element of dissent 
from the dominant – that is, largely Bourdieusian – interpretation.733 
  
 
Thus, the second edition of Un art moyen may be interpreted as a manifestation 
of the unquestionable  hegemony  of  the  Bourdieusian doxa  within  the 
CSE. Le métier de sociologue : Préalables épistémologiques734 – which Bourdieu had 
co-written with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron and 
which was published in 1968 – was an ambitious project in that it ‘sought to 
offer a blueprint for a reflexive methodology capable of securing scientific validity for 
sociological explanation by deploying procedures outlined by Gaston Bachelard’.735 
Broadly speaking, this book makes a case for a realist-objectivist – and, arguably, 
Durkheimian – conception of sociology, arguing that ‘[t]he construction of a 
science of social behaviour involves the deliberate detachment of “facts” from their everyday 
contexts’.736 At the same time, this study endorses a constructivist-contextualist – and, 
arguably, Kuhnian – conception of sociology, contending that these ‘facts’ need 
to be discussed, just as their existence needs to be corroborated, ‘within a self- 
referencing epistemic community’.737 To the extent that the conception of sociology 
defended in this epistemological treatise has both realist-objectivist and 
constructivist-contextualist underpinnings, it anticipates Bourdieu’s attempt to 
overcome counterproductive antinomies in the social sciences. 
Whilst  recognizing  the  valuable  insights   gained   from   constructivist- 
contextualist accounts of knowledge, in particular the fact that ‘the academic 
gaze has to be situated’,738 Bourdieu was eager to insist that social scientists 
should not underestimate ‘the benefits of  structuralism’739  for the pursuit    
of critical research aimed at exposing seemingly subterranean mechanisms 
and forces whose existence largely escapes a quotidian grasp of reality based 
on common sense. In this respect, his article ‘Structuralism and Theory of 
Sociological Knowledge’740 (1968) conveys an unambiguous message – namely, 
that it would be utterly inappropriate to dismiss the epistemic challenges 
arising from scientific projects motivated by an ‘uncovering mission’. 
Certainly, it is possible to trace various Bourdieusian themes in the writings 
Boltanski produced between 1965 and 1970, notably in the following works: 
Le bonheur suisse741 (1966), La découverte de la maladie742 (1969), Prime éducation et 
morale de classe743 (1969), and ‘Taxinomies populaires, taxinomies savantes: Les 
objets de consommation et leur classement’744 (1970). Although Bourdieu and 
Boltanski appeared to start following different intellectual paths, ‘there was no 
public indication of disagreement in the second half of the decade’.745 There 
is, however, ample evidence supporting the view that Boltanski’s paradigmatic 
outlook had begun to shift. Without wishing ‘to celebrate “popular thought” 
or “popular knowledge”’746 in his writings, and whilst sharing Bourdieu’s 
persuasion that, in hierarchically structured societies, ‘the models of thought, 
and, a fortiori knowledge, always circulate from top to bottom but never, 
inversely, from bottom to top’,747 Boltanski sought to move away from his 
mentor’s explanatory framework by stressing the socio-ontological significance
  
 
of human agency – including the critical, moral, and reflexive resources from 
which it is derived. In Robbins’s words, ‘Boltanski was articulating – against 
structuralism – his conviction that social science has to study the conscious relations of 
human actors, especially as they are rendered conscious linguistically in relation 
to dominant discourses imposed by dominant institutions’.748 
 
III. 
With regard to the third period, 1970–1972/73, Robbins points out that    the 
differences between Bourdieu and Boltanski became more and more 
pronounced. 
 
Bourdieu contended that not only do observed persons act strategically, rather 
than in accordance with ‘rules’ separately constructed by scientific observers, but 
that, in addition, scientific observers are themselves strategic agents.749 
 
In other words, ‘strategic action’ can be regarded as a power-laden, an interest- 
driven, and an outcome-oriented mode of behaviour that, in principle, exists 
in all social fields, including the scientific field. On this account, it is not only 
the ‘observed’ but also the ‘observers’ who are strategically motivated agents. 
According to Robbins, this sociological presupposition is central to Bourdieu’s 
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique : Précédé de Trois études d’ethnologie Kabyle750 (1972) 
and, arguably, applies to an even larger extent to the English version of this 
study, published under the title Outline of a Theory of Practice751 (1977 [1972]). 
During the aforementioned transition process – which Robbins characterizes 
as a shift from a ‘structuralist’ to a ‘post-structuralist’752 conception of social 
research – the concept of ‘reflexivity’753 acquired increasing importance and, 
indeed, ‘became a cornerstone of his methodology’.754 For Robbins, Bourdieu’s 
concern with the methodological commitment to sociological reflexivity reflects 
a ‘kind of epistemological Angst’755 triggered by a ‘sense of guilt’756 for running 
the risk of becoming ‘a transfuge, a betrayer of his class origins’.757 
Faced with Bourdieu’s paradigmatic shift towards a methodological 
emphasis on radical sociological (self-) awareness and (self-) questioning, 
Boltanski began to carve a niche for himself. 
 
Boltanski continued to work within the collective framework that Bourdieu had 
established, continuing to acknowledge the direction of his patron, but he did so 
with his own particular orientation.758 
 
In this reorientation process, the epistemological question regarding the status 
of everyday knowledge as well as the sociological question concerning the status
  
 
of ordinary people became central to Boltanski’s research programme. In the 
paper ‘Carrière scientifique, morale scientifique et vulgarisation’759 (1969), 
co-written with Pascale Maldidier, the ‘differentiation between professional 
and everyday knowledge’760 is a crucial concern in the effort to understand, 
from a sociological perspective, ‘the attempts of scientists to popularize  
their knowledge’.761 What is perhaps even more significant, however, is that 
Boltanski – in his aforementioned ‘Taxinomies populaires, taxinomies savantes : 
Les objets de consommation et leur classement’762 (1970), which articulated a 
strong critique of recent studies of food consumption – proposed to examine 
‘the effects of  “systems of  naming and classification” on the perceptions   
of ordinary people’.763 In the context of this enquiry, Boltanski’s plea for a 
sociology inspired by the ‘vigilance of its practitioners’764 is, as remarked by 
Robbins, ‘reminiscent of the epistemological vigilance recommended in Le 
métier de sociologue’765 and, indeed, comparable to Bourdieu’s Durkheim-inspired 
insistence upon ‘the need for an “epistemological break”’.766 Yet, as became 
clear in his subsequent writings, for Boltanski, such an epistemic distance- 
taking from everyday experiences and common-sense understandings of 
reality can be justified only to the extent that ordinary actors are conceived of 
as critical entities capable of reflection and justification. 
 
IV. 
With regard to the fourth period, beyond 1972/73, Robbins draws his 
readers’ attention to the fact that the works published in 1973 ‘intimated  
new research directions within the CSE’,767 most notably the definite ‘end of 
the collaboration between Bourdieu and Passeron’.768 To be sure, Boltanski’s 
‘L’espace positionnel : Multiplicité des positions institutionnelles et habitus 
de classe’769 (1973) contained unambiguous traces of Bourdieu’s continuing 
influence on his disciple’s work. This may not have been particularly 
surprising, given that this research project – which was concerned with 
position-taking dynamics at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris – ‘was 
explicitly located in the context of a collection of projects, directed by 
Bourdieu, to examine the production and reproduction of “dominant 
ideologies” in society’.770 The publication of Bourdieu’s La noblesse d’État : 
Grandes écoles et esprit de corps771 (1989) may be interpreted as the culmination 
of a long-term research project, designed to explain the reproductive logic 
governing both materially and symbolically constituted power structures in 
stratified societies, such as late twentieth-century France. Several influential 
studies preceding this book – especially ‘Les stratégies de reconversion :  
Les classes sociales et le système d’enseignement’772 by Bourdieu, Boltanski, 
and Saint Martin (1973), but also ‘Le titre et le poste : Rapports entre le
  
 
système de production et le système de reproduction’773 by Bourdieu and 
Boltanski (1975) – were aimed at uncovering the logic underlying the 
production and reproduction of power mechanisms in class-divided and 
field-differentiated societies. 
It may be tempting to draw parallels between Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’, 
which he developed from the mid-1980s onwards, and Erving Goffman’s 
‘ethnomethodology’, on whose respective merits and limitations he reflected, in 
some detail, in a piece published in 1973 and entitled ‘Erving Goffman et    
le temps du soupçon’.774 If the commentator Yves Winkin is right to suggest 
that this text had been intended to serve as the Introduction to the French 
translations of Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life775 (1971 [1959]) 
and Relations in Public776 (1971) for the one-volume edition La mise en scène de la vie 
quotidienne777 in 1973, then anyone who has read the article will not be astounded 
to learn that it was ‘ultimately considered too critical for inclusion’778 in the 
French version. In particular, Boltanski was suspicious of Goffman’s attempt 
 
to borrow, from the indigenous language of the groups and classes that he is 
analysing, their categories of thought and words and, by systematic and 
controlled redeployment, makes quasi-conceptual use of them […].779 
 
Boltanski’s scepticism vis-à-vis the seemingly unproblematic ‘appropriation 
of indigenous terminologies’,780 combined with his misgivings about the 
ethno-methodological ambition to reconstruct people’s experiences as ‘quasi- 
natural’ processes by  virtue of  ‘quasi-conceptual’ frameworks developed  
by social scientists, can be regarded as an expression of his critical attitude 
towards the methodological failure to distinguish between ‘immersion’ and 
‘distance-taking’. His sustained effort ‘to expose the tensions between everyday 
experience and scientific observation’781 was – perhaps, even more forcefully – 
articulated in a core article he co-wrote with Bourdieu: ‘La production de 
l’idéologie dominante’782 (1976), republished – six years after the master’s 
death – in 2008.783 The centrality of  this piece is reflected in the fact that  
this new edition was accompanied by an extensive commentary by Boltanski, 
Rendre la réalité inacceptable : À propos de ‘La production de l’idéologie dominante’784 
(2008), containing a number of instructive remarks on the context in which 
the original piece had been written. 
Most studies concerned with the difficult – personal and 
intellectual – relationship between Bourdieu and Boltanski may come to the 
conclusion that ‘[t]he intellectual tension that had been so creatively fruitful clearly 
could not be sustained’785 from the mid-1980s onwards. One may follow Robbins, 
however, in recognizing that the ‘valedictory flavour’786 permeating Boltanski’s 
acknowledgment in the final section of his Foreword to Les cadres : La formation
  
 
d’un groupe social787 (1982) illustrates that – despite all his subsequently 
articulated reservations and disagreements with his patron – he will always 
be grateful for the immensely formative impact that his père intellectuel had on 
him: after ‘so many years of collaboration with him having left their mark  
on this work’,788 Boltanski’s ‘homage in action’789 is a genuine ‘homage as 
practice’790 in recognition of the profound influence that Bourdieu has had, 
and will always continue to have, on his oeuvre. 
 
Mohamed Nachi 
As anticipated in the title of his chapter, ‘Beyond Pragmatic Sociology: A 
Theoretical Compromise between “Critical Sociology” and the “Pragmatic 
Sociology of Critique”’,791 Mohamed Nachi proposes to examine Bourdieu’s 
and Boltanski’s respective approaches with the prospect of reconciling  
them. Arguably, the French sociological discourses produced between the 
1960s and the 1980s were dominated by the influence of four prominent 
scholars: Raymond Boudon (1934–2013), Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), 
Michel Crozier (1922–2013), and Alain Touraine (1925–). These high-flying 
intellectuals shaped, respectively, ‘four major currents’792 of sociological 
analysis: ‘methodological individualism’ (Boudon), ‘genetic structuralism’ 
or ‘critical sociology’ (Bourdieu), the ‘sociology of organizations’ (Crozier), 
and the ‘sociology of action’ (Touraine). Their hegemonic position in French 
academia ‘prevented the development of other sociological perspectives’,793 
or at least it appeared to have a constraining impact upon the development  
of French sociological  thought,  notably  in  terms of  its  potential  
diversity and its capacity to generate a multiplicity of paradigms with a 
corresponding plurality of fruitful theoretical controversies. Considered in 
this light, Thévenot and Boltanski’s success in having created an alternative 
paradigmatic approach – known as the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – 
will go down as a remarkable achievement in the history of French 
intellectual life. 
Crucial to their project is the sociological ambition to grasp the ‘plurality 
of action’794 by examining – to use Thévenot’s terminology – ‘diverse modes 
of engagement in the world’.795 More specifically, they are concerned with 
shedding light on the ‘grammatical construction of regimes of action and 
justice’796 – that is, on the rule-governed constitution permeating socio-
historically situated performances and normativities. Given their 
determination to develop ‘a model of analysis capable of taking seriously the 
justifications provided by ordinary people in their performative actions’,797 it 
comes as no surprise that they reject any attempt to generate a ‘totalizing 
account of society’.798 
  
 
In opposition to the macro-sociologically oriented and scientistically 
motivated aspiration to provide some sort of ‘catch-all framework’ capable of 
uncovering underlying causal mechanisms, which reflect the lawfulness of the 
social universe but which, by and large, escape people’s everyday perceptions 
of reality, Boltanski and Thévenot’s project possesses a more contextualist 
outlook. In particular, the two researchers aim to explore 
 
the modes of equivalence – as well as the operations of judgement, qualification, adjustment, 
and justification – by way of which agreements and compromises are made and 
unmade in the course of action coordination processes.799 
 
In other words, the paradigm shift from ‘critical sociology’ to the ‘sociology of 
critique’ reflects the need to account for people’s capacity to coordinate their 
actions in accordance with discursively negotiated values and principles. 
 
I. 
In the first section of his chapter, entitled ‘Inflections’,800 Nachi focuses on two 
of Boltanski’s co-authored studies: On Justification801 (2006 [1991]) and The New 
Spirit of Capitalism802 (2005 [1999]). 
With regard to the first book, it is important to take notice of the fact that 
its authors, Boltanski and Thévenot, take issue with both the critical theory 
developed, in different variants, by members of the Frankfurt School and the 
critical sociology proposed by Bourdieu for their tendency ‘to conceive of society 
exclusively in terms of domination, power relations, exploitation, and conflicts 
of interests’.803 At the same time, Boltanski and Thévenot do not have much 
sympathy for Kantian and contractual approaches, notably those associated with 
the works of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, due to their alleged failure  
to do justice to the sociological role of contradictions and conflicts within 
people’s lifeworlds.804 Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘overture towards a new 
social critique’805 – namely, the critique derived from the reflexive resources 
of ordinary actors – rejects the macro-theoretical ambition to develop an 
‘overarching’806 conceptual architecture of society. 
With regard to the second book, it is vital to acknowledge that its authors, Boltanski 
and Chiapello, are determined to ‘take into account relations of power and, 
above all, relations and actions of a non-institutional nature’,807 which – in the 
‘connectionist world’808 of the ‘global village’ – play no less important a role 
than the ideological endorsement of ‘networks, flexibility, autonomy’809 in the 
construction of post-Fordist societies. Yet, far from conceiving of processes 
of  critique and justification as obstacles to the emergence of  a ‘new spirit  
of capitalism’, Boltanski and Chiapello interpret them as driving forces of
  
 
large-scale social transformations, especially with regard to capitalism’s ability 
to adapt to the demands  of  rapidly  changing  interactional  environments 
by converting the ‘projects-oriented polity’ (cité par projets)810 into the future- 
oriented powerhouse of an ever-more pioneering stage of modernity. 
 
II. 
In the second section of his chapter, entitled ‘Hybridization’,811 Nachi grapples 
with the eclectic thematic underpinnings of Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology 
of critique’. In his opinion, two intellectual sources of influence are chiefly 
important in this regard: structuralism and phenomenology. 
Central to structuralist analysis is the concept of ‘grammaticality’.812 In 
structuralist studies, this term is employed to account for the fact that human 
actions are shaped – or, in some cases, even determined – by different sets of 
underlying structures.813 There is a large variety of grammars impacting upon 
the constitution of social life: human actors are simultaneously immersed in 
numerous – notably cultural, political, economic, demographic, linguistic, 
and ideological – grammars. 
Crucial to phenomenological analysis is the concept of ‘experience’.814 In 
phenomenological studies, this term is used to account for the fact that 
human actions acquire meaning only insofar as they possess direct or indirect 
implications for people’s experiential exposure to and absorption of reality.815 
Surely, there is a wide range of experiences allowing for the meaning-laden 
participation in social life: human actors can have countless – for instance, 
individual or collective, rational or emotional, mediated or unmediated, 
soothing or unsettling, ordinary or extraordinary, formative or insignificant, 
reassuring or traumatic, positive or negative – experiences. 
There is, however, a third dimension to which Nachi draws his readers’ 
attention: ‘historicity’.816 This category mediates between grammatically organized 
structures and phenomenologically constituted experiences in that both levels 
of existence are spatio-temporally connected and obtain meaning in relation to 
the socio-historically constituted background horizons in which human actors 
find themselves situated.817 Put differently, the ‘dialectic established between the 
structural and the phenomenal’818 is embedded in the constantly changing horizon 
of the historical. 
 
III. 
The third section of Nachi’s chapter takes on the task of reflecting on the 
possibility of a significant intellectual challenge: finding a ‘compromise 
between “critical sociology” and the “sociology of critique”’.819 In particular,
  
 
Boltanski’s later writings – notably, On Critique820 (2011 [2009]) and Rendre la 
réalité inacceptable821 (2008) – play a pivotal role in his attempt to reconcile his 
own approach with that of his ‘intellectual father’, or at least in his ambition 
to accomplish this vis-à-vis key aspects of their respective conceptual and 
methodological frameworks. 
However one seeks to settle previous disputes between the two currents of 
thought, and regardless of  whether  or not one comes to the conclusion  that  it  
is not only possible but also desirable to cross-fertilize their respective insights, a 
compromise between Bourdieusian and Boltanskian thought can be found only to 
the degree that the advocates of both approaches are willing, at the same time, to 
accept and to reject the distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’.822 
 
• The distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’ 
needs to be accepted to the extent that the validity claims raised by experts 
and researchers are meant to transcend the constraining and misleading 
boundaries of common sense and everyday misconceptions. 
• The distinction between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’ 
needs to be rejected to the extent that laypersons are capable of engaging 
in processes of communication, reflection, and justification, by means of 
which they – similar to trained investigators – are able not only to question 
taken-for-granted assumptions about specific aspects of reality, but also to 
shape the development of different domains in society in accordance with 
discursively established principles of normativity. 
 
Hence, the attempt to ‘establish a relationship between sociology and critique, metacritique 
and ordinary critique’,823 reflects the ambition to locate the cognitive, normative, 
and judgemental resources of actors not in the privileged sphere of scientific 




In his second chapter, entitled ‘Towards a Dialogue between Pierre 
Bourdieu’s “Critical Sociology” and Luc Boltanski’s “Pragmatic Sociology 
of Critique”’,824 Simon Susen reflects on ‘the relationship between two 
prominent paradigmatic programmes, which are often regarded as 
diametrically opposed’.825 Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ have not only attained considerable recognition and praise, 
but also provoked a substantial amount of criticism and scepticism in the 
contemporary literature. Furthermore, the intellectual connections between 
these two approaches have been explored, in some detail, by numerous
  
 
sympathetic and unsympathetic commentators.826 What is striking, however, 
is that ‘the key points of convergence and divergence between Bourdieu and 
Boltanski have hardly been examined in a systematic fashion’.827 This chapter 
aims to fill this gap in the literature by reflecting on (I) points of convergence, (II) 
points of divergence, and (III) points of integration between Bourdieu’s ‘critical 
sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. As demonstrated 
in this enquiry, ‘paradoxically, the key points of convergence between Bourdieu 
and Boltanski are, at the same time, the most significant points of divergence 
between these two thinkers’,828 in addition to representing the central issues in 
relation to which their respective insights can be cross-fertilized. The following 
levels of analysis are particularly important. 
(1) The concept of ‘the social’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski scrutinize social 
reality from a sociological point of view – that is, by insisting on its relational 
constitution. Bourdieu stresses the determinate, power-laden, unreflexive, complicit, 
and reproductive mechanisms permeating social structures. Boltanski, by contrast, 
emphasizes the indeterminate, value-laden, reflexive, discursive, and transformative 
dimensions pervading social processes. 
(2) The concept of ‘practice’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski shed light on 
the practical constitution of social reality, which is reflected in the 
methodological privilege they ascribe to the systematic study of human 
actions. Bourdieu portrays social practices as the product of the homological 
correspondence between objectively determined positions, which are 
situated within specific social fields, and subjectively naturalized dispositions, 
which are located within particular forms of habitus. Boltanski, on the other 
hand, interprets social practices in terms of  an open flow of  normative 
performances structured   in relation to context-dependent orders of worth, 
which are embedded within specific regimes of action, and shaped by context-
sensitive critical and moral capacities, whose empirical significance manifests 
itself in processes of discussion and justification. 
(3) The concept of ‘critique’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski conceive of 
their projects as profoundly normative, rather than merely descriptive, 
endeavours. Bourdieu tends to regard critique as a professional privilege of 
researchers, who are not only able to undertake an epistemological break with 
common sense but also equipped with the terminological and 
methodological tools necessary to uncover the underlying power 
mechanisms that govern the constitution of field-specific realities. 
Conversely, Boltanski considers critique as a universal resource of ordinary 
people, who are not only able to engage in processes of reflection and 
justification but also bestowed with the capacity to assess the validity of 
social actions by mobilizing their discursive resources on the basis of ‘tests’ 
– notably ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and ‘existential tests’ – in order to shape 
the development of everyday life. 
  
 
(4) The concept of ‘interest’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski recognize that all 
human practices are – directly or indirectly – influenced by social interests. 
According to Bourdieu, social interests emerge within social fields: (a) as ‘spaces 
of possibles’, they are structuring horizons, which set the limits for what agents 
can and cannot do; (b) as ‘spaces of divisions’, they are stratifying horizons, 
which divide agents between those who are dominant and those who are 
dominated; (c) as ‘spaces of struggles’, they are tension-laden horizons, in which 
agents compete for access to dominant positions and resources. According to 
Boltanski, social interests arise within social ‘cities’: (a) as ‘spaces of 
engagement’, they are interactional horizons, which form the background 
against which actors are invested in the world; (b) as ‘spaces of worth’, they are the 
interpretive horizons through which actors attribute meaning to their practices 
in accordance with specific principles; (c) as ‘spaces of disputes’, they are the 
normative horizons, which oblige actors to participate in processes of 
discussion oriented towards the justification of different modes of 
performance. 
(5) The concept of ‘aporia’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski aim to 
overcome different sources of  explanatory reductionism  in the social 
sciences. One  of Bourdieu’s main objectives is to transcend the allegedly 
artificial and counterproductive division between ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ 
approaches in social and political thought. One of Boltanski’s principal 
intentions is to challenge the fatalistic implications of ‘determinist’ accounts, 
as well as the positivist presuppositions underlying ‘scientistic’ research 
programmes, in social and political analysis. 
(6) The concept of ‘background’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski insist upon the 
sociological centrality of ‘social grammars’, providing indispensable background 
horizons within and against which human actions take place. For Bourdieu, 
the foundational space of human life is the social field, whose underlying logic 
of functioning tends to be unconsciously reproduced and taken for granted by those 
immersed in it. For Boltanski, the foundational space of human life is the cité, 
whose order of worth can be consciously problematized and, if necessary, called into 
question by those situated in it. 
(7) The concept of ‘power’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski seek to contribute 
to a better understanding of social power by exploring the origins, functioning, 
and consequences of  its existence. The former appears to endorse a form of 
socio-ontological pessimism, according to which the unequal distribution of 
social power is – largely and unconsciously – accepted and reproduced by 
human actors, even by those who are negatively affected by it. The latter 
seems to advocate a form of socio-ontological optimism, according to which 
the unequal distribution of social power can be, and often is, challenged and 
transformed by human actors, both by those who benefit from and by those 
who suffer from it. 
  
 
(8) The concept of ‘emancipation’: Both Bourdieu and Boltanski are committed 
not only to criticizing the existence and effects of social domination but also 
to envisaging the construction of historical conditions allowing for processes 
of social emancipation. For Bourdieu, processes  of  social  emancipation  
can be brought about by making use of the critical spirit inherent in scientific 
rationality, capable of seeing through the false consciousness permeating 
everyday preconceptions, thereby contesting the epistemic validity of doxic 
misrepresentations prevalent in particular interactional realms of society.  
For Boltanski, processes of social emancipation are inconceivable without  
the critical spirit derived from ordinary people’s moral and reflexive capacities, enabling 
them to question the apparent givenness of reality and thereby dare to 
imagine the possibility of alternative, and universally empowering, modes  
of sociality. 
By way of conclusion, Susen’s chapter formulates eight hypotheses concerning 
the possibility of cross-fertilizing Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. These hypotheses can be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) The production of scientific knowledge is inconceivable without the 
construction of everyday knowledge, since the reflexive discourses of 
specialist researchers emanate from the critical capacities of ordinary 
people. 
(2) Homologically structured realities cannot escape the unforced force of 
critique, which has the normative power to convert relationally assembled 
regimes of action into discursively constituted spaces of justification. 
(3) Every social field forms a relationally constructed space of action that 
depends on processes of justification, just as every cité represents a 
communicatively constituted regime of validation that is internally 
divided by mechanisms of social stratification. 
(4) People are agents who are bodily situated in social relations shaped by 
dynamics of competition and confrontation. People are also actors, 
however, able to build communal bonds based on normative processes  
of justification and cooperation. The outcome-driven attitude underlying 
strategic action cannot be divorced from the understanding-oriented spirit 
motivating communicative action. 
(5) Critical competence, whilst permitting subjects capable of action and 
justification to convert their engagement with reality into an object of 
reflection, is socio-historically situated in a doxic horizon, composed of 
culturally specific values and preconceptions. 
(6) The normativity of every cité is not only sustained by orders of worth, which 
set the parameters for actions and justifications, but also impregnated with 
the structuring power of social fields, which impose a stratifying logic of
  
 
positioning upon the seemingly most disinterested encounters between 
its competing participants. 
(7) The normative configurations created within cités are shot through with 
relations of power and structures of inequality generated within fields. 
Yet, in any social setting, the material and symbolic divisions between 
dominant actors and dominated actors can be called into question by 
those who produce and reproduce them when converting the real or 
imagined existence of legitimacy into an object of test-based scrutiny. 
(8) Critical sociology needs to draw on the sociology of critique, since the 
critique of society acquires its normative resources from the society of 
critique. At the same time, the sociology of critique needs to build on 
critical sociology, since the society of critique dissipates its emancipatory 
resources without the critique of society. 
 
Luc Boltanski and Political Sociology 
Kate Nash 
In her chapter, entitled ‘The Promise of Pragmatic Sociology, Human Rights, 
and the State’,829 Kate Nash steps into what many Boltanskian sociologists may 
perceive as unfamiliar territory. Indeed, it is far from clear to what extent the 
sociology of human rights and the sociology of the state have an explicit, or at 
least implicit, role to play in Boltanski’s scholarly writings. As Nash forcefully 
states, ‘[p]ragmatic sociology, with its emphasis on the importance of principles 
of justice as intrinsic to social life, is an attractive starting point for exploring […] 
questions’830 vis-à-vis the status of human rights in the contemporary social 
sciences in particular and in present-day society in general. 
Far from reducing social life to a power-laden conglomerate that is dominated 
by ‘violence, self-interest, or habit’,831  and instead of  downgrading the value  
of human rights by asserting that they represent little more than decorative 
ingredients of ‘neo-liberal imperialist ideology’,832 Nash welcomes ‘the study of 
disputes, uncertainty, and socially embedded moral argument’,833 which – in her 
eyes – is central to Boltanski’s sociological project. She critically remarks, however, 
that ‘it is striking that Boltanski has written nothing explicitly on human rights, despite 
the concerns of pragmatic sociology with contemporary questions of justice’.834 
Hence, given the lack of attention to the sociological role of human rights both 
in Boltanski’s own studies and in the numerous commentaries grappling with 
the significant – empirically informed and conceptually sophisticated – insights 
provided in his works, Nash has a major challenge on her hands when trying  
to fill this gap by attending to the task of assessing the potential usefulness of 
pragmatic sociology for examining citizens’ entitlements and obligations in 
relation to the state. Her analysis is divided into three main sections. 
  
I. 
In the first section of her chapter,  Nash explains why,  from her point of  
view, pragmatic sociology represents a promising and fruitful paradigmatic 
approach. At the same time, she questions ‘the lack of attention that has been 
given to human rights in refining it theoretically and empirically’835 within 
the Boltanskian framework. Reflecting on the intellectual merits of Boltanski’s 
writings, Nash is convinced that ‘the most significant contribution of his 
work to sociology’836 is his empirically grounded and conceptually innovative 
capacity to demonstrate, in impressive detail and with palpable passion, that 
‘[e]veryday life is normative’.837 The centrality of this ambition is eloquently 
summarized in the following assertion: 
 
Pragmatic sociology involves understanding everyday life as involving disputes over the 
appropriateness of principles of justice in particular situations.838 
 
Unlike various power-focused analytical frameworks (notably those inspired by 
Nietzschean, Marxist, Bourdieusian, Foucauldian, and Deleuzean thought), in 
Boltanski’s universe of normative encounters, social action is not portrayed 
as ‘invariably motivated by hidden interests, habit, or the “will to power”’.839 
Rather, in his studies, it is conceived of as a form of value-laden performance, 
which is – to a significant extent – shaped by people’s ability to mobilize their 
critical and moral resources when coordinating their practices and when 
establishing meaningful relations with one another and, more generally, with 
the world by which they find themselves surrounded. According to Nash, two 
levels of analysis are chiefly important in Boltanski’s sociology: 
 
(a) the level of reflexive individuals, and 
(b) the level of polities or cités.840 
 
‘Individuals are situated in “worlds”’,841 in which they are required to confront 
‘assemblages of ways of categorizing’,842 by means of which they mediate their 
encounter with different dimensions of existence through the normative 
construction of symbolically organized realities. Yet, there is no such thing as  
an ultimate and unshakable consensus about anything concerning people’s 
existence. On the contrary, human actors need to face up to both the fragility and 
the multiplicity of agreements,843 implying that social arrangements – irrespective 
of whether they are of material or symbolic nature – are never forever and, 
furthermore, that there is ‘a pluralism of equally valid principles’844 from which 
actors have to choose in particular situations. Drawing on insights provided by 
Latour, both Boltanski and his collaborator Thévenot are eager to emphasize that
  
 
‘arrangements of things’845 are, by definition, relatively arbitrary and, hence, 
malleable, as illustrated in the sociological function of ‘tests’ (épreuves), by means of 
which the validity of a given set of agreements and constellations can be either 
confirmed or questioned. 
 
Tests provide ‘proof ’ that social reality is organized correctly to ensure that 
principles of justice are being properly applied, whilst at the same time they 
organize reality as such.846 
 
One of the most original, but also most controversial, aspects of Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s framework847 is ‘the relation they posit between “ordinary” 
judgements and “philosophical” traditions’.848 In essence, they claim that the 
normative principles at work in the six polities (cités) they identify – namely, ‘the 
inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, ‘the civic world’, ‘the world of opinion 
and fame’, ‘the world of the market’, and ‘the industrial world’849 – have both 
a ‘quotidian’ and a ‘metaphysical’ dimension. 
 
• Their ‘quotidian’ – or, if one prefers, ‘ordinary’ – dimension is reflected in 
the fact that these principles are relevant to people’s everyday practices, as 
they find themselves immersed in different regimes of action and justification, 
when navigating their way through the social universe: the experiences of 
passion (‘inspired’), trust (‘domestic’), solidarity (‘civic’), recognition (‘fame’), 
exchange value (‘market’), and productivity (‘industry’) are built into ‘orders 
of worth’, providing the normative parameters for the construction of social 
life in the context of modernity. 
• Their ‘metaphysical’ – or, simply, ‘philosophical’ – dimension is expressed in the 
fact that these principles can be traced back to the writings of classical political 
philosophers: St. Augustine (‘the inspired world’), Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet 
(‘the domestic world’), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (‘the civic world’), Thomas 
Hobbes (‘the world of fame’), Adam Smith (‘the world of the market’), and 
Henri de Saint-Simon (‘the industrial world’). 
 
Whilst both the validity and the usefulness of this two-level framework may 
be called into question,850 Nash is willing to concede that ‘their methodology 
seems reasonable, not to say highly inventive, for their purposes’.851 It is 
important to acknowledge, however, that, ‘when social actors justify moral 
principles, they generally do not articulate them fully’.852 Unlike political philosophers, 
ordinary people – placed in the immediate circumstances of their lifeworlds – 
tend to apply normative codes implicitly and intuitively, rather than explicitly 
and consciously. As stressed in all forms of  sociological pragmatism, in  
real life, we are confronted with the tangible preponderance of praxis,
  
 
rather than with the imagined preponderance of theory. In their everyday 
interactions, people’s ‘pronouncements are often incomplete, fragmentary, 
even incoherent, but this does not mean that they are unintelligible or self- 
regarding’.853 
Whilst expressing her support for a pragmatist approach that is designed 
to draw attention not only to the normative constitution of social life, but also to 
both the fragility and the plurality of contemporary regimes of action, she critically 
remarks that ‘[t]he most obvious principles of justice that are neglected in 
On Justification are those of  human rights’.854 This explorative limitation 
reflects a serious shortcoming whose significance has been acknowledged  
by Thévenot in a recent interview conducted by Paul Blokker and Andrea 
Brighenti.855 In fact, Thévenot, unlike Boltanski, has a tendency to consider 
‘expressions of rights only as strategic, intended to further an individual’s 
advantage, rather than as fragmentary and incomplete manifestations of a 
model of justice’.856 
If there is such a thing as a ‘polity of human rights’, it must not be interpreted 
as tantamount to the ‘civic polity’ in the Rousseauian sense.857 Given the 
context-transcending nature of their normative validity and owing to their 
global relevance, ‘[h]uman rights go beyond a social contract with a particular 
state’858 governing within a specific territory. The theoretical framework 
defended in Boltanski’s Love and Justice as Competences859 (2012 [1990]), which is 
central to his conception of normativity, makes a case for a model of justice 
that is founded on two key ideas: 
 
(a) the idea of a ‘common humanity’, which presupposes ‘the equivalence of identity 
amongst individuals, with no human being left out’;860 
(b) the idea of ‘orders of worth’, on the basis of which ‘equivalences are drawn 
between individuals’,861 allowing for the pursuit of the ‘common good’, 
notwithstanding the various differences that exist between people. 
 
Even though ‘Boltanski is committed to a version of sociology that is both 
empirical and conceptual’,862 and despite his in-depth engagement with the 
normative issues arising from both ordinary and scholarly debates on the 
nature of justice, there is little in the way of systematic enquiry into 
 
the importance of migration and multiculturalism, the building of transnational 
connections and networks concerned with justice, and ‘arrangements of things’ and 
tests now developing across borders.863 
 
What, according to Nash, is even more serious a shortcoming in Boltanski’s 
work, however, is that his silence on the ‘polity of human rights’ is intimately
  
 
related to a highly questionable ‘conceptualization  of  institutions  and,  





In the second section of her chapter, Nash examines the relationship between 
‘states, justice, and critique’865 in Boltanski’s writings. In essence, she argues 
that, despite its considerable strengths, ‘the model he has developed since On 
Justification  remains  unsatisfactory’.866  In  particular,  she  makes  the  following 
assertion: if he and Thévenot had paid more attention to the sociological significance of 
human rights, they would have been able to produce a much more fine-grained, and more 
timely, account of the ways in which the development of the state and the development of 
claims for justice are closely interrelated. 
As famously noted by Paul Ricœur, one of the major limitations of On 
Justification consists in the fact that its authors fail to ‘specify the kind of political 
society to which their model is applicable’.867 Indeed, one may suggest that 
‘pragmatic sociology can be valid only in a constitutional democracy, in which, by 
definition, there is respect for pluralism’.868 What their conceptual framework 
falls short of providing, then, is ‘any insight into how different models of 
justice are actually realized, denied, or avoided’.869 In other words, rather than 
taking the existence of basic rights and political pluralism for granted, it is  
of paramount importance to reflect on the possibility of their absence and, 
indeed, of systematic attempts – notably, by dictatorial states – to delegitimize 
or even suppress them. 
More specifically, Nash insists that, in light of the above, we need to 
distinguish between two levels of politico-discursive articulation: on the one 
hand, there are ‘localized disputes’,870 permitting embodied actors to engage in 
dialogue and, if necessary, reach agreements within their respective lifeworlds; 
on the other hand, there is the ‘wider, national, or even transnational’871 arena, in 
which normative concerns about justice can be applied and ‘administered’872 
on the basis of ‘legal and bureaucratic procedures’873 that ‘conform to rational- 
legal principles’,874 whose validity goes beyond the spatio-temporally limited 
horizons of people’s lifeworlds. 
As Nash – drawing upon Boltanski – points out, ‘the critiques of everyday injustices 
that give rise to disputes and justifications are almost invariably reformist’,875 
mainly because people have to be – or, at least, appear to be – ‘realistic’.876 If, 
by contrast, they engage in radical forms of critique, they run the risk of ‘being 
perceived as abnormal by their fellows’877 and, consequently, of being marginalized 
by those who endorse seemingly moderate and measured normative positions.
  
 
‘Reformist’ criticisms remain within the limits of the regulative parameters 
dictated by integrationism, gradualism, pragmatism, opportunism, and realism. 
‘Radical’ criticisms, on the other hand, tend to be oriented towards inventing 
new normative agendas capable of transcending the constraining logic of 
instrumentally driven mechanisms of systemic immanence.878 
Although Nash welcomes Boltanski’s concern with ‘political strategy’,879 
she remains unconvinced by his conceptualization of the state. She 
complains that, when Boltanski, in On Critique,880 ‘finally theorizes the state 
[…], he does not engage with the polities outlined in On  Justification and 
elaborated elsewhere in his work at all’.881 In her view, Boltanski’s failure to 
apply his – rather sophisticated – theory of polities to the state means that he 
ends up offering little more  than a  highly obscure account of 
institutionalized ‘power from above’. Put differently, ‘he  outlines  a highly 
speculative metacritique of the state as securing domination’.882 Indeed, 
unsympathetic critics may be suspicious of the vagueness underlying the 
following Boltanskian claim: in order to avoid remaining trapped in the 
oppressive steering power of the state, ‘there doubtless exists no other road 
than the eternal road of revolt’.883 Not only does such a broad  assertion omit 
to provide any details about what needs to be done in concreto in order to 
challenge the ubiquitous power  of  the  state; but,  in  addition, it  fails  to 
specify on what normative grounds mechanisms of domination can, and 
should, be undermined and – correspondingly – processes of emancipation 
can, and should, be reinforced.884 
In Nash’s opinion, Boltanski’s highlighting of the ‘semantic functions’885 of 
institutions in general and of the state in particular illustrates that his theory 
stresses the symbolic – notably, linguistic – mediation of actors’ involvement in 
their everyday existence. Put differently, we relate to the world by constructing 
meaningfully organized realities. It is evident, then, that Boltanski ‘gives a 
good deal of emphasis to language as the paradigmatic institution through 
which social reality is constructed’.886 To the extent that ‘institutions construct 
social reality’,887 and to the extent that they do so by codifying and regulating 
people’s engagement with their environment, they define – in Boltanski’s 
terms – ‘the whatness of what is’.888 In this light, as Nash points out, Boltanski’s 
approach can be regarded as a contemporary version of social constructivism, 
not dissimilar to the epistemological perspective advocated by Peter L. Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann.889 
An institutional manifestation that epitomizes the constructed – and, 
hence, contingent – constitution of social reality is ‘the enterprise-state’, 
which is central to both the implementation and the justification of the ‘new 
spirit of capitalism’.890 Whilst such an ‘enterprise-state’ is no less ‘totalizing 
and dominating’891 than previous forms of capitalist statehood, one of its
  
 
distinctive features is that it prioritizes transformation and dynamism more 
than any hitherto existing polity. Certainly, ‘domination through change 
(rather than through repression)’892 can be considered a constitutive element 
of neo-liberal and neo-managerial regimes in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. What is more worrying when reflecting upon the 
development of Boltanski’s theoretical framework, however, is that his 
‘metacritique of the enterprise-state is disengaged from “ordinary” critiques’.893 
Thus, Nash expresses a significant degree of scepticism about Boltanski’s 
conception of ‘metacritique’: 
 
It does not relate to, or engage with, any of the criticisms that arise from the 
polities identified in On  Justification, and it is not rooted in a new or emerging 
polity. It is, in this sense, a classic example of critical sociology to which pragmatic 
sociology was a (critical) response. […] It is unclear, then, why Boltanski goes 
against all the basic precepts of pragmatic sociology in order to elaborate a 
revolutionary metacritique that is not grounded in daily disputes over justice.894 
 
On this account, we are confronted with the following problem: just as 
Boltanski’s late ‘sociology of critique’ remains caught up in the disempowering 
implications of ‘metacritical sociologies’, his ‘sociology of domination’ does 
not succeed in liberating itself from the ‘domination of sociology’ by the elitist 
mission to transcend the illusory immanence of ordinary epistemic comfort 
zones by virtue of rigorous scientific enquiry. 
 
III. 
In the third section of her chapter, Nash defends a conception of the state 
‘that is closer to the pluralist model of On Justification’895 than to the metacritical 
model advocated in On Critique. Indeed, Nash explicitly states that, in her eyes, 
 
[t]he pragmatic theory of  plural ‘worlds’ and ‘polities’, supplemented with      
a theory of the state, still seems […] to be a very important contribution to 
establishing the sociology of human rights.896 
 
Yet, she is also convinced that such a pragmatic approach – ‘if it is to realize 
its potential as a paradigm that can re-establish and reconnect sociology with 
popular disputes and everyday normative reasoning’897 – is in need of both 
further conceptual refinement and further empirical substantiation. There     
is not much point in insisting upon the pivotal importance of human rights 
unless it can be demonstrated that the defence of their validity and centrality 
is anchored in quotidian forms of sociality. 
  
 
Of course, we may follow Ricœur in arguing that the civic sphere is not ‘simply 
one polity amongst others’.898 Rather, it may be regarded as the polity par excellence, 
owing to its power to shape and revise the normative parameters underlying 
the construction of any democratically organized society. At the same time, 
one may share Ricœur’s sympathetic assessment that, due to the increasing 
interconnectedness of different polities or cités in highly differentiated social 
settings, the ‘civic polity’ has lost its foundational status, given that it has not 
only to compete but also to engage with other polities. In practice, this means that, 
in the present age, the civic polity is obliged to provide justifications, not only 
in terms of the parameters it sets for itself, but also in terms of the parameters 
set by other ‘worlds’ – that is, by ‘the inspired world’, ‘the domestic world’, 
‘the world of opinion and fame’, ‘the world of the market’, ‘the industrial 
world’, and ‘the connectivist world’. Applied to real-world politics in general 
and to people’s normative validity claims in particular, it is difficult to deny 
that, although ‘the state remains the pre-eminent institution towards which 
demands for justice are oriented’,899 its capacities to govern – that is, to ‘make 
law and regulations on behalf of its citizens’900 – have been substantially 
weakened in the context of an increasingly globalized world.901 
One may be inclined to share Nash’s conclusion that ‘it would not be 
difficult to add the polity of human rights to those listed by Boltanski and 
Thévenot  in  On  Justification’.902  Challenging  the  relativist  underpinnings  of 
radically constructivist or pragmatist approaches in sociology,903 we need to 
recognize that the defence of human rights requires endorsing universalist normative 
parameters in the search for interculturally defensible principles, which, in terms of 
their validity and applicability, transcend the spatio-temporal specificities of 
both small-scale and large-scale forms of sociality. What is no less important, 
however, is to acknowledge, as Nash does, that ‘[s]tates are never unified’,904 but 
‘always complex assemblages of official positions, rules, categorizations, and 
instruments’.905 Such a ‘poly-constructivist’ conception of ‘the social’ leaves 
little, if any, room for clear-cut separations between the state and other 
spheres of action, let alone between the state and civil society.906 What we 
need to understand, then, is that – far from constituting ‘unified, totalizing 
institutions’907 – states in advanced capitalist societies are ‘pluralist, fragmented, 
complex, even incoherent’.908 
As Nash forcefully argues, it would have been much more difficult for 
Boltanski and Thévenot to ignore the pivotal role that states play in the 
regulation of norms and values, if they had paid more attention to the 
increasing importance of political discourses concerned with human rights  
in the current era.909 Irrespective of  whether or not one wishes to conceive  
of the state as a ‘composite set-up’,910 there is little doubt that a truly pragmatist 
spirit is committed to the idea of bringing ‘sociologists and citizens together, rather than
  
 
splitting us into “experts” and “objects of study”’.911 Tautologically speaking, 
the challenge consists in developing a ‘critical sociology of social critique’ with 
the aim of denouncing mechanisms of domination and promoting processes 
of emancipation, whilst anchoring the reflexive resources of methodical 
enquiry in quotidian forms of sociality. 
 
Paul Blokker 
Paul Blokker’s chapter – entitled ‘“The Political” in the Pragmatic Sociology 
of Critique: Reading Boltanski with Lefort and Castoriadis’912 – is not only a 
persuasive reminder of the normative dimensions underpinning Boltanski’s 
work but also an illustration of the insights that can be gained from comparing 
and contrasting his main contributions with those made by other  major 
social and political thinkers. Yet, the purpose of Blokker’s chapter is not 
merely comparative. Rather, its ambition is to shed light on a key dimension 
that remains largely implicit in most of Boltanski’s writings: ‘the political’. 
Undoubtedly, as Blokker points out, there is ‘a normative dimension in pragmatic 
sociology that links it with (radical) democratic theory’.913 This aspect, however, 
remains under-conceptualized, not only in Boltanski’s own works and in those 
he co-authored with his collaborators, but also in the numerous commentaries 
in which both his sympathetic and his unsympathetic critics seek to engage 
with the various contributions he has made to sociology in particular and    
to the social sciences in general. One of the remarkable achievements of 
Blokker’s chapter, then, is to have provided a fine-grained understanding of 
the role of ‘the political’ in Boltanski’s work, not only by examining some  
of his key writings, but also by drawing useful comparisons between central 
insights provided by Boltanski himself and those one may find in the seminal 
studies of Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis. 
 
I. 
In the first section of his analysis, Blokker invites his readers to reflect upon 
the concept of ‘the political’.914 To the extent that Boltanski and Thévenot’s 
‘sociology of  critical capacity’ conceives of  social realities as ‘grounded   
in a plurality of possible ways of engaging with the world and of justifying 
individual actions’,915 it is opposed to both monolithic and dualistic accounts 
of human existence. Indeed, as observed by Blokker, their pluralist approach to 
the normative aspects underpinning the construction of social realities builds 
upon the variegated framework developed by Michael Walzer, especially in his 
influential book Spheres of  Justice (1983).916 Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘explicit 
sensitivity to a plurality of justifications’917 is expressed in their commitment
  
 
to exploring different ‘worlds’ or, as they also call them, different ‘cités’, each 
of which develops its own ‘mode of justification’ – that is, its own normative 
patterns of interaction and validation. As Blokker – quoting Ricœur – critically 
remarks, however, one of the most problematic, and paradoxical, aspects of 
the theoretical framework developed in On  Justification  is that ‘politics seems 
both to constitute one sphere of justice among others and to envelop all the 
other spheres’.918 Indeed, the tautological concept of the ‘civic city’ suggests 
that we are confronted with a paradox: on the one hand, it appears to be   
only one amongst many other cities; on the other hand, its pleonastic description 
indicates that, in a fundamental sense, it represents ‘the city’ par excellence – 
that is, it comprises all other ‘cities’. In short, Boltanski and Thévenot’s cité-
based perspective implicitly presupposes that the most differentiated human life 
forms are permeated by the preponderance of ‘the political’. 
It is in light of this insight that, for Blokker, Lefort’s work comes into 
play.919 In this respect, the French philosopher’s conceptual ‘distinction 
between “politics” (la politique) and “the political” (le politique)’920 is crucial. 
The former designates ‘explicit political activity’,921 notably ‘the struggle for 
public power in society’.922 The latter denotes a much broader conception    
of political practice – that is, of any kind of human performance oriented 
towards the construction of normativity. The ‘confinement of “the political” 
to “politics”’,923  commonly expressed in ‘reductive and “scientific” views   
of politics’,924 is problematic in that it tends to generate narrow – that is, 
institutionalist, professionalist, managerialist, or elitist – conceptions of 
discursively shaped, and ideologically driven, coordinating practices.925 Lefort, 
then, is eager to endorse a broad definition of ‘the political’, which Blokker 
eloquently describes as follows: 
 
‘[T]he political’ refers not to an a priori defined, objectified understanding of ‘the 
political’, a sphere of overt political action or conflict, but instead to a symbolic 
or representational dimension of power: the principle, or set of principles, that 
institutes a particular kind of society.926 
 
II. 
According to Blokker, the Lefortian  distinction  between  ‘politics’  and  
‘the political’ occupies a firm place in pragmatic sociology, notably in 
Lamont and Thévenot’s edited collection Rethinking Comparative Cultural 
Sociology927 (2000), but also in Boltanski and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of 
Capitalism928 (2005 [1999]) and – perhaps, most importantly – in Boltanski’s 
On Critique929 (2011 [2009]). Indeed, in the second section of his chapter, 
Blokker examines the role of ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ in the writings of
  
 
Bourdieu’s probably most influential disciple. Chiefly important in this regard 
is Boltanski’s conception of politics as an ensemble of ‘historical constructs’,930 
and, more specifically, his claim that 
 
[t]he normative supports that critiques and justifications are based on are 
associated with systems rooted in social reality, which are considered to be the 
product of the political history of a society.931 
 
On this view, human practices of critique and justification cannot be 
divorced from socio-historically specific horizons shaped by political rules and 
expectations. 
Boltanski’s distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité) is not 
insignificant in this respect, as it illustrates that one of the key socio-ontological 
functions of ‘the political’ is to enable individuals to confront ‘the fundamental 
uncertainty and indeterminacy that plague human society’932 by constructing 
normatively codified domains of interactionality. If the ‘world’ – in the 
Wittgensteinian sense – is ‘everything that is the case’,933 then ‘reality’ – in 
the Boltanskian sense – is ‘everything that is habitually allowed to be the case’, 
and ‘politics’ is ‘everything that is discursively agreed, or authoritatively imposed, to 
be the case’. In other words, just as the construction of ‘reality’ is oriented 
towards the ‘preservation of order’,934 enabling individuals to cope with their 
exposure to the uncertainty inflicted upon them by the ‘world’, the pursuit of 
‘the political’ permits them to define the parameters on which to coordinate 
their actions. Regardless of whether the construction of reality and the 
coordination of social activities are mediated by ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, 
or ‘existential tests’,935 the very fact that normative processes can be called 
into question – not only by those who study them ‘from outside’, but also by 
those who are directly involved in them ‘from inside’ – indicates that there  
is at least the potential of transformative and subversive ‘beyondness’ within 
the most conservative and complicit forms of ‘withinness’. In fact, as Blokker 
notes, ‘the reference to radical possibilities for challenging instituted reality’936 




It is in the third section of his chapter that Blokker proposes to reflect upon 
the meaning of ‘radical democracy’. Although this may not be obvious, in 
Boltanski’s later writings, especially in On Critique, there is a substantial 
point of convergence between his own understanding of social reality and 
that of political theorists endorsing the idea of radical democracy:938  namely, their
  
 
insistence upon ‘the impossibility of full semantic closure’939 and, correspondingly, 
their defence of the right to ‘the public disclosure of societal fragility’.940 Such an anti- 
reductionist – and, arguably, anti-totalitarian – conception of social reality goes hand in 
hand with ‘an open, post-foundationalist view of democracy’941 and an anti-universalist 
interpretation of normativity. Faced with the ubiquity of ‘contingency, uncertainty, 
conflict’,942 heterogeneity, and indeterminacy, it is imperative to abandon the 
ambition to aim for ‘the full closure and completion of the democratic project’,943 
representing a scenario that is neither possible nor desirable. 
If anything prevails in highly differentiated social settings, which are 
characterized by elevated degrees of complexity, it is ‘an irreducible plurality of 
understandings of the common good’,944 whose amorphous composition constitutes 
one of the most challenging aspects permeating collective processes  
oriented towards the construction of democracies based on ‘openness and 
transparency’.945 To be sure, this is not to deny the fact that both systematic and 
systemic ‘attempts to create coherence and semantic closure in order to diminish 
uncertainty and inquietude’946 are vital not only to modes of domination but 
also, in a more general sense, to all small-scale and large-scale endeavours to 
generate codified – and, hence, relatively predictable – frameworks of both 
concrete and abstract socialization. Every society is permeated by both the uncertainty 
of certainty and the certainty of uncertainty. It is the task of radical democracy to 
permit, and indeed encourage, its participants to face up to the material and 
symbolic consequences of this existential ambiguity. 
Blokker goes on to scrutinize three key elements underlying his argument: 
(a) ‘uncertainty’,947 (b) the relation between ‘world’ and ‘reality’,948 and (c) ‘the political 
form of society’.949 
 
(a) Blokker draws attention to the fact that a striking similarity between 
Boltanski, Lefort, and Castoriadis can be found in their emphasis on   
the radical uncertainty permeating human existence. The ‘world’, far from 
presenting itself as ‘some kind of total preordained order’,950 constitutes 
a ‘void’ or form of ‘nothingness’, upon which socialized and socializing 
actors project the structuring power of institutions and ‘social imaginary 
significations’.951 Instead of searching for an ‘Archimedean point’952 from 
which to grasp the entire complexity of the social universe, we need to 
face up to the ineluctable indeterminacy of both the world itself and the 
discursive tools mobilized to attribute meaning to it. 
(b) The distinction between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ is useful in that it permits us 
to shed light not only on the social constructedness of the variegated 
relations that humans establish with their environment, and indeed with 
themselves, but also on the empowering role of critique in enabling 
them to question the taken-for-grantedness of instituted realities.953 
  
 
The potential beyondness derived from people’s critical capacity indicates 
the fragility pervading the withinness of reality. 
(c) The ‘lack of explicit engagement with “the political” in pragmatic 
sociology’,954 which manifests itself in Boltanski and Thévenot’s tendency to 
confine normative affairs concerning the pursuit of the ‘common good’ to 
the realm of the ‘civic world’,955 may be regarded as a serious paradigmatic 
limitation. Yet, their emphasis on the ‘irreducible plurality of understandings of 
the common good’956 as well as their critical engagement with the ineluctable 
presence of existential uncertainty are indicative of their commitment to 
conceiving of democracy as an open-ended process, whose participants are not 
only ‘sensitive to the threat of closure’957 but also conscious of the need 
to defend individual and collective expressions of autonomy against the 
disempowering causes and consequences of social mechanisms driven by 
the logic of heteronomy.958 
 
IV. 
In the final section of his chapter, Blokker explores the extent to which, in 
‘contemporary democratic-capitalist societies’,959 we have been witnessing ‘the 
decline of politics’.960 Undoubtedly, the seriousness of this concern is intimately 
interrelated with Boltanski’s thesis that the rise of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ is 
reflected in the emergence of a ‘complex’961 system of domination, in which the 
paradoxical mixture of technocratic rationality and neo-managerialist creativity 
appears to have transcended the dividing lines of traditional political ideologies. 
This is not to contend that we have entered a ‘post-political age’ characterized 
by ‘the end of ideology’.962 Rather, this is to acknowledge that the principle 
‘dominating by change’963 is central to a dynamic Zeitgeist that has converted the 
belief in the civilizational power of late modern imperatives – such as 
‘flexibility’, ‘elasticity’, ‘adaptability’, ‘accountability’, ‘creativity’, ‘vitality’, and 
‘velocity’ – into virtues of, rather than obstacles to, the success of an economic 
system capable of colonizing the entire planet and defending its legitimacy, even 
in the face of profound social and political crisis and instability.964 
Yet, in addition to accusing Boltanski of failing to provide a satisfactory 
account of the role of ‘the political’ in the multilayered construction of society, 
Blokker puts his finger on a major problem arising from the overly pessimistic 
interpretation of the present with which one appears to be confronted in On 
Critique: 
 
It seems to be an overstatement to argue that ordinary actors do not have any recourse to a 
radical critique of reality in current times, not least because the instituted imaginary 
still refers to democratic markers.965 
  
 
If Blokker’s criticism is justified, then we are confronted with a curious paradox. 
On the one hand, one of the main reasons for the paradigmatic attempt to 
replace Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ with Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ 
was to avoid falling into the trap of socio-ontological fatalism, by doing justice 
to the central role of ordinary people’s moral and critical capacities in shaping the 
development of society. On the other hand, motivated by the ambition to 
reconcile his own approach with that of his ‘intellectual father’, Boltanski – in 
his later works, notably in On Critique – appears to overestimate the pivotal role 
of reflexive sociologists’ metatheoretical and metacritical capacities in uncovering the 
underlying mechanisms that presumably determine the constitution of reality. 
Put differently, one gets the impression that Boltanski runs the risk of 
confining critical capacity to a professional privilege of reflexive sociologists, rather 
than pursuing his previous project of demonstrating that it constitutes a 
universal privilege of human actors. As Blokker perceptively observes, such a 
pessimistic conception of ‘the social’ needs to be challenged by reminding 
ourselves, and others, of the emancipatory potential of ‘the political’: ‘the 
possibility of speaking out’966 is not only inconceivable without ‘the existence 
of a public space that allows one to make one’s views public’967 but, more 
fundamentally, constitutes a sine qua non for constructing a society based on the 
normative foundations of a genuinely consolidated – that is, open-ended and, 
hence, never fully consolidated – democracy. Blokker has done contemporary 
social theory a great favour by making Boltanski’s largely implicit engagement 
with politics explicit and by illustrating that there is no comprehensive 




In his chapter,  entitled ‘Axel  Honneth and Luc Boltanski at the Epicentre    
of Politics’,968 Mauro Basaure examines a controversial issue: namely, the 
tension-laden relationship between Honneth’s ‘theory of recognition’969 and 
Boltanski’s ‘pragmatist sociology’.970 As he explains in the opening paragraphs 
of his chapter, the systematic reconstruction of Honneth’s theory of the 
struggle for recognition permits us to identify three central analytical axes, 
which are closely interrelated: 
 
(a) The moral-sociological-explicative axis: This axis concerns the moral motives 
underlying human actions in general and social struggles in particular. 
Important in this regard is Honneth’s explicit attempt to develop a non- 
utilitarian approach to social conflicts, which is capable of shedding light 
on the morally constituted reasons and impulses behind human practices. 
  
 
Indeed, moral principles and ‘values anchored in the intersubjective 
structures of mutual recognition’971 are chiefly important in shaping 
people’s everyday performances, including the specific grammars 
underpinning social conflicts, in normatively codified ways. To the extent 
that the collective experience, or perception, of ‘moral damage’972 can 
‘form the motivational basis for social struggles’,973 there appears to be an 
intimate ‘link between conflict and normativity’974 in every society. 
(b) The historic-philosophical-reconstructive axis: This axis relates to the ‘historical 
interpretation of processes of moral construction’975 emerging within spatio- 
temporally situated social struggles. This level of analysis illustrates that, by 
definition, every social conflict is embedded in a given context and, hence, 
in a set of historically specific circumstances. Irrespective of whether one 
chooses to focus on individual, communal, or societal practices, all three 
levels of social-scientific exploration – that is, ‘the micro’, ‘the meso’, and 
‘the macro’ – permeate ‘processes oriented towards moral learning’976 and 
have to be historicized in terms of their context-dependent capacity to set the 
normative agendas structuring the moral grammars of social conflicts. 
(c) The political-sociological axis: This axis obliges us to reflect upon ‘the concept of 
struggle in a strict sense’.977 As such, it is concerned, first and foremost, with 
‘the modes of construction of collectives in antagonistic positions’978 as well as 
with ‘the opportunities they have to access the public political space, intervene 
in it, and transform social categories, value orientations, and practices that 
regulate social recognition and individual rights’.979 Thus, this axis focuses 
on the performative capacity of individual and collective actors to mobilize 
their symbolic and material resources, with the aim of coordinating their 
practices and shaping their environment in accordance with their normative 
principles and moral values as well as with their personal or social interests. 
 
In brief, the first axis is concerned with the morally constituted ‘why’, the second axis 
with the historically structured ‘when and where’, and the third axis with the politically 
motivated ‘how’ of social struggles.980 Similar to Boltanski, Honneth assumes that 
‘a moral – and, hence, normative – logic is at the basis of political action’.981 It 
comes as no surprise, then, that – again, in line with Boltanski – he is strongly 
opposed to ‘utilitarian-strategic explanations of political motivations’,982 
which arguably play a pivotal role in Bourdieu’s writings.983 In this respect, the 
‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – developed by Boltanski, in collaboration 
with his colleague Thévenot – appears to be a more promising starting point 
than Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. Whereas the former places the sociological 
significance of morally motivated actions at the centre of its analysis, the latter 
tends to reduce them to praxeological manifestations of the field-specific – and, 
thus, interest-driven – logic permeating the entire social universe. 
  
 
Basaure goes on to unearth the central presuppositions underlying Boltanski 
and Thévenot’s ‘moral and political sociology’; he does so by comparing and 
contrasting their approach to the intellectual tradition associated with the 
works of members of the Frankfurt School, notably Jürgen Habermas and 
Axel Honneth. Unlike most critical theorists, especially those who explicitly 
draw on Kantian and neo-Kantian as well as Hegelian and neo-Hegelian 
frameworks, 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s moral and political sociology not only lacks but also 
rejects the idea of developing a normative framework based on the development 
of reason in history.984 
 
In Basaure’s own terminology, their investigative model does not possess a‘historic- 
philosophical-reconstructive axis’.985 Given Boltanski and Thévenot’s concern with 
both moral and political matters, however, they engage – extensively – with the 
key issues arising from the ineluctable presence of the aforementioned ‘moral- 
sociological-explicative axis’986 and ‘political-sociological axis’.987 
Perhaps, one of Boltanski and Thévenot’s most significant contributions 
to contemporary sociology is reflected in the ample evidence they have 
provided to illustrate not only the existence but also the central normative 
role of people’s ‘ordinary sense of justice’988 in the construction of social life. The 
multiplicity of ‘regimes of justification’989 manifests itself  in the ‘plurality  
of orders of value’,990 to which social participants implicitly or explicitly 
refer when coordinating, or justifying, their actions. Owing to their shared 
emphasis on the plurality of action, an analogy can be drawn between Walzer’s 
theory of different ‘spheres of justice’,991 Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘regimes of action’,992 
and Honneth’s ‘spheres of recognition’.993 Indeed, what all of these ‘spheres’, 
‘domains’, ‘realms’, or ‘regimes’ of action have in common is that they 
possess specific grammars that structure the normative practices taking place 
within the boundaries of people’s context-dependent  existence.  Indeed,  
both Honneth’s three ‘spheres of recognition’ – love, legal rights, and social 
esteem994 – and Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘regimes of action’ with their 
corresponding ‘orders of worth’ – ‘inspired’, ‘domestic’, ‘reputational’, 
‘civic’, ‘market-based’, and ‘industrial’ – indicate that, as sociologists, we 
need to account for the fact that codified and codifying sets of relationally 
established arrangements both mediate and regulate people’s engagement 
with reality. 
This insight leads Basaure to examine what he characterizes as the 
‘immanent normativity of political and moral judgement’.995 More specifically, 
we are confronted with the task of scrutinizing ‘the “grammaticalization” of the 
normative bases of ordinary judgement’.996 To put it simply, every judgement is made
  
 
on the basis of a set of assumptions. The semantic resources through which 
these assumptions are expressed can be mobilized implicitly or explicitly, 
unconsciously or consciously, intuitively or reflexively, unwittingly or deliberately. 
The ‘acceptability997 of an action depends on its capacity to obtain approval by 
those assessing its validity in terms of the parameters underlying a particular 
regime of action generating normatively codified forms of sociality. Crucial in 
this regard is the pragmatist conviction that 
 
morality does not refer to more or less formal criteria that are exterior to social practices 
on the basis of which the universal justifiability of pretensions of discursive 
validity is evaluated.998 
 
Rather, morality, in the pragmatist sense, constitutes an assemblage of ‘pre- 
theoretical’999 and context-dependent principles, which are applied in specific situations 
and shaped by ‘evaluations and judgements made by actors’1000 when navigating 
their way through the multiple situations they experience as participants in social 
life. 
Basaure summarizes the principal objective that undergirds the Boltanskian 
project as follows: 
 
The main purpose of Boltanski’s sociological research is to reconstruct immanent or 
implicit forms of normativity – that is, the ordinary sense that governs the evaluative judgement of 
expressive practices […].1001 
 
He is aware of the fact, however, that grammars create normative oppositions: 
‘right’ versus ‘wrong’, ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’, ‘appropriate’ versus 
‘inappropriate’, ‘legitimate’ versus ‘illegitimate’. Hence, the parameters 
defining the boundaries of acceptability are socially contingent: 
 
This clearly implies the opposite possibility – that is, that such practices do   
not satisfy the pragmatic conditions of acceptability immanent in evaluative 
judgement of an ordinary subject and, as a result, are considered illegitimate, 
illusory, unbalanced, etc.1002 
 
Put in more radical terms, we may suggest that the creation of every grammar 
potentially involves the emergence of an anti-grammar – that is, of a way of 
doing things that diverges from the rules imposed by a particular normative 
framework and, hence, has the transformative, or even subversive, potential 
of creating a new one. In relation to the dynamic constitution of normative 
grammars, Basaure proposes to distinguish ‘three separate aspects of the 
justification of critique’:1003 namely, ‘legitimacy, facticity, and admissibility’.1004
  
 
According to Basaure, these dimensions lie at the heart of Luc Boltanski, 
Yann Darré, and Marie-Ange Schiltz’s influential study entitled ‘La 
dénonciation’1005 (1984). This enquiry may be conceived of as ‘the basis of the 
architecture of the model of cities developed by Boltanski and Thévenot’1006 
in De la justification.1007 Many political sociologists will sympathize with the 
emphasis placed on the role of normativity in the construction of ‘regimes  
of  action’, especially with regard to the fundamental Rousseauian idea that 
 
the worth that people in the civic city (cité civique) can access is directly related 
to the capacity that they demonstrate for de-singularizing or de-privatizing their 
relationships and, with that, for embodying and representing the general interest.1008 
 
As Basaure notes, however, we must not forget that, often, those who present 
themselves ‘as procurers of the common good’1009 seek to pursue their 
individual, personal, or private interests.1010 
This sensibility towards the relationship between ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests is 
central to Boltanski and Thévenot’s model of economies of worth,1011 illustrating 
that their conceptual framework is informed by the critical engagement with 
empirical dimensions of human existence – that is, by an explanatory approach 
that ‘presupposes a strong anchoring in reality and objects’,1012 rather than a 
soft reliance on symbolic representations and language. Far from following 
the post-structuralist rhetoric about the social construction of reality by virtue 
of symbolically mediated and discursively constituted realms of interpretive 
projection, Boltanski and Thévenot endorse a form of ‘sociological realism’, 
capable of avoiding the danger of falling into the traps of hermeneutic idealism, 
linguistic determinism, and postmodern textualism. In fact, their ‘opposition 
to the discourse-theoretic accounts associated with the “linguistic turn”’1013 
is expressed in their conviction that not only sociologists, when examining 
and reflecting upon social life, but also ordinary actors, when experiencing and 
participating in the construction of everyday existence, have to be ‘realistic’.1014 
The role of different ‘tests’ (épreuves) – notably of ‘truth tests’, ‘reality tests’, and 
‘existential tests’1015 – is significant due to their capacity to contribute either to 
confirming or to challenging the validity attributed to particular aspects of reality. 
From a pragmatist  point  of  view,  then,  human  experiences  of suffering – 
irrespective of whether they occur on an individual or on a collective basis 
– cannot be dissociated from the socio-historical contexts in which they 
take place, let alone from the concrete practices of those who undergo 
these experiences. As Basaure reminds us, the interconnectedness of the moral, 
historical, and political dimensions permeating social struggles obliges us to take 
seriously the significance of the aforementioned axes of analysis: both as 
critical theorists and as pragmatic sociologists, we need to explore the
  
 
morally constituted ‘why’, the historically structured ‘when and where’, and the politically 
motivated ‘how’ of people’s practices if we seek to understand the normatively 
specific (i.e. value-laden), spatio-temporally contingent (i.e. context-laden), 
and ideologically driven (i.e. interest-laden) constitution of social struggles. 
 
Irène Eulriet 
As anticipated in the title of her chapter, Irène Eulriet compares and contrasts 
two of the most influential books in contemporary sociology: Jeffrey Alexander’s 
The Civil Sphere1016 (2006) and Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification1017 (2006 
[1991]), which she characterizes as ‘two models of public culture’.1018 With 
this ambitious task in mind, Eulriet is interested, above all, in their respective 
‘understanding of public culture in liberal democracies’,1019 especially with 
regard to the sociological tools they offer for its critical study. 
 
I. 
Eulriet makes it clear from the outset that their approaches have a number of 
significant features in common. Both are inspired by Durkheimian intuitions, 
notably in terms of the distinction between ‘the sacred’ and ‘the profane’. Both 
aim to combine philosophical and sociological issues, as reflected in their shared 
terminology – such as ‘justice’, ‘pragmatics’, and ‘compromise’. Both have 
been given promising paradigmatic labels: in the case of Alexander, ‘cultural 
sociology’ or – with more precision – ‘new American cultural sociology’; in 
the case of Boltanski and Thévenot, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, 
the ‘sociology of justification’, or – in a more wide-ranging sense – ‘new 
French social sciences’. Both endeavour to examine the extent to which 
specific normative aspirations – particularly in relation to justice, solidarity, and 
universalism – trigger idiosyncratic socio-political dynamics, which are vital to 
the construction of liberal democracies. 
These are the most obvious reasons why The Civil Sphere and On 
Justification  are  comparable.  As  Eulriet  convincingly  illustrates,  however, 
there are several further points of convergence. The two frameworks of 
analysis coalesce in their effort ‘to isolate culture from other conceivable 
social dimensions’1020 – an ambition that involves the methodological 
challenge of having to specify how culture can and should be studied in 
sociology. Consequently, both are opposed to ‘the common-sense notion   
of culture as a homogeneous symbolic whole presiding over the social practices of 
those who happen to be socialized in it’.1021 Irrespective of whether one has  
a preference for Boltanski and Thévenot’s six-dimensional differentiation   
of ‘regimes of justification’ or for Alexander’s model of a ‘binary code’,
  
 
both approaches are designed to identify not only the core elements of 
culture, but also the multiple ways in which its constitutive components 
impact upon people’s capacity to mobilize their symbolic resources. In both 
accounts, then, the critical engagement with ‘justice’1022 and ‘processes of 
justification’1023 plays a pivotal role. 
 
II. 
In Alexander’s case, the ambition to shed light on ‘the structure and dynamics 
of the civil sphere’,1024 reflected in ‘a definite form of discourse and a range of 
institutions’,1025 is central. In this regard, his distinction between ‘civility’ and 
‘anti-civility’ needs to be taken into consideration.1026 
 
• The former designates an attitude based on ‘rationality, autonomy, and self-
control’.1027 It can be conceived of  as both a producer and a product  of 
‘open, trusting, critical, honourable, altruistic, truthful, straightforward, 
deliberative, and friendly social relations’1028 – that is, of social ties and 
connections shaped by communicative processes oriented towards mutual 
engagement, understanding, and consensus-building. 
• The latter refers to an attitude motivated by the search for power, control, 
and self-interested success. It can be interpreted as both a producer and     
a product of ‘secrecy, suspicion, deference, self-interest, greed, deceit, 
calculation, conspiracy, and antagonism’1029 – that is, of social links and 
networks sustained by instrumental actions impregnated with dynamics of 
competition, conflict, and deception.1030 
 
The above-mentioned opposing attitudes and values manifest themselves in 
the emergence of ‘civil and anti-civil institutions’.1031 The dialectic of ‘civility’ 
and ‘anti-civility’ permeates not only the symbolic, discursive, and ideological 
domains of society but also the institutional structures that allow for a minimal 
degree of solidified interactionality. In this context, what is significant from 
a normative standpoint is Alexander’s assertion that, inevitably, processes of 
inclusion generate mechanisms of exclusion. On this account, ‘[t]he evils of 
modernity are not anomalies’1032 but, rather, ‘systemic products of the search 
for civil justice and the good life’.1033 In other words, there is no search for justice 
and the good life without the creation of injustice and the bad life. 
 
III. 
In Boltanski and Thévenot’s case, processes of ‘critique, debate, and deliberation’1034 
are considered to play a pivotal role in the construction of normative orders.
  
 
Yet, instead of developing a narrative based on binary categories such as ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’, they make a case for a multidimensional framework founded on several 
‘orders of worth’ or ‘cités’, in which people employ their ‘day-to-day sense of 
justice’1035 and in which they not only coordinate their actions, but also assess the 
validity of the principles bywhich they are guided when performing them. On this 
view, there is no overarching normative principle; rather, each ‘cité’ – ‘inspired’, 
‘domestic’, ‘civic’, ‘market’, ‘industrial’, or ‘fame-based’ – is shaped by its own 
parameters of justification, which human subjects cannot possibly bypass when 
defending the moral value  of  an action  within  the normative  boundaries  of 
a particular social realm. In a general sense, then, the normative pluralism that 
underpins Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociology of justification goes hand in hand 
with the emphasis placed on the fruitful role of the diversity of opinions, belief 
systems, and life styles in democratically organized societies. 
 
IV. 
It appears that, both in The Civil Sphere and in On Justification, 
 
the primary battle to be fought is not one over allocation of resources or access to 
power structures, but one that situates itself on the terrain of influence, persuasion, 
and hence discourse.1036 
 
Unlike Bourdieusian approaches, which tend to focus on field-specific struggles 
over access to material and symbolic resources and, correspondingly, on the 
homological interplay between position-taking and disposition-acquisition, 
here social actors are portrayed as capable of engaging in critical dialogue and discursive 
processes of justification. 
Of course, one may level various criticisms  against Alexander’s as well  
as against Boltanski and Thévenot’s conceptual frameworks, notably – as 
pointed out by Eulriet – with regard to the ethnocentric spirit underlying their 
understanding of normatively differentiated societies. Notwithstanding the 
epistemic limitations attached to their respective sociological projects, the 
insights provided in The Civil Sphere and On Justification are far from insignificant: 
just as Alexander’s fine-grained socio-historical analysis of the civil sphere 
permits us to shed light on ‘the vital, maybe primary, role of cultural processes 
in shaping social life in liberal democracies’,1037 Boltanski and Thévenot’s socio- 
pragmatist account of processes of justification opens ‘conceptual avenues […] 
for the study of public culture as an autonomous sphere of social life within 
changing institutional environments’.1038 The creation of open,  democratic, 
and empowering civil spheres depends on dialogical processes of justification. 
At the same time, the possibility of dynamic, inclusive, and emancipatory
  
 
processes of justification is inextricably linked to the normative challenge of 
contributing to the communicatively constituted construction of civil spheres. 
 
William Outhwaite and David Spence 
In their chapter, William Outhwaite and David Spence take on the – perhaps, 
slightly unexpected – task of placing ‘Luc Boltanski in Euroland’.1039 More 
specifically, they seek to demonstrate that some of Boltanski’s key theoretical 
contributions are useful to contemporary studies of European politics in 
general and of the European Union in particular. Notoriously controversial 
issues, in this respect, are the following: the conditions of European 
integration, the possibility of the emergence of a European state, the creation 
of European citizenship, the construction of a European identity, and – more 
generally – both the idea and the reality of a European society.1040 
 
I. 
In the first section of their chapter, Outhwaite and Spence propose to 
distinguish ‘four broad families of critical social theory’,1041 all of which are relevant 
to contemporary studies of Europe and ‘Europeanization’:1042 
First, ‘Frankfurt’ critical theory – rooted in Germany, but increasingly present 
on a European and, indeed, transatlantic scale – is now represented by various 
German scholars (notably, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Claus Offe, 
Hauke Brunkhorst, Ulrich Beck, and Edgar Grande), but also by prominent 
Anglo-American intellectuals (such as Andrew Arato, Seyla Benhabib, James 
Bohman, Jean Cohen, Nancy Fraser, William Rehg, and others). In recent 
decades, their numerous works have gained considerable influence in and on 
the field of European studies.1043 
Second, Foucauldian theories of governmentality – rooted in France, but widely 
discussed, developed, and applied across and beyond Europe – are defended 
by a variety of  social and political scientists. They are commonly applied  
by researchers focusing on two related areas in European studies: (a) ‘the 
territorial polity of the EU – borders, regional policy etc.’;1044 and (b) the 
‘mode of surveillance’1045 of the EU, especially with regard to the emergence 
of ‘a regulatory state’.1046 The ‘regulated freedom’1047 that characterizes 
demographic forms of control and movement in contemporary  Europe  
lends itself to being studied in Foucauldian terms, for it obliges social and 
political scientists to revise traditional conceptions of power, advocated in 
modern – notably, Marxist and Weberian – theories of domination.1048 
Third, Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ – widely recognized as one of the 
most influential approaches in the social sciences of the late twentieth
  
 
and early twenty-first centuries – has had a substantial impact not only on his 
disciples – such as Luc Boltanski, Jean-Louis Fabiani, and Loïc Wacquant – but 
also, more widely, on social scientists across the world. Multiple scholars 
have illustrated the usefulness of Bourdieu’s work to the field of European 
studies.1049 Crucial in this context is Bourdieu’s La misère du monde1050 (1993), a 
large-scale study of ‘the reproduction of class inequalities in the spheres of 
culture and ideology’1051 in late twentieth-century France. Bourdieu’s attack 
on neo-liberalism is comparable to Honneth’s criticisms of social mechanisms 
based on disrespect,1052 Beck’s enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism,1053 and 
Habermas’s reflections on the emergence of a ‘post-national constellation’.1054 
For  all of  these European thinkers share a firm belief  in the possibility      
of an emancipatory society contributing to the self-realization and self- 
empowerment of humanity. 
Fourth, Luc Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ – moreandmoreinfluential 
since the mid-1980s, not only in Francophone circles but also internationally, 
notably in Anglophone and Germanophone social science – features centrally 
in Outhwaite and Spence’s chapter. Two of Boltanski’s most well-known co-
authored books are particularly relevant to European studies: 
 
•  On Justification: Economies of  Worth1055 (2006 [1991]), co-written with Laurent 
Thévenot, offers an insightful analysis of  practices of  justification and   
of decision-making processes in everyday life. The book’s explanatory 
framework can be applied to the study of formal and institutional settings, 
including those existing in the EU. 
• The New Spirit of Capitalism1056 (2005 [1999]), co-written with Ève Chiapello, 
provides an original examination and assessment of the transformation of 
capitalism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, epitomized in 
the emergence of a new ‘spirit’ of capitalism, allowing for social domination 
based on constant change and for processes of innovation in which people’s 
critical capacity plays a pivotal, rather than marginal, role. 
 
Boltanski’s emphasis on ‘the contingency of  social order’1057 and on what  
he refers to as ‘the fragility of reality’1058 is reflected in the fact that, as he 
himself points out, he has always been interested in ‘the practical and flexible 
application of […] theoretical categories’,1059 rather than in ‘their more 
formal aspects’.1060 This has permitted Boltanski and his followers – similar 
to symbolic interactionists and ethno-methodologists – to develop a special 
sensitivity to the normative significance of micro-social dynamics and, hence, 
of ‘the production of social order in everyday interaction’.1061 To be concerned 
with ‘how people engage in critique’1062 requires taking ordinary actors seriously 
and recognizing that they are equipped with both individually and collectively
  
 
empowering moral, reflexive, and discursive capacities. One of the principal 
ambitions of Boltanski’s pragmatic approach, then, is to propose a conceptual 
and methodological framework designed to shed light on the grammatical 
underpinnings of ‘the activity of critical justification’1063 and on the practical 
role of ‘tests’ (épreuves)1064 in shaping the normative development of social life in 




In the second section of their chapter, Outhwaite and Spence go on to discuss 
the relevance of Boltanski’s pragmatic approach to the study of the European Union . As 
they state at the outset, given that the EU 
 
is substantially a discursive forum based on argument and justification […], it is 
perhaps surprising that Boltanski’s approach has not been more widely invoked 
in the extensive volume of literature devoted to it.1066 
 
In this respect, one may compare Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ 
with Habermas’s ‘theory of communicative action’. Indeed, it is striking that, 
despite the somewhat abstract and largely conceptual nature of Habermas’s 
work, there are several empirical investigations that draw upon his writings.1067 
With regard to Boltanski’s oeuvre, a literature attempting to combine 
substantive data with a Boltanskian framework is starting to emerge,1068 but in 
relation to the EU this is not – or, perhaps, not yet – the case. 
As Outhwaite and Spence explain, one of the most central – and, possibly, 
most controversial – aspects of the Lisbon Treaty concerns the fact that it 
stipulates the ‘primacy of EU law, noting that EU law takes precedence over 
the national laws of  EU member states’.1069 Consequently,  one easily gets  
the impression that ‘[n]ational borders disappear’1070 and that ‘the territorial 
imperative manifests itself at a geographically higher level’,1071 reflecting a 
process that may be described as an integral part of the transnationalization – 
and, indeed, the globalization – of contemporary societies, which are 
increasingly interconnected and interdependent. To the extent that this 
‘process is essentially contested by both analysts and the general public’,1072  
it is ‘in need of “justification”’1073 by those who endorse it – either as social- 
scientific researchers or as laypersons experiencing its tangible consequences. 
This new ‘post-Westphalian world’,1074 however, ‘is only in part recognized by 
Europeans’,1075 most of whom continue to consider the nation-state to which 
they belong – in terms of their citizenship – as the main reference point for large- 
scale decision-making processes and for the definition of their cultural identity.
  
 
Nevertheless, in such a post-Westphalian context, it appears ‘unacceptable for 
a minister to say in the European Council that he or she is concerned only with 
the national interest’,1076 although Eurosceptic politicians – such as Margaret 
Thatcher and David Cameron – have often come close to articulating such an 
openly nationalist position.1077 
The key contention that Outhwaite and Spence seek to defend, then, can 
be summarized – in their own words – as follows: 
 
Tension between national (member state) and Union interest is fundamental to the nature of the 
EU; in fact, it constitutes a frequent theme of its self-justification.1078 
 
They go on to comment that 
 
we must regret that Boltanski has so far not developed for the EU as a subject 
of  sociological  inquiry  the  ideas  contained  in  On  Justification,  in  particular  his 
discussion of the tensions between the cité civique and cité industrielle.1079 
 
In other words, justificatory processes are no less relevant – empirically – to the 
everyday functioning of the EU than they are – theoretically – to Boltanski’s 
architecture of ‘the social’. Notwithstanding the question of whether or not  
it is possible, in a given case, ‘to reclassify a national interest as a European 
interest and thereby bolster political support’1080 for the EU, Outhwaite and 
Spence 
 
regret that Boltanski did not develop his views on the resolution of such tensions 
between servants and politicians at the level of the nation-state and of the 
supranational state.1081 
 
Granted, in one of his latest works, Énigmes et complots : Une enquête à propos 
d’enquêtes1082 (2012), Boltanski provides a critical study of ‘the relations between 
the state, its employees, and citizens’1083 in relation to the development of police 
fiction and spy novels. In this context, his enquiry into ‘the relation between 
official and unofficial power resources’1084 is remarkably insightful. One of his 
most fundamental questions concerning the nature of power – ‘Where is power 
really located, and who really holds it?’1085 – is central not only to social and political 
theorists, but also to the empirical study of both national and supranational 
decision-making processes within the EU. 
In seeking to scrutinize the relationship between different levels of 
deliberative and institutional power, ‘[w]hat an approach drawing on Boltanski 
may contribute is a sharper focus on modes of justification’,1086 not only in 
relation to ‘the legitimate use of rhetoric’1087 but also – à la Habermas – in relation
  
 
to the legitimate use of arguments. Unlike Bourdieu’s framework, which appears 
to reduce discursive practices to their exogenous determinacy in terms of 
‘static elements of position in a field and possession of capital’,1088 Boltanski’s 
pragmatist model – reminiscent of Habermas’s discourse ethics – ‘can be 
invoked to reinforce the case for attending to the more dynamic aspects of 
Eurocracy’.1089 The ‘fragility of reality’1090 is reflected in the instability of 
European democracy, including the lack of legitimacy from which it may 
suffer within different – nationally defined – societies, especially when political 
decisions are justified by reference to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’.1091 
As    Outhwaite    and    Spence     emphasize,     Euro-governance     
relies – substantially – on the knowledge of ‘independent experts’1092 and 
their capacity to form ‘epistemic communities’1093 and ‘policy networks’,1094 
forming an integral component of ‘Eurocracy’,1095 which has been extensively 
discussed in the literature.1096 When using Boltanskian parameters to make 
sense of ‘forms of argumentation’1097 underlying decision-making processes in 
the EU, it becomes clear that different – but interrelated and overlapping – logics of 
discursive engagement are at work: the ‘inspired’ world, shot through with creativity; 
the ‘civic’ world, motivated by the defence of public interests; the world of 
‘opinion’, shaped by both private and public interpretations and attitudes; the 
‘domestic’ world, ruled by – often nepotistic – networks and hierarchies of 
personal  and collective dependence; the ‘mercantile’ world, based on market 
principles, notably competition and profit; and, last but not least, the 
‘industrial’ world, in which productivity and efficiency are considered 
indispensable.1098 One may, of course, add the ‘connectivist’ world, which 
represents the ‘new spirit of capitalism’1099 and which, nourished by the idea 
of ‘flexicurity’, is driven by the ambition to construct a transnational 
‘network society’.1100 Whichever of these ‘worlds’ one may consider 
objectively preponderant or normatively most significant, a ‘commitment to 
the idea of supranationality’1101 – and, hence, ‘to “integration” at the highest 
level’1102 – appears to be unavoidable when steering the development of 
increasingly globalized societies. A ‘Boltanskian approach may illuminate the 
discursive micro-dynamics of […] negotiations’1103 making the emergence of 
communicatively organized realms of supranationality possible in the first 
place. In a world of globalization, processes of justification are no less trans- and 
supranational than the realities with which they are concerned. Indeed, borderless 
processes of justification have themselves become a constitutive reality of 
the global network society. 
Boltanski’s reflections on ‘a “transport of values” – that is,  a  situation  in which 
one kind of “value” is judged with the tools of another’1104 – may remind us of 
Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘convertibility of capital’1105 – that is, a situation in which 
one kind of ‘capital’ can be transformed into, and be valorized with the tools 
of, another. A given world may be characterized as ‘inspired’, ‘civic’, ‘opinion- 
  
 
based’, ‘domestic’, ‘mercantile’, ‘industrial’, or ‘connectivist’. In a similar vein, 
a specific type of capital embodies primarily ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, 
‘intellectual’, ‘educational’, ‘linguistic’, ‘political’, ‘symbolic’, or ‘erotic’ 
resources. In both the Boltanskian and the Bourdieusian universe, however, 
every ‘world’ and every form of ‘capital’ can be attributed meaning and value 
through the lenses of another ‘world’ and form of ‘capital’, at the same time 
as people navigate their way through reality by going back and forth between 
different domains of action and by mobilizing different resources for action. 
Considering the impact of bottom-up constructions of normativities upon 
the development of democratically organized societies, ‘Boltanski’s stress on 
the critical activity developed by ordinary actors’1106 may seem plausible. Yet, 
when reflecting on the implications of the fact that – as Outhwaite and Spence 
argue – ‘Europe’s diplomats […] currently live divided lives and loyalties’,1107 the 
challenge consists in examining the extent to which their official justifications 
(justifications officielles) differ from their unofficial justification (justifications officieuses) 
and, correspondingly, the extent to which their public reasoning (raisonnement 
publique) diverges from their private reasoning (raisonnement privé). Inevitably, the 
‘new global order’1108 is permeated by various material and symbolic, real and 
imagined, formal and informal, public and private conflicts. The tension-laden 
construction process of the EU is only one example of the multiple conflicting 
forces shaping social developments on a supranational scale. One of the key 
strengths of the Boltanskian analytical framework resides in its ability to do 
justice to the civilizational role of critical capacity, without reducing it to an 
outcome of a monolithic power that is self-sufficient enough to escape the 
normative parameters underpinning particular domains of social reality. 
 
Bryan S. Turner 
In his chapter, Bryan S. Turner provides a number of insightful and critical 
‘Reflections on the Indignation of the Disprivileged and the 
Underprivileged’,1109 arguing that Boltanski’s approach offers a useful 
sociological framework for the analysis of the causes and consequences of 
the recent and ongoing social and economic crisis. 
 
I. 
According to Turner, one of the most significant limitations of orthodox 
versions of Marxism has been their inability ‘to explain the failures of 
working-class opposition to capitalist exploitation’.1110 Indeed, the emergence 
of what Lenin provocatively called ‘the working-class aristocracy’ – that is, 
the rise of a relatively affluent working class in most economically developed
  
 
countries – poses a serious challenge to classical variants of Marxism, since 
it illustrates the adaptable, elastic, and integrationist potential of advanced 
forms of capitalism. 
One can find several examples in modern history demonstrating capitalism’s 
capacity to obtain considerable degrees of legitimacy in different national 
societies: the consolidation of Otto von Bismarck’s ‘minimal social security 
system’1111 in late nineteenth-century Germany; H. H. Asquith’s attempt to 
build a ‘welfare safety net’1112 in the early twentieth-century United Kingdom; 
or the Beveridge Report of 1943, which – as is widely acknowledged – ‘laid the 
foundation of the British welfare state and the social rights of citizenship’.1113 
What these substantial socio-political developments have in common is that 
they are indicative of capitalism’s capacity to strengthen its own systemic 
stability and ideological legitimacy by virtue of institutional adjustments, 
implemented and administered by the state, in order to guarantee its own 
long-term viability as the predominant mode of organizing the economy. 
Regardless of whether one accepts or rejects Gramscian explanations 
concerning ‘the creation of a moral and ideological hegemony through the church 
and educational institutions over the working class’,1114 and irrespective of 
whether one advocates or discards classical and contemporary versions of 
the ‘dominant ideology thesis’,1115 there is little doubt that capitalism has turned 
out to constitute a far more flexible and adjustable economic system than 
assumed in orthodox Marxist circles. Modern analysts grappling with the 
numerous theoretical challenges arising from this socio-historical constellation 
have developed diverging understandings of what is commonly referred to as 
the ‘structure/agency debate’. In Marxist and Durkheimian approaches, the 
emphasis tends to be placed on structural constraints shaping, or even determining, 
social actions. In Weberian thought, the consideration of interpretive and reflexive 
resources mobilized for the realization of human actions tends to be given 
particular attention. In the writings of most influential modern sociologists – 
such as Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre Bourdieu –  the  
critical engagement with the tension between structure-focused and action-focused 
explanatory frameworks plays a pivotal role. Luc Boltanski’s oeuvre is, in this 
respect, no exception. 
One may choose to follow Giddens by recognizing that ‘social structures  
are both the product and the medium of human actions’,1116 in addition to 
accounting for ‘the “knowledgeability” of the social actor and the “contingency” of 
social action’.1117 In a similar vein, Boltanski’s writings on people’s ‘moral and critical 
capacities’,1118 as well as his insistence on what he describes as the ‘the fragility of 
reality’,1119 are aimed at taking ordinary actors seriously, whilst drawing attention 
to the fact that social arrangements, given that they are constructed, can be both 
deconstructed and reconstructed. When examining ‘the relationship between
  
 
action and structure, subjectivity and objectivity, and common-sense knowledge 
and scientific knowledge’,1120 one may come to the conclusion that ‘big-picture’ 
thinkers – such as Marx, Durkheim, and Bourdieu – tend to overemphasize the 
constraining impact of social structures, whereas ‘context-sensitive’ scholars – such 
as Weber, Simmel, and Boltanski – tend to overestimate the degree of freedom 
enjoyed by subjects performing social actions. 
For a long time, Marxist thought has been motivated by the following – 
perhaps, hopelessly optimistic – conviction: ‘Once their alienation was 
turned into anger and their anger into organization, the collective action      
of the workers would become a potent historical force.’1121 In opposition to 
this view, Karl Mannheim, in his seminal study Ideology and Utopia1122 (1936 
[1929]), maintained that ‘declining classes or class fractions would adhere  
to conservatism’.1123 Yet, in his book Conservatism1124 (1986 [1925]), he 
acknowledged that, far from converting into some kind of new ‘bourgeoisie’ or 
secure class of mere affluence, ‘the “middle stratum” (Mittelstand) in Germany 
was not fully developed’1125 and had a long way to go. 
In this chapter, Turner reflects on the social and political consequences of the 
financial crisis of 2008. In the context of this crisis, he interprets both ‘the Occupy 
Wall Street (OWS) movement and the Tea Party as empirical examples of indignation 
and rage’.1126 Throughout his discussion, he draws, above all, upon three major 
modern sociological works, namely On Justification1127 (2006 [1991]), The New 
Spirit of Capitalism1128 (2005 [1999]), and Distant Suffering1129 (1999 [1993]). In 
Turner’s opinion, Boltanski’s ‘work has a strong ethical quality, because he seeks to 
understand how human beings respond to injustice’.1130 More specifically, his scholarly 
writings permit us to understand that ‘social actors are not passive and supine in 
the face of tangible evidence of inequality and injustice’,1131 but, on the contrary, 
responsive, reflexive, and engaged when being confronted with circumstances whose 
normative constitution they perceive as problematic or even unacceptable. 
 
II. 
As convincingly explained by Turner, The New Spirit of Capitalism can be 
regarded as an important study for several reasons: 
 
(a) It provides one of the most powerful accounts of the transformation of 
capitalist forms of organization in Western Europe, notably in France, since 
the 1960s – in particular vis-à-vis ‘class formation, the role of the state, the 
character of industrial relations, and the rise and fall of ideologies’.1132 
(b) It offers a convincing proposal to revise Weber’s conception of ‘the spirit 
of capitalism’, based on substantial evidence suggesting that ‘the discourses 
by which the social order is legitimated and individuals are motivated to
  
 
engage in tasks and enter into occupations’1133  have  fundamentally  changed 
since the late twentieth century. 
(c) It illustrates the qualities and merits of Boltanski’s sociological framework 
in terms of its capacity to shed light on the role of critical capacity in bringing 
about, and influencing the direction of, ‘historical change’.1134 
(d) It forms part of the more ambitious attempt to develop ‘a critical and moral 
sociology’1135 aimed at taking ordinary actors seriously, especially by exploring 
the ways in which they deal with ‘issues relating to justice and inequality’1136 
in their everyday lives. For Boltanski and Chiapello, processes of justification are 
not ‘merely an ideological smokescreen’.1137 On the contrary, they have a direct 
impact, and exert constraints, upon ‘the power elite and on the functioning of 
capitalism’,1138 thereby potentially limiting the detrimental effects of alienation, 
exploitation, and domination. On this view, the public sphere can be conceived of 
as a discursive realm shaped by an ‘endless debates between different orders of 
value’1139 and by a ceaseless undertaking of ‘tests’1140 (épreuves) either confirming 
or undermining the legitimacy of a given set of normative arrangements and 
practices. 
 
According to Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, we can distinguish three ‘spirits’ 
of capitalism: 
 
•  The first ‘spirit’ can be characterized as ‘family capitalism’1141, which prioritizes 
‘the individual figure of the bourgeois capitalist proprietor’1142 and finds its 
ideological justification, above all, in the ‘domestic city’. 
•  The second ‘spirit’ can be conceived of as ‘industrial or organizational capitalism’,1143 
epitomized in the protagonist role of ‘the manager’,1144 whose societal 
function is ‘associated with “organization man”’.1145 
•  The third ‘spirit’ manifests itself, most clearly, in the ‘city of projects’,1146 
in which neo-liberal principles – such as ‘flexibility’, ‘adaptability’, 
‘creativity’, and ‘mobility’ – play a pivotal role in developing an ever-
more elastic and seemingly forward-looking capitalist system. 
 
As Turner eloquently puts it, we are confronted with ‘a profound irony of 
modern capitalism’:1147 
 
The social and artistic critiques that flowered in May 1968 have been incorporated 
into the management ideology of modern capitalism, just as the soixante-huitards 
have themselves been incorporated into the French social establishment.1148 
 
Capitalism has not only been able to tolerate criticism; but, in a more fundamental sense, it 
has succeeded in incorporating evaluative processes based on critical discourse into its
  
 
very mode of functioning, thereby converting openness to debate, controversy, and constant 
assessment into one of its normative cornerstones. 
Given the ‘emphasis on flexible global networks with people working 
cooperatively on multiple projects’,1149 the ‘sustained attack on hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, top-down organizations’1150 has reflected a significant shift in 
capitalist culture from the 1960s onwards. The rise of the ‘network man’,1151 
however, stands not simply for the emergence of an unprecedented systemic 
and ideological modus operandi of capitalism, but also for its unparalleled 
capacity to take seriously ‘four sources of indignation’:1152 ‘inauthenticity, oppression, 
misery and inequality, and egoism’.1153 The former two were central objects of 
different versions of artistic critique; the latter two were principal matters of 
concern under the umbrella of social critique. 
If Boltanski and Chiapello are right to assert that ‘[t]here is no ideology, however 
radical its principles and formulations, that has not eventually proved open to 
assimilation’,1154 then capitalism is equipped with the capacity  to incorporate,  
and thereby neutralize, the apparently most subversive forms of criticism and 
alternative social realities. As Turner remarks, profound changes have taken place, 
reshaping the structural constitution of capitalism since the 1960s: 
 
the decline of large trade unions in the manufacturing sectors of the economy; 
the transformation of the career structure of employment, where employees now have 
short-term projects, rather than long-term jobs; the casualization and outsourcing of 
employment that is associated with project-driven employment; and, above all, the 
decline of solidaristic and politically active social classes as the basis of social identity and 
classification.1155 
 
Arguably, one of the key features characterizing the ‘new spirit of  capitalism’  
is that ‘social exclusion has replaced social class as the principle of social differentiation and 
division’;1156 that is, patterns of social stratification are increasingly complex. In the 
contemporary literature, this differentiation process is often described in terms of 
the sociological challenge of ‘intersectionality’:1157 social structures and processes of 
inclusion and exclusion are shaped by key – intersecting – sociological variables 
such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and ability. In the ‘connexionist world’,1158 
being ‘successful’ is associated with being ‘incessantly on the move’,1159 whilst those 
who are considered ‘unsuccessful’ are portrayed as having ‘squandered their 
talents’1160 and as being trapped in a state of ‘fixity’.1161 The ‘endless freedom of 
movement’1162 enjoyed by the super-rich is expressed in their privileged capacity to 
obtain ‘visas, passports, and citizenship’1163 when and if they need them – unlike 
poor migrants, for whom these matters are hardly ever a matter of choice.1164 
Turner draws attention to the fact that, owing to the emphasis that most 
modern sociologists place on the social constructedness of reality, which – in
  
 
many cases – leads to cognitive and normative ‘relativism’,1165 ‘the term “justice” 
rarely enters the sociological lexicon’,1166 and the term ‘injustice’ may even have 
less of a solid place in the discursive space of social-scientific analysis. It comes 
hardly as a surprise, then, that Boltanski and his collaborators are criticized for 
failing to identify ‘context-transcendent principles of justice common to different 
ways of life’1167 and, in addition, for giving the impression that ‘their “cities” are 
historically somewhat arbitrary and underdeveloped’.1168 Turner’s main criticism 
levelled against Boltanski and his collaborators, however, is their ‘lack of attention 
to gender and religion’1169 as well as to culture and ethnicity. Elaborating on the 
implications of this significant limitation, Turner makes the following remarks: 
 
For a study of indignation, protest, and justification, they have remarkably little to say 
about the women’s movement or feminist criticisms of inequality and exploitation.1170 […] Public 
contestations over ethnicity and citizenship, race and religion, Islamism and laïcité 
spilt onto the streets of Paris suburbs in a spectacular fashion in 2006; and yet, there 
are no references to ethnicity or religion in their study of French society.1171 
 
Whilst rejecting orthodox versions of Marxist materialism, Boltanski and 
Chiapello draw on Weber’s  concern with the constantly changing ‘spirit’    
of capitalism. Unlike Weber, however, they fail to take religion seriously. 
Habermas is amongst the most  prolific  and  prominent  contemporary  
social and political analysts eager to reflect on the normative challenges 
arising from the tension-laden relationship between ‘secular and religious 
citizens’.1172 In whatever way one wishes to make sense of this relationship, 
Habermas rightly insists that, in democratically organized and pluralistically 
constituted societies, ‘both secular and religious citizens have an obligation to 
defend their views in public by offering cogent reasons for their beliefs’.1173 
The notion that we have entered a ‘post-secular’ era has been examined  
from different angles; undoubtedly, Habermas’s conception of ‘post- 
secularity’ is highly influential.1174 Insisting on the sociological complexity of 
post-secular realities in the contemporary context, Turner goes on to argue 
that the recent and current crisis – which may be described as ‘the worst 
recession since the Great Depression’1175 – appears to have overshadowed 
tensions not only between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ actors but also between religious 




According to Turner, ‘[t]he origins of the current economic crisis can be traced back to 
the 1970s’1176. One only needs to remember the oil crisis of 1973, combined
  
 
with rising inflation rates and the end of  the Bretton  Woods system designed 
to guarantee monetary stability, in order to become aware of the fact that, in 
the late twentieth century, capitalism has been far from entirely stable, let alone 
completely predictable. Reaganomics in the United  States,  Thatcherism  in the 
United Kingdom, and Helmut Kohl’s neo-conservatism  in Germany can be 
regarded as symptoms of the emergence of a worldwide hegemony of the neo- 
liberal project, notably in the economically advanced countries of ‘the West’. In 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in other financially 
strong countries, ‘bank deregulation and cuts in personal taxation produced a 
number of economic bubbles, especially around the Internet and the rapid rise in 
house prices’.1177 The most devastating consequences of the crisis were certainly 
experienced in the weaker European countries, also described as the PIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain),1178 which were substantially exposed to 
economic upheavals not only due to internal mismanagement but also ‘as a result 
of the credit collapse and the rapid decline in property markets and tourism’.1179 
One option is to interpret the 2008 crisis as the result of avaricious bankers, 
financiers, and investors who took advantage of ‘the deregulation of the 
banking sector to satisfy their own narrow interests’.1180 Another option is to 
conceive of the 2008 crisis as a manifestation of the structural 
contradictions built into capitalism, which – because of their far-reaching 
detrimental effects – suggests that, ‘without deficit financing and quantitative 
easing, there is insufficient consumer demand to sustain full employment 
and full production’.1181 Irrespective of whether one favours a ‘voluntaristic’ 
or a ‘structuralist’ account of economic crises, there is little doubt that ‘the 
financialization of capitalism’1182 constitutes a key feature of the emerging 
global network society in which we live.1183 
The austerity packages imposed not only upon the PIGS but also upon the 
United Kingdom and other ‘big players’, however, illustrate that we are not 
confronted with a merely economic or systemic problem;  any major crisis on     
a large scale has significant socio-political implications. Confronted with the 
consequences of financial crisis, the tendency to blame either external or internal 
forces, or a combination of these two levels, is reflected in the rise of far-right 
movements, which hold particular – ethnically or culturally defined – groups 
wholly or at least partly responsible for economic disasters and societal instability. 
 
IV. 
It is in this context that Turner proposes to reflect on the role of progressive 
protest movements aimed at giving a voice to the seemingly voiceless and at 
expressing ‘indignation against the current state of society’.1184 Turner offers 
an unorthodox interpretation of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement
  
 
when drawing attention to the fact that, upon close examination, ‘one finds an 
interesting, if unexpected, dimension: namely, faith leaders’.1185 Shortly after 
the OWS mobilizations began to take shape on 17 September 2011 in New 
York’s Zuccotti Park, it became clear that it was more than a local, ephemeral, 
and amorphous group of protesters; it quickly spread across the country and, 
eventually, around the entire globe. As Turner observes, ‘[p]rotest chaplains 
from Union Theological Seminary in New York were in Zuccotti Park on a 
regular basis, joining in the protest actions, while also offering spiritual support 
to the protesters’,1186 showing that OWS – far from being reducible to an 
entirely secular movement – had numerous religiously motivated participants, 
whose activities were, in some cases, based on ‘interfaith collaboration’1187 
grappling with issues concerning social and economic justice. Their presence 
and active participation in OWS are yet another empirical example of the fact 
that classical versions of the ‘secularization thesis’1188 need to be seriously revised 
in the face of the continuing influence of religiously based practices and belief 
systems on the development of contemporary societies. 
 
Over the last two decades, sociologists of religion have turned against the 
secularization thesis to argue that religion is more – rather than less – important 
and visible in modern public domains. The notions of ‘de-secularization’, ‘public 
religions’, and ‘post-secular society’ have been developed to understand the role 
of religion in the public sphere. Such public debates are especially important in 
response to economic and political crises.1189 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Marxist and anarchist elements of the OWS movement 
were not easily reconcilable with traditional Christian values, notably the 
Christian striving towards and ‘respect for social order’.1190 Moreover, OWS’s 
critical attitude towards mainstream and ‘organized politics’,1191 especially  
in terms of their hierarchical and institutional dimensions, is indicative of 
their commitment to grassroots processes of inclusion and decision-making 
processes in the spirit of radical democracy.1192 To be sure, individual or 
collective actors associated with left-wing – that is, ‘progressive’, ‘forward- 
looking’, and ‘inclusivist’ – discourses and practices do not possess a monopoly 
on grassroots politics. Indeed, as Turner points out, there are various right-wing – 
that is, ‘conservative’, ‘backward-looking’, and ‘exclusivist’ – movements that 
also defend a particular notion of grassroots politics. 
 
V. 
One contemporary example of these right-wing movements is the Tea Party, 
which was formed in 2009, largely as a response to the social and economic
  
 
crisis of 2008 in general and to the Obama administration’s policies designed to 
deal with it in particular. As a value-conservative and, to a large extent, reactionary 
movement, the supporters of the Tea Party are deeply sceptical of rapid social 
change and critical of the forces that are allegedly behind destabilizing structural 
and ideological transformations in the contemporary era.1193 
 
Their anger is directed at what they see to be the undeserving poor, the 
freeloaders, and generally people who do not share their strong sense of the 
Protestant Ethic. There was also a clear element of racism in their vocabulary 
against President Obama, who was seen to be an outsider, if not a Muslim. They 
were especially fearful of what they saw as the unstoppable spread of the shari’a, 
which was evidence of Muslims taking over the country. Whereas OWS had 
only weak linkages with organized religion, over 40% of Tea Party supporters 
describe themselves as evangelical Christians. The social conservatism of their 
rank and file is also illustrated by their standpoint on a range of social issues. 
Illegal immigrants were seen to be ‘freeloaders’, who were accessing benefits to 
which they had no entitlement […].1194 
 
It is difficult to demonstrate with more clarity that – despite the arrival of 
secularization processes – religion and politics remain intimately interrelated. 
Given their significant mutual influence, it is surprising that, although ‘Boltanski 
has developed a powerful and general analysis of responses to injustice 
through his study of resentment and indignation’,1195 in his numerous writings 
one finds little in the way of a fine-grained analysis of the pivotal role religion 
continues to play in contemporary societies. When scrutinizing economic, 
cultural, political, and ideological divisions in highly differentiated societies, 
such as the United States, it becomes evident that there are multiple ‘types of 
indignation’.1196 These are triggered by individual and collective experiences 
of injustice, shaped by sociological variables such as class, ethnicity, gender, 
age, and ability. On this account, then, it is difficult to ignore ‘that “the city” 
is deeply fragmented and indignation as such provides no collective basis for 
uniting “the city”’.1197 
Some may perceive their participation in a given ‘city’ as empowering and 
others as disempowering, depending not only on the relationally defined positions 
they occupy in the social space, but also on the ideologically constituted and 
behaviourally habitualized dispositions they develop within it. One need not  be 
a Bourdieusian to recognize the constraining power of mechanisms  of social 
structuration, just as one need not be a Boltanskian to acknowledge the 
potentially liberating force of processes of discursive justification. One of the 
key tasks for both ‘critical sociologists’ à la Bourdieu and ‘sociologists of critique’ 
à la Boltanski, however, consists in elucidating the extent to which structural
  
 
determinacy and critical reflexivity depend on one another when shaping the 
development of society. Whatever the real or imagined sources of anger and 
resentment in a particular context affecting a specific group of actors may be, 
both mechanisms of social structuration and processes of discursive justification 
permeate people’s meaning-laden exposure to the experience of indignation. 
 
 
Luc Boltanski and Contemporary Issues 
Bruno Karsenti 
In his chapter, entitled ‘Arranging the Irreversible: The Female Condition  
and Contradiction’,1198 Bruno Karsenti provides an in-depth review of  one  
of Luc Boltanski’s most controversial studies: La condition fœtale : Une sociologie 
de l’engendrement et de l’avortement,1199 published originally in French in 2004 
and, subsequently, in English – under the title The Foetal Condition: A 
Sociology of Engendering and Abortion1200 – in 2013. Perhaps, Karsenti’s 
boldest claim is that La condition fœtale illustrates that ‘[a] sociology of 
abortion depends on a sociology of procreation’.1201 Put differently, Boltanski 
has sought to restore ‘a broken link: that between abortion and what it has 
just denied’1202 – that is, the relationship between the possibility of 
terminating a pregnancy and the possibility of continuing with it. More 
specifically, Karsenti maintains that Boltanski’s analysis permits us to 
understand that abortion is a twofold process: as a process regarding our ‘natural’ 
condition, it raises various questions vis-à-vis ‘production of the living by the 
living, reproduction in the biological sense’;1203 as a process concerning our 
‘social’ condition, it poses multiple challenges arising from the 
‘reproduction of society itself by the continuous flow that is required of new 
beings called up to incorporate themselves within it’.1204 
 
I. 
For Karsenti, there is little doubt that La condition fœtale is 
 
as much a book about the woman as it is a book on the foetus, and all its difficulty 
lies precisely in its effort not to separate them, and especially not to put them  
in opposition, aiming at placing itself exactly at the point at which they belong 
together.1205 
 
On this reading, it appears that the whole point of a sociological understanding 
of the foetus and its mother is not to dissociate them from another,  but,  on 
the contrary, to shed light on their – presumably ontological – interconnectedness. 
In terms of its methodological outlook, Boltanski’s study combines two
  
 
epistemologically distinct forms of social analysis. On the one hand, his account 
is ‘resolutely constructivist’,1206 in the sense that it examines abortion in terms of 
its ‘logical or grammatical’1207 constitution and, hence, conceives of it as a social 
practice that cannot be divorced from the act of procreation. On the other 
hand, his account is determinedly perspectivist, in the sense that it takes seriously 
‘the perspective of the actor […], engaged in a very particular problematic situation, 
whose most salient feature, regardless of the chosen outcome, is irreversibility’.1208 
In brief, abortion is both a grammatically constructed and a personally experienced 
process, one of whose constitutive characteristics is its protagonist’s exposure 
to irrevocability. 
It is this ‘horizon of the irreversible’1209 which Karsenti considers to be about 
‘much more than life or death’1210 and which, according to him, features centrally 
in Boltanski’s enquiry into abortion. Given the  simultaneously  grammatical 
and phenomenological aspects  underpinning  the  process  of  abortion, 
‘[l]ogical dilemma and tragedy experienced are […] inseparable’.1211 What is 
more significant from a sociological standpoint, however, is that ‘they can be 
explained only by each other’.1212 Yet, ‘explaining’ and ‘justifying’ are two separate, 
albeit interrelated, tasks. Indeed, as Karsenti spells out, ‘the justification for what 
cannot be’,1213 or for what can be, is a major challenge to be confronted when 
reflecting upon the moral dimensions attached not only to decision-making 
processes concerning abortion but also to ‘the biological and social question    
of procreation’.1214 What is at stake, then, is not only the purposive and cognitive 
constitution of an individual actor, let alone simply the behavioural and ideological 
patterns prevailing in a given realm of society, but also – in a broad sense – ‘the 
relationship between nature and culture’,1215 as well as – in a narrow sense – ‘the 
relationship  between  nature  and  culture’1216  in  terms  of  the  impact  it  has 
on her – that is, on ‘the actor’,1217 who, in this case, ‘is a woman’.1218 
 
II. 
Karsenti draws attention to the fact that, even if one is sympathetic towards 
Boltanski’s emphasis on the grammatical constitution of the motivational and 
circumstantial background conditions that undergird abortion, the ‘structuralist 
lineage is somewhat surprising in the case of a sociology that explicitly calls for a 
pragmatics of action’.1219 Whatever one makes of such a grammatical approach, 
the message is clear: for sociologists, the challenge consists in making sense of 
the social constitution of both abortion and procreation: 
 
Procreation, understood as the production of new human beings, is an activity in 
which society reveals itself in its conditions of life, but only to the extent that the life 
processes themselves are always already socially apprehended.1220 
  
 
In a similar vein, one may infer from the above statement that, for Karsenti, 
abortion – conceived of as an intervention aimed at obstructing the production 
of one new human being or, possibly, multiple new human beings – is also  
an activity impregnated with the conditions of life created within a given society 
and, hence, comprehensible only in terms of the relationally organized 
constellations of the socially apprehensible context in which it takes place. Even if 
we agree, however, that both procreation and abortion constitute social practices 
and social experiences,1221 we are confronted with several complicated – and 
rather contentious – questions, such as the following: 
 
How do humans relate to what happens […]? How does society deal with its 
relationship with its own nature, knowing that it is never ‘nature’ in the separate 
and indeterminate sense of the term?1222 
 
Of course, one of  the most debated and recurring issues in this context is  
the question of the point at which ‘the foetus should be considered a living 
being with a personality’.1223 Conservatively inclined sociologists may draw 
upon Durkheim’s Suicide (1966/1951 [1897])1224 in order to explain the ways 
in which societies aim to regulate individual behaviour, thereby making it 
relatively predictable and allowing for the possibility of consolidating a real 
or imagined sense of social order. Far from constituting an unambiguous 
‘social fact’, however, 
 
the foetus cannot be described as an external being […]; it is, instead, a boundary 
social condition, whose outline is a continual question for subjects who come up 
against its ambiguous mode of existence.1225 
 
In a more radical sense, then, Boltanski’s book demonstrates that ‘it is artificial 
and mistaken to separate a natural from a social moment’1226 when studying 
procreation and abortion. Indeed, his enquiry illustrates that these two 
moments are inextricably linked. In order to do justice to the fact that the 
boundaries between ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ are increasingly blurred, we 
need to recognize the performative constitution of all human actions. Hence, as 
Karsenti argues, procreation is ‘an activity’: 
 
this is not something that happens passively to human beings; rather, it is 
something that women do, and something through which they make social 
beings.1227 
 
Owing to its performative constitution, we, as sociologists, need to examine 
the ‘socio-historical variations’1228 not only of procreative practices themselves,
  
 
but also of the meanings attributed to them by individual and collective actors. 
Societies put in place what Boltanski calls – cultural, ideological, institutional, 
or legal – mechanisms of ‘confirmation’,1229 in order to generate relatively 
solidified realms of interaction. ‘For the already-born, there is an extreme 
tension: to procreate is to elect this one and no one else.’1230 On this account, 
abortion can be conceived of as ‘an emergent possibility in the very course 
of procreation’1231 – that is, as a potential scenario inherent in a horizon of 
practical options. 
 
Within the new context that it is given here, abortion no longer seems to be at 
all the external and contradictory opposite of procreation, but it is rather the 
negation that procreation modally incorporates (as possibility) to be able to carry out 
what it carries out, to be able to occur as action – that is to say as an entire process 
organized towards confirmation.1232 
 
Hence, we are confronted with a new picture, according to which procreation 
and abortion are to be regarded not as antithetical but as two mutually inclusive 
possibilities. To the extent that abortion ‘is something practiced in all known 
societies’,1233 it is sociologically perplexing to realize that – even in contexts 
in which it is both institutionally and culturally accepted, if  not protected,  
as an inalienable right of  women  – it tends to be ‘relegated to the sphere    
of the secret and unofficial’.1234 The sociological  distinction  between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ – epitomized in antinomies such as ‘society’ versus 
‘individual’ (‘collective’ versus ‘personal’), ‘visibility’ versus ‘concealment’ 
(‘transparent’ versus ‘opaque’), and ‘openness’ versus ‘closure’ (‘accessible’ 
versus ‘sealed’)1235 – can hardly be more relevant to abortive practices, 
including in the most liberal societies. As Karsenti perceptively remarks, 
however, ‘the unofficial is no longer the same thing when it is snared by the 
official, when it is managed by it, when it finds its place not outside of it, but 
within it’.1236 Put differently, ‘the unofficial’ can be regulated and colonized 
by ‘the official’ to such an extent that it is almost completely controlled by 
it, in which case the very distinction between these two levels of sociality 
appears to become meaningless. 
 
III. 
For Karsenti, there is no doubt that, ‘by admitting publically and legally that 
there really is a leftover, that any being procreated is not ipso facto destined to 
be born’,1237 we are obliged to reject absolutist conceptions of life and death. 
In an existentialist fashion, Karsenti suggests that abortion is misrepresented 
if understood as the opposite of procreation and that, in a fundamental sense,
  
 
uncertainty is built into the very condition of humanity, including the reproductive 
practices aimed at securing its survival as a species. If, however, there is one 
certainty that is inherent in all human societies, it is the fact that its members 
cannot escape from their exposure to the experience of irreversibility when 
participating in reproductive practices, whose spatio-temporal contingency 
cannot do away with the ‘unrewritability’ of history. 
In Karsenti’s eyes, ‘both procreation and abortion alongside it come under 
the order of the irreversible’.1238 Put in negative terms, the condition of human 
life is permeated by the presence of irreversibility at the heart of its evolutionary 
determinacy. Put in positive terms, the construction of human life is driven 
by the presence of choice at the centre of its developmental indeterminacy. 
By studying the conditions of our existence, then, we come to realize that to 
decide means to renounce, implying that we need to accept that the experience 
of irreversibility forms an integral part of our participation in the construction 
of human reality. At the same time, 
 
by scrutinizing life, it is society that one examines, with all of the scandal that  
it involves, not only of unequally redistributing beings, but also, in the very first 
place, of choosing them.1239 
 
As a species, we cannot choose not to choose, but, in principle, we can choose 
what to choose when having to choose between abortion and procreation. 
 
Ilana F. Silber 
In her chapter, entitled ‘Luc Boltanski and the Gift: Beyond Love, beyond 
Suspicion…?’,1240 Ilana F. Silber takes on a difficult task: she examines 
Boltanski’s writings in terms of their relevance to contemporary studies of 
the gift. As she explains, his ‘pragmatic sociology’ has ‘remained largely 
untapped in that regard’.1241 Hence, Silber seeks to fill this gap in the literature 
by illustrating not only the insightfulness of Boltanski’s contributions but also 
their usefulness to the sociological engagement with the nature of the gift. 
 
I. 
In the first section of her essay, Silber is concerned with Boltanski’s 
understanding of  the gift in his seminal study Love and Justice as Competences1242 
(2012 [1990]), notably in terms of its relationship to what he calls philia and 
agapè. Whilst the concept of ‘the gift’ remains a relatively marginal category 
in Boltanski’s analysis, this book includes a subsection entitled ‘The Paradoxes 
of the Gift and the Counter-Gift’,1243 in which some sociological issues
  
 
arising from social processes based on intersubjective reciprocity are given 
special attention. Boltanski is suspicious of structuralist approaches to the 
gift, particularly of its Lévi-Straussian and Bourdieusian variants, since, in 
his opinion, they tend to disregard the sociological importance of people’s 
‘experiences and interpretations of the gift’.1244 Drawing on the works of 
Marc Anspach1245 and Claude Lefort,1246 he argues that there is a ‘paradoxical 
quality built into gift exchanges’:1247 namely, ‘the tension between the freedom 
entailed in the gift […] and the demands of exchange’.1248 Rather than privileging 
the importance of one of these two dimensions at the expense of the other, it 
is crucial to comprehend their interrelatedness. 
The principal problem with structuralist approaches to gift exchanges lies 
in the fact that they tend to underestimate the power of agency (‘freedom’) 
and overestimate the power of necessity (‘demands’), thereby endorsing the 
‘fatalistic view that social actors are merely deluded and that their behaviour 
is essentially the result of structural forces, of which they are unconscious’.1249 
Boltanski, however, ‘refuses to conceptualize it in terms of a form of collective 
lie or distortion of reality’,1250 let alone in terms of an expression of ‘bad 
faith’ or ‘false consciousness’. Instead, he is eager to face up to ‘the profoundly 
complex and paradoxical character’1251 of gift exchanges. 
For Boltanski, it is  not  primarily  the  concept  of  agapè,  understood as 
‘a distinct “regime of peace” and type of “love”’,1252 but, rather, the concept 
of  philia, broadly conceived of  as  ‘friendship’, which  permits  us to 
understand that gift exchanges – far from being reducible to social 
mechanisms driven by interestedness, strategy, and utility – also constitute 
social processes motivated by the need for intersubjectivity, solidarity, and 
reciprocity, thereby anticipating the possibility of ‘a political-contractual 
alternative to violence’.1253 In order to comprehend  the  contradictory nature 
of gift exchanges, it is imperative to study how they ‘are perceived and 
experienced, as well as often discussed and reflected upon, by social 
actors’.1254 In other words, ordinary people have to be taken seriously in 
order to understand why they engage in the construction of social relations 
based on exchange and mutuality. 
Yet, the concept of agapè – defined as ‘a state of peace that is basically 
indifferent to all matters of reciprocity and equivalence’1255 – is also central to 
the sociological study of the gift. Unlike philia, which is based on dynamics of 
reciprocity and mutuality, agapè is an attitude that ‘expects nothing in return, 
either in the material form of objects or in the immaterial form of requited 
love’.1256 Of course, one may speculate about the sociological viability of 
agapè, especially with regard to the question of the ‘sociological “possibility” or 
“impossibility” of the pure, non-reciprocal gift as an enduring form of social 
action’.1257 Rather than succumbing to the illusion of disinterestedness and
  
 
rather than making transcendental claims about unconditional forms of love 
that can dispense with reciprocity-based forms of social relationships, we need 
to face up to ‘the sociological impossibility of pure agapè’.1258 
Instead of hypostatizing the value of an allegedly ‘agapic state’,1259 
understood as an ‘ideal love situation’, which is not far removed from 
Habermas’s paradisal ‘ideal speech situation’,1260 it seems fruitful to grapple 
with ‘less utopian situations’,1261 especially with those ‘in which not all 
actors share the same regime’,1262 contributing to the grammatical and 
praxeological complexity of their  interrelated  performances.  Irrespective 
of  whether or not different actors are – often simultaneously – immersed   in 
different regimes, however, the point is to recognize that the antinomy that is 
built into gift exchanges is not only one between agency (‘freedom’) and 
necessity (‘demands’), but also – in Boltanskian terms – one between philia 
(‘reciprocity’ and ‘equivalence’) and agapè (absence of ‘calculative 




In the second section of her chapter, Silber reflects on the place of the gift in 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s On  Justification1264 (2006 [1991]). She laments that 
‘[l]ittle has been done […] to approach the gift with the help of his ideas on 
economies of worth and justification’.1265 Given that this book ‘hardly relates 
to the gift or gift exchange at all (tellingly, the word “gift” is not even mentioned 
in the volume’s thematic index)’,1266 this may be hardly surprising. Amongst 
the six different ‘worlds of worth’ identified by Boltanski and Thévenot in On 
Justification, the ‘world of  inspiration’ may be the most appropriate one to make 
sense of gift-exchange dynamics. In this world, ‘greatness’ is conceived of as 
the privilege of experiencing ‘an interior state of intense emotions, passions, 
and creativity’,1267 triggered by a seemingly unidentifiable force, intuition, 
afflatus, or inspiration. As such, it surges ‘in an unexpected, involuntary, and 
spontaneous fashion’,1268 manifesting itself in ‘a powerful desire to create’:1269 
the ‘world of inspiration’ is shaped by the ‘experience of receiving a gift’1270 – 
that is, the gift of being driven by the relentless motivation to imagine, 
envisage, and invent something. Arguably, this potentially resourceful looking- 
forwardness lies at the heart of artistic creation. It is not far removed from 
theological conceptions of ‘grace’, which is represented by St. Augustine and 
founded on the notion of ‘(God’s) “free giving” – “gratuité du don”’.1271 
Another option, however, would be to conceptualize the gift as ‘an 
additional “regime of justification” in its own right, with its own battery of 
parameters of worth and tests’.1272 On this account, gift exchanges are based
  
 
on an idiosyncratic and irreducible praxeological grammar that makes them 
possible in the first place. In a similar vein, various studies1273 have argued 
that it is necessary to identify and scrutinize ‘additional regimes of action 
and/or justification’,1274 permitting us to shed light on the emergence and 
functioning of ‘“worlds of worth” centring on benevolent emotions and non- 
reciprocal orientations’.1275 Whichever option one may prefer, these alternative 
approaches indicate that ‘the gift – in diverse modalities and configurations – may 
constitute a potent source of critique and justification on its own’,1276 rather than being 
reducible to other regimes of action, such as the regimes of peace and love.  
It is one of the key contributions of Silber’s chapter to have demonstrated 
precisely this. 
It is no less significant to recognize, however, that the gift constitutes not 
only a pivotal source of critique and justification but, in addition, ‘a dynamic 
feature of social life which is itself in constant, and perhaps increasing, need 
of justification’.1277 In practice, this means that, as sociologists concerned with 
dynamics of giving and taking, we need to explore ‘what kind of regimes of 
worth and justification […] actors deploy when engaged (as donors, recipients, 
mediators, or spectators) in specific gift situations’,1278 not to mention the 
difficult task of investigating, in some detail, ‘what tensions and dilemmas are 
entailed in these situations’.1279 
If we follow Silber in assuming that ‘a plurality of coexisting and 
competing regimes of justification’1280 undergirds gift-exchange scenarios, 
then it makes sense to suggest that ‘Boltanski’s conception of the gift’1281 can 
be enriched by conceding that ‘the very same pluralism that characterizes  
his approach to social life’1282 in general can, and should, be applied to the 
study of the gift in particular. Hence, rather than reducing the nature of gift- 
exchange processes to conceptual antinomies – such as ‘reciprocity’ versus 
‘non-reciprocity’, ‘obligation’ versus ‘spontaneity’, and ‘interestedness’ versus 
‘disinterestedness’ – we need to take seriously the imperatives of ontological 
and methodological pluralism. At the ontological level, gift-exchange 
processes are impregnated with multiple normative realities – that is, with 
several interconnected and partly overlapping ‘worlds of worth’ and ‘worlds 
of justification’.1283 At the methodological level, sociology needs to develop 
appropriate investigative tools to examine these processes in terms of their 
variegated constitution. 
As Silber forcefully states in her Conclusion, one of the main challenges 
faced by contemporary sociologists, especially by those drawing on the 
significant intellectual insights provided by Marcel Mauss,1284 consists in 
developing ‘increasingly complex and multidimensional typologies of gift 
giving and gift relations’,1285 of which there are numerous examples in the 
literature.1286 In essence, neither an idealistic ‘hermeneutics of love and recognition’
  
 
nor a fatalistic ‘hermeneutics of power and suspicion’ will enable us to unearth the 
underlying secrets of gift exchanges. Rather, it is a realistic ‘hermeneutics of 
contradictions’ – capable of accounting for multiple coexistential dimensions 
‘ranging from trust, authenticity, and truthfulness to suspicion, manipulation, 
and falsification’1287 – that permits us to explore the infinite ways in which 
human actors navigate their way through society by accepting their constant 
exposure to different degrees of existential uncertainty. If there is a gift with 
which we have all been bestowed, it is the experience of having been thrown 
into a reality characterized by  uncertainty,  even if  and where we believe  




In his chapter, entitled ‘The World of Worth in the Transhuman Condition: 
Prolegomena to a Proactionary Sociology’,1288 Steve Fuller confronts his 
readers with a number of thought-provoking reflections. 
 
I. 
He starts by affirming that, probably against Boltanski and Thévenot’s will 
and  intentions,  their  book  ‘On  Justification  (2006  [1991])  marks  a  triumph  for 
economic reasoning within sociology’.1289 Whilst the six ‘polities’ or ‘worlds of worth’ 
that they distinguish in their study obtain meaning and derive value from 
different sources, what they have in common is that they are contingent upon 
‘the same general accounting principles’,1290 in such a way that it is possible to 
identify commensurable criteria on the basis of which they ‘allocate costs and 
benefits to sustain their respective conceptions of value’.1291 At the same time, 
it appears that ‘each world presupposes a sense of “common humanity”’,1292 
which serves as a universal normative reference point for the construction of 
context-specific values and ideologies. According to one of Fuller’s principal 
assertions, however, Boltanski’s conception of ‘the human’ is embedded in a 
Lockean notion of the individual. It is this presupposition, allegedly inherent in 
Boltanski’s understanding of ‘the social’, with which Fuller takes issue in the 
first section of his chapter. In the second section, he proposes to interpret  
and conceptualize the ‘world of worth’ in terms of what he characterizes as ‘the 
transhuman condition’.1293 Let us consider the key elements underpinning Fuller’s 
critical assessment of Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘pragmatic sociology’. 
What lies at the heart of Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘common ontology of 
value’1294 is their concept of  ‘investment formula’,1295 which permits them   
to examine, and explain, how each particular ‘world’ or ‘regime of action’
  
 
establishes outcome-oriented criteria for ‘the business of justice’.1296 Influenced by John 
Rawls’s ‘difference principle’,1297 they grapple with the idea that structural 
inequalities can be justified only to the extent that ‘they serve to benefit 
disadvantaged members of the polity’.1298 This does not mean, however, that 
such a – normatively regulated – trickle-down mechanism converts some,  
let alone all, deprived members of society into privileged ones. Since every 
‘world’ has its own currency, different forms of resources – which may be 
material or symbolic – can be redistributed in each of them. Far from seeking 
to provide an ‘abstract normative yardstick’1299 for the measurement  of 
value, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’ aims to shed light on what Fuller 
describes as ‘the boundary conditions of concrete sociality’1300 and, hence, on the 
practically established parameters underpinning the construction of context- 
laden realities. 
According to Fuller, to the degree that the ‘principle of common humanity’1301 
is tantamount to a normative cornerstone of ‘gravitational attraction’,1302 the 
Boltanskian ensemble of social polities is comparable to a Newtonian 
universe of laws and ‘inertial tendencies’.1303 People’s everyday engagement 
with questions concerning justice demonstrates that, despite the presence of 
‘earthly imperfection’,1304 the critical capacity with which ordinary actors are 
equipped enables them to choose, or at least to attempt to construct, ‘the best 
of all possible worlds’1305 available within a specific set of circumstances. In line 
with Thomas Hobbes, we may assume that, although individuals are fallible 
and driven by desires, they are ‘mutually adaptive’1306 and, hence, capable of 
committing to respecting the rules of a ‘social contract’,1307 which allows for 
the consolidation of relatively predictable and stable forms of coexistential 
orders, perhaps even a ‘world order’,1308 based on a set of shared assumptions 
about the nature of justice. As Fuller eloquently spells out, 
 
[h]ere, ‘justice’ refers to a state of equilibrium between a population and its environment, 
which amounts to a balance of power among individuals whose behaviour is 
minimally prescribed, independently of their interactions.1309 
 
Fuller posits that it is necessary to advocate a ‘bottom-up approach to value 
creation and maintenance’,1310 in order to contribute to ‘de-reifying Boltanski’s 
six worlds of worth’.1311 Perhaps, the most contentious claim that Fuller 
makes in this regard is the assertion that ‘differences in kind may be rendered 
as differences of degree’,1312 indicating that ‘one world can be exchanged for 
another through a common ontological currency’.1313 There is a healthy degree of 
commensurability, translatability, and interconvertibility due to the existence 
of a shared underlying ontology built into distinctive – grammatically 
structured – spheres of social reality. 
  
II. 
Fuller goes on to propose an idiosyncratic interpretation of Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s account of ‘worlds of worth’, which distinguishes three levels of 
analysis in terms of the ‘physical origin of value’.1314 
 
• The first level designates the realm of the ‘individual self’ – that is, the micro- 
sphere of human existence, sometimes characterized as ‘people’s subjective or 
inner world’. 
• The second level refers to the realm of the ‘local environment’ – that is, the 
meso-sphere of human existence, sometimes described as ‘people’s normative 
world or lifeworld’. 
• The third level refers to the realm of the ‘entire world’ – that is, the macro- 
sphere of human existence, sometimes defined as ‘people’s societal world’. 
 
The ‘inspired’ and ‘industrial’ worlds are particularly important to the first level; 
the ‘domestic’ and ‘market’ worlds are located at the second level; and, finally, the 
‘civic’ and ‘fame-oriented’ worlds permeate the complexity of the third level.1315 
This multilevel model is useful in that it draws attention to the environment- 
specific constitution underlying different scopes of value. As Fuller explains, 
‘Boltanski’s worlds of worth escape the neat opposition of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to social order’,1316 in the sense that – unlike systems 
theorists à la Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, or Humberto Maturana – he 
is ‘not interested merely in functional differentiation within a larger social 
system or in the self-differentiation of some proto-social state’.1317 Rather, he 
insists on the importance of recognizing and ‘respecting the dignity of the 
individual human being’,1318 including ‘the body’s territorial integrity and 
self-ownership’.1319 Hence, he subscribes to an anthropocentric conception of 
reality, in line with the type of humanist thought defended by Enlightenment 
scholars – a position to which Fuller refers as ‘Humanity 1.0’1320 and which is, 
arguably, enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
III. 
In light of  the above,  it comes as no surprise that Boltanski is unlikely  to 
endorse what Fuller describes as the ‘proactionary principle’1321. This 
normative opposition is reflected in Boltanski and Thévenot’s ‘strident 
comments against eugenics, which they denounce as a “degenerate 
industrial order” […] for its portrayal of human reproduction as akin to the 
manufacture of goods’.1322 Their main objection to eugenics, however, is 
its reduction of an individual’s life to an instrumental component of
  
 
a genetically constituted societal whole,  in  which  every  single aspect  of 
existence appears to be dictated  by  the  evolutionary  principle  of ‘the 
survival of the fittest’, regardless of  the presuppositional grounds  on 
which such a seemingly determinist conception of being is justified. To be 
sure, these ‘grounds’ can be of social, political, cultural, ethnic, ‘racial’, 
or physiological nature – to mention only a few possibilities. In any case, 
from Boltanski and Thévenot’s perspective, eugenics is culpable of 
‘endogenizing sacrifice to the polity; which is to say, each person’s life is 
not valuable in its own right but only as a means to a political end’.1323 Arguably, 
humanistically inclined thinkers – such as Boltanski and Thévenot, but 
also Rawls and Habermas – presuppose the existence of a Homo sapiens in 
terms of a ‘Lockean individual’1324 – that is, of an entity ‘whose life ends 
with the death of the body of one’s birth’.1325 
In contrast to this anthropocentric account of the world, Fuller advocates 
what he describes as ‘an extended “proactionary” conception of the human condition’,1326 
in which a ‘post-Lockean individual would find a natural home’.1327 In this 
context, as he explains, the term ‘proactionary’ 
 
refers to the foundational normative principle of transhumanism, an emerging 
ideology that defines humanity’s uniqueness in terms of our capacities for self- 
transcendence, typically through various biomedical enhancements (for instance, 
brain-boosting drugs, gene therapy, etc.), though increasingly the prospect of our 
minds migrating from a carbon to a silicon platform is countenanced.1328 
 
Such a ‘proactionary’ or ‘transhumanist’ understanding of existence conceives of 
the human entity as an actor who 
 
has acquired sufficient morphological freedom to regard his or her identity as a portfolio 
of investments in diverse asset groups, which may include avatars in cyberspace, 




The challenge to be confronted, then, consists in exploring ‘the scope for self- 
transcendence’1330 within the ‘transhumanist world of worth’,1331 particularly in 
relation to the role that critique plays in both the material and the symbolic – 
that is, both the substantive and the formal1332 – construction of social existence. 
As Fuller observes, the concept of ‘humanity’ designates ‘the quality of being 
human’,1333 irrespective of which of the different elements underpinning this 
quality may be considered to be of fundamental importance. Far from
  
 
constituting a merely secular point of view, however, humanistic conceptions 
of worldly existence cannot be dissociated from religious thought: 
 
That all members of Homo sapiens are eligible to be treated as humans is essentially 
an Abrahamic theological aspiration that, over the past five centuries, has been 
sharpened by science.1334 
 
The ‘world-historic significance’1335 of the notion that, as a teleologically 
motivated individual, one may have ‘a desire to overcome the body of one’s birth’1336 – 
epitomized in the Christian ‘idea of a humanity created “in the image and 
likeness” of God’1337 – can hardly be overestimated. Such a goal-oriented and 
purpose-driven attitude is not incompatible with the ‘proactionary’ perspective 
endorsed by Fuller: 
 
To be proactionary is, in the first instance, to identify with this progressive historical 
narrative, which, in the secular West, has been known mainly as ‘Enlightenment’ but 
in our own day is expressed as the drive to ‘human enhancement’.1338 
 
The idea of  ‘enhancement’, understood in the above terms, is embedded in  
a ‘vision of human upgrading’.1339 Undeniably, extreme versions of eugenics, as 
experienced in the twentieth century, ‘involved sterilization, forced migration, 
warfare, and even genocide’.1340 As Foucauldian researchers are eager to 
point out, eugenicist policies have become more sophisticated, subtle, and 
widespread in the second half  of  the twentieth century – a development  
that Fuller provocatively describes as ‘a courtesy of the welfare state’.1341 By 
and large, ‘proactionaries welcome this domestication of control over the most 
fundamental features of human existence’.1342 What they are even more in 
favour of, however, is ‘the democratization of access to eugenic information and 
technologies’,1343 which – as they see it – ‘marks a major advance over the 
more authoritarian versions of eugenics that were on offer for most of the 
twentieth century’.1344 In short, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, eugenics has been gradually domesticated and democratized. An 
example of this development is reflected in the proposal of ‘hedgenetics’1345 – that 
is, a genetics defined and ‘treated as a source of hedge fund investment’,1346 
enabling human actors to bestow those who have ‘inherited certain common 
genes’1347 with intellectual property rights and, thus, effectively leading to a 
redefinition of self-ownership, which Fuller characterizes as ‘Humanity 2.0’.1348 
In a more general sense, such a post-humanist development entails ‘a 
radicalization of attitude towards the “human”’.1349 Traditional humanist ideals 
about the construction of the ‘just society’ à la Rawls are ‘self-evidently 
precautionary’.1350 Contemporary post-humanist pleas for the construction of
  
 
a ‘risk-taking society’,1351 by contrast, encourage the ‘entrepreneurship of the 
self’1352 with the aim of generating ever-more experiment-friendly – and, 
hence, potentially innovative and progressive – coexistential  settings. Yet, 
as Fuller states,  members  of  highly  differentiated  societies  ‘are no 
longer compelled by a  sense of  common ancestry and  are  inclined  to 
veer into increasingly divergent futures’.1353 This post-humanist 
recognition of social – that is, political, cultural, economic, and 
demographic – complexity poses a serious ‘proactionary challenge to 
classical liberalism’,1354 especially with regard to the question of how it 
remains possible to promote – arguably cosmopolitan – attitudes based on 
tolerance, mutual respect, and the willingness to engage in perspective- 
taking exercises on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, such a proactionary vision encourages  us  to  face  up to 
the ambivalence of the human condition by accepting the validity of two 
fundamental premises: on the one hand, ‘the naturalist premise that we are 
products of evolutionary forces’1355 and, hence, governed by underlying socio- 
biological mechanisms, whose determining power lies partly within and partly 
outside our control; on the other hand, ‘the super-naturalist premise that we 
are destined for a life that radically breaks with that of our ancestors’1356 and, 
thus, capable of constantly reshaping the parameters underpinning the spatio- 
temporal conditions of our existence. 
 
V. 
To the degree that Homo sapiens has transformed itself into a ‘Techno sapiens’,1357 
it appears that ‘biological evolution is the prehistory of technological 
evolution’.1358 To put it in Marxist terms, the development of productive 
forces has permitted the human species to raise itself above nature by 
converting technology into the motor of its own destiny, thereby challenging 
the ontological limitations imposed upon the condition of its existence by the 
lawful functioning of its own biology. Irrespective of the question of whether 
or not human bodies can be reduced to ‘vehicles for the propagation of 
genes’1359 and, consequently, human beings to ‘evolutionary dupes’,1360 
 
proactionaries do not have a principled objection to seeing one’s body as a means 
for realizing a larger end, especially if it enables what one regards as an improved 
expression of our humanity.1361 
 
On this account, the exchange of ‘biocapital’1362 – in addition, rather than in 
opposition, to other forms of capital – turns out to be a fundamental element 
of proactionary societies. 
  
 
Given their constructivist outlook, it is no accident that the conceptual,  
let alone empirical, analysis of ‘biocapital’ has no space in Bourdieusian 
approaches, which tend to focus on other – notably, social, cultural, linguistic, 
educational, political, and symbolic – forms of capital. Constructivist 
sociologists will have little, if any, sympathy with Fuller’s assertions about the 
alleged emergence of a ‘proactionary world’. Whatever one makes of his 
framework, however, the burden on proactionaries will be not only ‘to design 
welfare states that tolerate […] a diversity of human conditions’,1363 but also 
to demonstrate that they do not, in practice, end up endorsing – in the best- 
case scenario – mechanisms of exclusion reflected in different forms of ‘ableism’ 
or – in the worst-case scenario – an open or concealed system of ‘Apartheid 
2.0’.1364 If Fuller’s plea for ‘a fundamental reorientation in our epistemic 
horizons’1365 in the name of the ‘enhancement of the human species’1366 turns 
out to be an unintended re-legitimization of processes of domination and 
discrimination, then its most sympathetic critics will have to search for ways of 
reconceptualizing the conditions of our existence by resorting to alternative – 




The thematic focus of Lisa Adkins’s contribution to this volume is succinctly 
summarized in the title of her chapter: ‘Luc Boltanski and the Problem of 
Time: Notes towards a Pragmatic Sociology of the Future’.1367 In her fine- 
grained analysis, she reflects on key ‘issues of temporality’1368 in terms of their 
relevance to Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology. 
 
I. 
In the first section of her chapter, Adkins draws attention to the theoretical 
challenges arising from what she describes as ‘the renewal of the social sciences’.1369 
As she explains, one  of  the  key  issues  that  have  been  reconceptualized 
in recent decades – not only by Boltanski in his pragmatic ‘sociology of 
critical capacity’,1370 but also by other scholars within diverging explanatory 
frameworks – is ‘the relationship between agents and the world’.1371 According 
to Bourdieu’s ‘dispositionalist sociology’,1372 socially acquired dispositions can be 
conceived of as ‘durably inscribed in agents’,1373 whose behaviour is largely 
shaped, if not governed, by ‘structuring structures (or a field of positions)’.1374 
According to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology’, by contrast, the explorative 
emphasis should be placed on how human actors ‘make use of objects to 
establish orders and, conversely, how they consolidate objects by attaching
  
 
them to orders constructed’.1375 Both approaches highlight the relational 
nature of social existence. Yet, whereas the former seeks to identify structural 
homologies established between habitus-specific dispositions and field-specific 
positions, the latter aims to examine situation-laden normativities emerging 
from the interplay between ‘critical capacity’ and ‘orders of worth’. 
What is particularly important to Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic programme’,1376 
then, is the negotiation and consolidation, but also the subversion and 
transformation, of ‘standards, regulations, assurances, conventions, principles, 
and guarantees’.1377 For Adkins, however, one of the most significant 
paradigmatic developments in contemporary intellectual thought is the 
elaboration of a ‘post-representational social science’,1378 which is characterized by 
the ambition ‘to go beyond constructionism and constructivism by exploring 
non-hermeneutic activities, including those of sensation and affect’.1379 Far from 
representing a uniquely Boltanskian undertaking, the project of proposing a 
‘non-dispositionalist social science’1380 is a collective endeavour in which multiple 
researchers in different disciplines have been involved in recent decades.1381 
In Adkins’s eyes, especially promising in this regard are socio-philosophical 
approaches committed to taking seriously the concept of ‘time’ in general and 
the concept of ‘future’ in particular.1382 
Irrespective of whether one advocates a ‘post-Bourdieusian’1383 sociology, 
based on a radical ‘critique of dispositionalism and of the critical sociology 
of  domination’,1384 or a ‘turn to the surface’,1385 inspired by  a ‘descriptive   
or (post-) empirical turn’,1386 in light of the profound social and political 
transformations that have reshaped the entire globe over the past few decades, 
it appears imperative ‘to rethink the axes of sociological enquiry in and for the 
contemporary age’.1387 For Adkins, a decisive shift from ‘a form of sociology 
which focuses on an already-inscribed-world (and cartographic descriptions of 
that world) to a sociology of a world-in-the-making’1388 reflects a paradigmatic 
transition process aimed at converting the description and interpretation of 
the temporal dimensions permeating society into an integral – if not, the most 
significant – concern in present-day critical social enquiry. Such an ‘emphasis 
on an in-process-world of as-yet-unrealized potentialities’1389 encourages social 
and political researchers to treat the power of transformative transcendence 
as both a motivational cornerstone of sociology and a constitutive component 
of human society, thereby challenging material and symbolic mechanisms that 
remain trapped in the logic of reproductive immanence.1390 
 
II. 
In the second section of her chapter, Adkins goes on to expose some of the 
key challenges resulting from ‘the rise of a pragmatic world’,1391 which requires a
  
 
sociological sensitivity for the study of what Adkins calls ‘post-representational 
action’.1392 One of the most obvious examples of this kind of social performance, 
escaping conventional standards of modern action theory, is – according to 
Adkins – ‘the practice of value creation, or more precisely, valuation’.1393 Yet, rather 
than reducing ‘value’ to ‘a social or cultural construction’,1394 to a relationally 
constituted condition, or to a property inherent in particular objects, here it  
is conceived of as ‘an activity or a practical action’.1395 Put differently, value 
constitutes an activity that ‘considers a reality while provoking it’.1396 
On this account, the emergence of ‘value’ is not simply a factual, let alone 
a static, affair. Rather, it designates both a regulative and an active – that is, both 
a codified and a performative – process, which those participating in, as well as 
those observing, its construction may seek to measure in objective, normative, 
or subjective terms. Far from having access to universally valid parameters 
permitting the context-transcending measurement of value, however, it is 
crucial to face up to ‘the historical specificity of these activities’1397 – that is, to 
the spatio-temporal contingency permeating all processual constructions of 
reality. 
According to Adkins, ‘reality […] is increasingly pragmatic in character; that is, 
it is invoked and constituted via a range of post-representational actions’.1398 From 
this perspective, if we aim to examine financial realities, we can understand ‘the 
various techniques and devices associated with economic science – including 
hypotheses, formulas, and algorithms’1399 – only to the extent that we scrutinize 
them, above all, not in terms what they represent, but, rather, in terms of 
‘what they do in the making of economic reality’.1400 Hence, for Adkins, ‘the 
contemporary world […] is increasingly one of (post-representational) actions; 
that is, it is increasingly pragmatic’.1401 It is for this reason that, as she spells 
out, ‘the programme of pragmatic sociology is much more than a simple 
corrective to a faulty or deficient social science’.1402 Indeed, the fact that it not 
only recognizes the practico-processual constitution of social reality but also 
considers it as its constitutive feature illustrates that it is ‘thoroughly entangled 
in changes to and in the world’,1403 rather than being detached from, let alone 
indifferent towards, them. 
 
III. 
In the third section of her chapter, Adkins offers a number of insightful 
reflections on what she characterizes as ‘the time of situations’.1404 If it is true 
that ‘the world is increasingly pragmatic’1405 and that, correspondingly, ‘post- 
representational actions’1406 are more and more important in shaping social 
reality, then sociologists, faced with this unprecedented scenario, need to grapple 
with ‘issues of time and temporality’,1407 even – and, perhaps, especially – if
  
 
this involves ‘the shattering of temporal continuity’.1408 Similar to Bourdieu, 
Boltanski intends to transcend the programmatic opposition between structuralist 
approaches, focusing on macro-sociological matters, and interactionist approaches, 
concerned with micro-sociological issues.1409 Whilst seeking to overcome this 
counterproductive paradigmatic antinomy, Boltanski’s sociology dares to 
envisage ‘a possible and different future’.1410 On this view, it is the task of sociologists 
to engage with the normative – and, conceivably, emancipatory – nature of 
social relations ‘not simply to analyse situations, but also, potentially, to present 
something new – “a possible and different future”’.1411 Ernst Bloch’s Das Prinzip 
Hoffnung [The principle of hope] (1959)1412 springs to mind, inviting us to take 
seriously the looking-forwardness that appears to be built into the human 
condition. 
 
Human hereness is always already inhabited by human beyondness: we have a 
desire to envisage the world, to imagine it, to long for it, to look forward to it; in 
short, we have a desire to desire the world.1413 
 
Sociology is never simply about producing descriptive, interpretive, explanatory, 
analytical, or critical forms of knowledge but always also about generating 
normative, creative, imaginative, and innovative – and, hence, future-oriented – cognitive 
maps, permitting  human  actors  to  convert  their  day-to-day  immersion  
in existential immanence into an invaluable source of self-empowering 
transcendence. Indeed, sociology is ‘thoroughly entangled with change and 
the creation of the new’;1414 hence, ‘questions of the new’1415 are an integral 
element of its paradigmatic make-up. 
It is in this context that Adkins insists that ‘[t]he recent history of capitalist 
innovation’1416 is profoundly shaped by the fact that ‘commodities take on 
properties of openness or indeterminacy’.1417 Indicative of the hegemonic 
parameters of late capitalism, the consumer of a commodity is not only 
allowed but also expected to engage with and attribute meaning to it – that is, 
to ‘put it to work in various ways’.1418 When reflecting upon the assumptions 
about temporality underpinning Boltanski’s writings, one presuppositional 
difference appears striking: the grammar-focused analysis developed in On 
Justification1419 ‘operates mostly with a synchronic model of  time’;1420 the action- 
oriented enquiry undertaken in The New Spirit of Capitalism,1421 by contrast, is 
based on ‘a diachronic approach’.1422 Thus, instead of building on ‘relatively 
static models of situated orders of worth’,1423 capturing the essence of the 
‘new spirit’ of capitalism requires a dynamic understanding of its rapidly 
changing, constantly adapting, and highly elastic constitution, allowing for 




In the fourth section of her chapter, Adkins articulates a number of critical 
thoughts on the bleak prospect of having to confront a ‘no future’1425 scenario. 
In the ‘post–financial crisis period’,1426 which is dominated by ‘neo-liberal 
rationalities’1427 and, thus, by ‘market-disciplinary modes of governance’,1428 
more and more people – especially those of the most vulnerable and 
disempowered sectors of society – perceive their lives as both impoverished and 
impoverishing – that is, as a state of affairs characterized by ‘futurelessness’ and 
‘perspectivelessness’. Symptomatic of this development towards ‘late-modern 
disenchantment’ is the emergence of the Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without 
a future) movement in contemporary Spain, where – in light of the recent and 
ongoing economic crisis – the situation could hardly be more precarious:1429 
 
skyrocketing youth unemployment rates (which, as I write, stand at 54.2%); 
ongoing government spending cuts; the privatization of education; labour market 
and labour law reforms; the prospect of a whole lifetime of unemployment 
and/or precarious employment; insecure housing; and, last but not least, no 
guaranteed retirement income.1430 
 
In brief, more and more people, especially those in their youth, are confronted 
with ‘the disappearance of the future as a horizon of possibility and hope’.1431 
The struggle against such a horizonless horizon – that is, resistance against the 
possibility of becoming ‘a lost generation’1432 – has become an everyday reality 
at the grassroots level of many societies – notably, of economically fragile 
European countries, such as the aforementioned PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain)1433 – in the collective refusal to accept that a futureless 
present is all there is left for large parts of the population. Large-scale protests 
against ‘hollowed-out, precarious, and compromised futures’1434 illustrate that 
individual lives, rather than ideological language games, are at stake. 
As Adkins eloquently remarks, the sheer possibility of such a futureless 
reality obliges us to take the potential transformation of temporality in 
contemporary society seriously: 
 
[C]ritiques of capitalism now demand not different kinds of time – for instance, 
the time of the singular, the authentic, or of difference – but a right to time itself. 
And, while contemporary critique demands access to time itself, futures – including 
alternative futures – are not to be found in conditions ‘freed from the constraints 
of situations’, but are not to be found at all. In short, the cries of ‘no future’ in post– 
financial crisis recessionary post-Fordism demand that pragmatic sociology – and the discipline of 
sociology more generally – revisit and revise its views on time, change, and the new.1435 
  
 
It is difficult to think of a more poignant way of synthesizing the fact that, both 
for ordinary actors and for social scientists, it is time to develop conceptual and 
methodological tools capable of accounting for the transformation of time in 




In the fifth section of her chapter, Adkins elucidates the discouraging 
implications of the emergence of an ‘eternal present’.1436 Drawing on informative 
and perceptive statements made by people who have experienced the 
consequences of social insecurity, Adkins urges us to grapple with the question 
of ‘how exactly the present may be dispossessed of time – that is, dispossessed 
of time-in-motion’.1437 Sympathetic to a Bourdieusian understanding of the 
link between temporality and sociality,1438 she argues that ‘for a practical 
disposition towards the forthcoming to be constituted – that is, for a future to 
be sensed and lived – a certain threshold of objective chances is required’.1439 
Put differently, there is no future-orientedness without an actor’s presence- 
bound immersion in the horizon of a field structured by interactions and 
struggles situated in the past. 
In practical terms, the experience of unemployment has serious 
implications for social mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, empowerment 
and disempowerment, purposefulness and meaninglessness, recognition and 
misrecognition: 
 
[T]he unemployed, and especially the chronically unemployed, are deprived of such 
chances or more precisely of an objective universe (deadlines, dates, timetables to be 
observed, buses to take, rates to maintain, targets and indicators to meet, and so 
on) which orientates and stimulates protensive practical action – that is, action which is 
future-orientated. This deprivation […] is evidenced in the chronically unemployed 
typically experiencing time as purposeless and meaningless – as dead time – and in their 
often incoherent visions of the future. The chronically unemployed, therefore, 
have ‘no future’ because they are precisely excluded from those objective conditions – or 
the pull of the field – which would allow the practical making of time.1440 
 
To  the extent that experiences of  futurelessness are reflected in experiences   
of meaninglessness and purposelessness, a person’s immersion in temporality 
is a socio-ontological precondition for their self-realizing capacity. To be 
excluded – provisionally or permanently – from participating in the production 
of the objective conditions, normative situations, and subjective projections 
emerging in a given social field means to be deprived of the right to protensive – that
  
 
is, purposive, cooperative, and creative1441 – action. The disenchanting adventure 
of living in an ‘eternal present’1442 is tantamount to the experience of realizing 
that one’s life cannot be realized in self-realizing terms. 
 
[A] present dispossessed of the future – or an eternal present – is a present in which practical 
action is deprived or is adrift from the pull of fields, a present in which protensive practical 
action cannot be actualized. To put this slightly differently, this kind of elaboration 
adds fuel to the argument that a present dispossessed of a future is one in which habits 
and dispositions are adrift from social fields, or – better said – one in which habits and fields 
lack synchronicity.1443 
 
Actors may be bestowed with a multifaceted set of resources. Yet, unless 
they are granted the opportunity to realize their potential in relation to an 
ensemble of conditions permitting them to do so, their empowering – notably 
purposive, cooperative, and creative – capacities will fail to be the basis of 
their ‘pro-tensive’, rather than ‘contra-tensive’, performances. To be sure,  
the ‘lack of synchronicity between habits and fields’1444 can have profoundly 
disempowering and disconcerting consequences, in the sense that it can deprive 
people of the opportunity to use and develop their subjective dispositions by 
occupying, relating to, and identifying with objective positions. At the same 
time, however, it can have intensely empowering and stimulating effects, in the 
sense that it can trigger, or at least contribute to, people’s reflexivity and 
versatility, when exposed to unexpected circumstances that lie outside their 
comfort zones and horizons of interactional familiarity.1445 
In the face of despair, one may get the impression that, ‘in the contemporary 
present, the future is over’.1446 Although it may appear overly schematic, and 
somewhat reductive, to suggest that the twentieth century was the ‘century 
that trusted in the future’,1447 whereas the twenty-first century is the century 
that falls short of substantial faith in the yet-to-come, it is true that the naïvely 
optimistic belief in ‘limitless growth’1448 and prosperity has been shattered by 
the individual and collective experiences of the bleak historical constellations 
generated by large-scale crisis and austerity. Given current and recent reality 
checks imposed by the systemic imperatives of inherently unstable social and 
economic formations, what has emerged in capitalist countries affected by 
politics of austerity is a climate shaped by a ‘post-futurist mood […] based 
on the consciousness that the future is not going to be bright’.1449 A ‘post- 
futurist sensibility’,1450 then, ‘concerns a shift in time itself’,1451 implying that 
the parameters of temporality have shifted, irrespective of whether they are 
defined in objective, normative, or subjective terms. 
The ‘colonization of the domain of time’1452 by systemic imperatives involves 
not only ‘colonization of the mind and perception’1453 but also, more generally, a 
  
 
colonization of people’s lifeworlds, ‘a colonization that has ensured that the 
future has collapsed’,1454 a colonization that robs people of the capacity to 
exercise control over the spatio-temporal conditions shaping their everyday 
existence.1455 Under the hegemonic influence of ‘digital capitalism’,1456 it 
appears that ‘the whole psychosphere of the human being becomes subject  
to the movement of capital, now operating at digital speeds’.1457 With the 
rising numbers of workers who are ‘precariously employed on temporary, 
short-term, sporadic, and intermittent bases’,1458 both capital and labour are 
expected to be constantly ‘on the move’. In other words, ‘flexible workers’ 
need to be prepared to relocate, journeying from place to place in the constant 
competition over jobs and, in some cases, even in the struggle for survival. The 
personal consequences of the post-Fordist work model are reflected not only in 
the fragmentation of life experiences but also in the undermining of collective 
bases for solidarity and, in many cases, in the ‘corrosion of character’.1459 
 
Shifts in the relationships between the person, labour time, work, production, 
and capital accumulation have opened out an infinitely expanding present, a 
present in which the future cannot be known or sensed and is beyond the grasp of human 
intervention.1460 […] [T]he eternal present of postfuturism [is] a present in which 
the future – or more precisely the time after the present – can no longer deliver on hopes, 
dreams, or promises.1461 
 
In short, the postfuturist condition describes a spatio-temporally specific 
situation characterized by the lack of belief in a worthwhile yet-to-come. 
 
VI.  
In the sixth section of her chapter,  Adkins provides some cursory remarks  
on the idea of ‘pragmatic futures’.1462 As she emphasizes, it would be mistaken 
to assume that ‘the exhaustion of the future’1463 is simply caused by ‘an 
intensification or acceleration of time’.1464 One of the most interesting aspects 
of contemporary forms of capitalism is that, under its hegemonic influence 
on the circulation of marketized objects, ‘the commodity is far from closed 
off ’.1465 In fact, as Adkins points out, ‘rather than comprising a substance 
made up of spent units of labour time, the commodity is dynamic and in process, 
with the labour of users comprising a key source of innovation’1466 and of ceaseless 
transformation. Owing to its ‘open-ended and continuously shifting character 
[…], the commodity moves in an unpredictable and unknowable manner’.1467 
Hence, it is not enough to acknowledge that the commodity is situated within time; 
under the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism, time is situated within the commodity. For 
‘time – innovation, the new, and change – unfolds with the commodity. Time 
and the commodity […] therefore unfold together.’1468 
  
 
To the extent that, in contemporary capitalism, the commodification and 
the temporalization of social relations are intimately interconnected, the logic 
of the market and the logic of time are deeply entangled in a world driven  
by constant transformation, acceleration, and cross-border interaction. A 
pragmatic account of time in general and of the future in particular, therefore, 
needs to explore both the conceptual and the empirical implications of the fact 
that ‘the emergence of a social which is processual, non-linear, experimental, 
and open-ended in character’1469 poses serious challenges to classical 
sociological conceptions of development. Recognition of the methodological 
imperative to study ‘events as they happen’1470 not only involves abandoning the 
uncovering mission concerned with the unearthing of ‘causality or depth’1471 
but also ‘requires that the sociologist – as the pragmatic school may very well 
agree – engage not in the search for explanatory systems but in a search for 
better description’.1472 Thus, the plea for a ‘descriptive turn’ is motivated by the 
ambition to do justice to the eventful nature of social life, by highlighting 
that occurrences, since they form the basis of all histories, are empirical 
manifestations of all past-, present-, and future-oriented performances. 
Arguably, such an open-ended conception of the historical construction of 
reality is capable of accounting for the pivotal sociological role played by both the 
experiential and the experimental resources of humanity.  Under the influence 
of the ‘new spirit’ of capitalism, ‘the commodity […] is continuously worked 
upon and updated in an iterative process of experimentation’,1473 improvisation, 
and actualization. Just as ‘time is actualized in events  and  situations’,1474 
events and situations are actualized in time. Adkins proposes to use the term 
‘temporalization’1475 to indicate that, in her view, we need to face up to the 
‘collapse in the distance between time and events’,1476 in order to understand 
that temporality and performativity represent two inseparable components 
permeating all forms of human sociality. Adkins’s chapter is a powerful reminder 
of the fact that it is imperative to problematize the tangible consequences of ‘a 
shift in time in which futures, the new, and change actualize and unfold with 
events’.1477 The challenge for pragmatic sociologists of time, then, is to shed light 
on the constitutive role of happenings in shaping the development of society by 
virtue of its members’ performative construction of temporality. 
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